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ABSTRACT 
One of the aims of the Local Content Policy (LCP) is the economic development of 
Nigeria through the utilisation of local personnel and resources in the activities of 
the Nigerian oil and gas industry. Many studies have investigated the LCP, but 
limited work has been undertaken in investigating the transparency practices 
involved in the implementation of the LCP in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. The 
study critically evaluates the effectiveness of the LCP and the transparency practices 
associated with its implementation. A conceptual framework based on accountability 
was developed and employed in designing the research instrument. This framework 
was underpinned by the institutional theory, which links accountability discourse to 
regulatory institutions where organisations within a particular field are subject to 
pressures to exhibit legitimacy through socially and culturally authorised 
administrative routines that are intended to render accountability.  The study 
employed a qualitative methodology and the data was collected through in-depth 
semi-structured interviews with respondents from twenty-three indigenous oil and 
gas companies, regulatory bodies, international oil and gas companies and non-
governmental organizations. The research findings demonstrate that the various 
LCP stakeholders’ views on the definition and purpose of the LCP differ significantly. 
These diverse opinions affect the way in which the LCP is perceived and 
implemented in the oil and gas industry. The study has been instrumental in 
revealing a number of positive effects the LCP has generated since its 
implementation in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. For example, the LCP 
compelled IOCs to utilise local resources in their operations, resulting in the 
domestication of oil and gas activities. However, the findings also reveal that the 
LCP has been enforced despite the lack of local capacity and capability for its 
implementation. The findings, therefore, highlight a number of challenges 
associated with LCP implementation including: the lack of infrastructure; 
insufficient capital and manpower; absence of trust; and the lack of coordination 
between the regulatory agencies in the industry. The research findings also reveal 
that there are different levels of transparency in the implementation of LCP. 
Determination of the level of transparency in LCP implementation and compliance 
monitoring is at the discretion of the NCDMB and the oil and gas companies, which 
unfortunately facilitates corrupt practices. Therefore, this study argues that 
significant improvements are required in transparency practices in LCP 
implementation by strengthening the LCP’s monitoring and enforcement process. 
Further, enforcement should strictly be the responsibility of the NCDMB, with no 
interference from the Nigerian government.  Some further recommendations 
arising from this research include the need for investment in infrastructure that will 
facilitate indigenous companies’ participation in the industry. Also, efforts should 
be made to promote partnership and collaboration between indigenous companies 
and IOCs, encouraging investment in world-class infrastructure that can compete 
with international standards. To foster this partnership, the government and IOCs 
must invest in educational institutions which could boost the knowledge and 
capacity of Nigerians. The research concludes with the development of two new 
models: (1) The LCP stakeholder perception model; and, (2) The LCP 
implementation model. These models, which are the main contributions of 
knowledge arising from this thesis, will potentially aid the effective implementation 
of the recommendations arising from this study.  
Keywords: Transparency, Local Content, Capacity Building, Active Participation, 
Nigerian Content Development Monitoring Board (NCDMB), Accountability, 
Monitoring  
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Chapter One 
Research Background and Overview 
1.1 Introduction 
Nigeria is the most densely populated nation in Africa, with a population of over 
186 million (Worldometer 2016). Located in West Africa, it is endowed with vast 
human and natural resources, the most notable of which is oil and gas (Ihua et 
al. 2011). Prior to 2012, Nigeria was ranked as the largest oil producing country 
in Africa and the seventh in the world (Adewuyi and Oyejide 2012). Oil and gas 
resources play a crucial role in sustaining the nation and fuelling Nigeria’s 
economic and development activities (Odularu 2008). Furthermore, oil and gas 
resources account for over 95% of Nigeria’s export earnings, 76% of 
government revenue and one-third of the nation’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) (Omenikolo and Amadi 2010; Ihua et al. 2011; Adewuyi and Oyejide 
2012).  
Nevertheless, despite significant oil and gas resources, the Nigerian economy 
is plagued with issues such as corruption, civil conflict, the gap between rich 
and poor, underdevelopment of local economy and infrastructure and local 
unemployment (Adewuyi and Oyejide 2012). These issues appear to have 
contributed to increasing frustration and crime among Nigerians, resulting in 
Nigeria being labelled dangerous and unsafe on the global stage (Odularu 
2008). Therefore, transparent decision making, associated with effective 
management of activities in the oil and gas industry, and the efficient use of 
the revenue generated play a vital role in shaping the Nigerian economy and 
the lives of Nigerian people (Odularu 2008). 
The organisational structure of the Nigerian oil and gas industry is presented in 
Figure 1.1. It not only illustrates the hierarchical nature of the system but also 
demonstrates the range of stakeholders involved in the decision-making 
process in the oil and gas industry, which ultimately influences the Nigerian 
economy. At the top is the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria who 
exercises his powers through the Minister of Petroleum. The authority of the 
Minister is then further passed on and exercised through the industry regulator, 
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namely the Department of Petroleum Resources. Other regulators include: the 
Nigerian Content Development Management Board (NCDMB); the National Oil 
Spill Detection Response Agency (NOSDRA); and the Petroleum Technology 
Development Fund (PTDF) (Subai 2014). At the upstream level, the Nigerian oil 
and gas industry consists of international oil and gas companies (IOCs) 
including ExxonMobil, Chevron and Shell, and indigenous oil and gas 
companies, for example, Oando, JC International, Degonceck and Comas. The 
Nigerian National Petroleum Cooperation (NNPC) acts as both the country’s 
national oil company and the regulatory body. These organisations have put a 
broad range of infrastructures in place all around Nigeria, including refineries, 
pipelines, and manufacturing facilities, in addition to implementing various 
regulatory and policy mechanisms to develop the oil and gas industry and 
improve the Nigerian economy.  
Figure 1.1 Structure of Nigerian oil and gas Industry (Author generated) 
However, the government’s approach has not been effective in ensuring the 
technological and economic development of the country (Omenikolo and Amadi 
2010; Olulu and Ajie 2010). To reverse this trend, the government undertook 
several reforms, one of which was the proposal of the Nigerian Local Content 
Policy (LCP) initiative. The policy was signed into law by the President to 
facilitate the effective participation of Nigerians in the oil and gas industry 
(Okafor and Aniche 2010; Ovadia 2013).  
Minister of 
Petroleum
Regulators
DPR NCDMB PTDF
NNPC
NAPIMS NPDC
Other 
subsidiaries
Operators
International 
oil and gas 
companies
Indigenous 
companies
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The purpose of the LCP is dual in nature; it is both a tool for promoting large-
scale economic development and a mechanism through which Nigerian citizens 
can capture oil revenue through policies that particularly favour indigenous 
companies (Appiah-Adu 2013; Ovadia 2012). Although the LCP can stimulate 
broad-based economic development necessary for the benefit of citizens of oil 
producing countries, its application still produces mixed results (Tordo et al. 
2013). For example, the specialised input and advanced technologies in the oil 
and gas industry used by the IOCs, often limit the possibility of the local 
economy from benefitting from the oil and gas industry’s activities (Balogun 
2008; Tordo et al. 2013). 
The Nigerian LCP is a useful point of entry into the debate concerning the many 
issues facing Nigeria, which range from closing the gap between the rich and 
the poor, to changing the methods of local accrual of wealth and managing the 
ever-growing conflict in the Niger Delta. Nigerian stakeholders disagree over 
how these issues are addressed by. (Ovadia 2011). To clarify these issues and 
contribute to the debate, this research focuses on evaluating the effectiveness 
of the LCP in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. The reminder of this chapter 
presents the rationale for the research, identifies the research aim and 
objectives, introduces accountability as the theoretical framework adopted in 
for the study and provides a summary of the research methodology. 
1.2 Research background 
Oil and gas reserves are being discovered globally, and policy makers in oil 
producing countries are eager to obtain as much economic benefits from the 
exploitation of these reserves as possible, by designing appropriate policies to 
accomplish their anticipated goals (Tordo et al. 2013) like the LCP. LCP is 
defined as, “the extent to which the output of the oil and gas industry generates 
benefits for the country’s economy beyond the direct contribution of its value 
added, and the inter-linkage to other sectors” (Tordo et al. 2013 pg. 1).   
In order to implement this policy, in 2010, the Nigerian government established 
the Nigeria Content Development Monitoring Board (NCDMB) (Ovadia 2013). 
Upon creation, the NCDMB began reviewing the Nigerian LCP and setting out 
new policies and guidelines.  At the same time, it also embarked on an 
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ambitious programme to improve Nigerian content through the capacity 
building initiative. All this was undertaken while the NCDMB was still 
establishing itself as an independent agency and organising its physical space, 
staffing, budgets, needs and internal processes. According to Ovadia (2013), 
this may be the reason why three years after the formation of the NCDMB, 
there were still several aspects of its targets that had barely been addressed, 
including the development of a defined approach to evaluate the extent to which 
the Nigerian LCP has been implemented in the Nigerian oil and gas industry 
(Okafor and Aniche 2014).  
Furthermore, the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Development Act (NOGICD) 
was established in 2010 with the main goal of creating a schedule that could be 
used to calculate the percentage of the Nigerian content in any given activity, 
in comparison to the targets set by the NCDMB (Ovadia 2013; Tordo et al. 
2013). This was achieved by setting specific objectives in all areas of the oil 
and gas industry. However, this form of measurement had yet to be developed 
by the NCDMB and required more consultation and oversight from the various 
stakeholders in the Nigerian oil and gas industry (Ovadia 2013). Furthermore, 
the NCDMB has been reluctant to evaluate the Nigerian content in the bidding 
for oil licences, which is an important priority, as it ensures the use of Nigerian 
content and that preference is given to indigenous companies when awarding 
oil licences to operators in the industry (Ihua et al. 2011). 
This might be as a result of the inability of the NCDMB to build sufficient 
capacity in bridging the demand gap and due to the shortfalls between 
indigenous capacity and available opportunities created by the Nigerian LCP. 
This capacity gap has made it difficult for IOCs to comply with the Nigerian LCP 
(Okafor and Aniche 2014). Hence, IOCs have entered into corrupt joint ventures 
with indigenous companies to subvert and violate the policy in return for part 
of the proceeds (Nwaokoro 2011; Okafor and Aniche 2014; Nwapi 2015). 
Although, the NCDMB are aware of these sharp practices, they are unable to 
enforce compliance because of its institutional weakness, lack of qualified 
workforce and poor regulatory framework (Ovadia 2011; Okafor and Aniche 
2014). Therefore, oil and gas companies have been able to evade LCP rules and 
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are not held accountable for their actions.  This aligns with the findings of 
Tandice-B Solutions (2011), which states that one of the challenges of the 
Nigerian LCP is the absence of a standard framework for monitoring the 
effectiveness of the Nigerian LCP together with poor accountability practices in 
LCP implementation. 
The NOGICD Act requires 100% compliance with all the objectives in order to 
operate in Nigeria, even though many targets for Nigerian participation are well 
beyond the current capacity of Nigerian companies (Tandice-B Solutions 2011; 
Ovadia 2013). Furthermore, the Act does not stipulate how these targets can 
be measured, where there are no existing concrete guidelines for measuring 
Nigerian content, the NCDMB has reverted to simple or surface measures for 
monitoring and evaluation. This is problematic as they rely on opaque and 
informal rules, as well as the individual discretion of its principal employees 
(Ovadia 2013). This approach offers a short-term results and ignores the long-
term objectives of the policy (Tandice-B Solutions 2011). Furthermore, it 
hinders transparency in the industry, where no-one is held accountable for their 
actions. In addition, the NOGICD Act allows the NCDMB to accept gifts of land 
and money, creating avenues for corrupt practices (Nwaokoro 2011). The Act 
also defines operators to include the NCDMB, its affiliates, joint venture 
partners and other entities operating in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. This 
begs the question of how the NCDMB will enforce the LCP against the NNPC in 
practice (Nwaokoro 2011). 
The foregoing collectively creates a number of challenges in the implementation 
of the Nigerian LCP, especially with regards to transparency and accountability 
practices, for instance, in the award of oil blocks and in the management of the 
Nigerian Content Development Fund (NCDF) (Tandice-B Solutions 2011). In 
addition, there are no records of financial statements relating to the NCDF or 
any available information regarding revenue and expenditure under the 
NCDMB’s custody. This contravenes section 90 of the NOGICD Act and the 
Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) objectives “to 
monitor and ensure accountability in revenue receipts of the Federal 
Government from extractive industry companies” (NEITI 2007. Pg.1, Ado 
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2016). Thus, it can be said that some of the barriers to LCP implementation in 
the Nigerian oil and gas industry are mismanagement of funds, corruption and 
lack of accountability (Nwosu 2006, Ado 2016). Given these challenges, this 
research seeks to critically evaluate the effectiveness of the LCP and the 
transparency practices associated with its implementation. 
1.3 Research aims and objectives 
This research centres on the growing pressure on Nigerians to take a proactive 
role in the nation’s most lucrative industry. It also focuses on understanding 
what the LC practice means to the Nigerian oil and gas industry. Accordingly, 
the focus of this research is to identify strategies that could be employed to 
improve the implementation of the Nigerian LCP in the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry. 
1.3.1 Research objectives 
To achieve the above aim, the objectives of the study are to: 
1. Critically evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the Nigerian 
LCP and its impact on the Nigerian oil and gas industry; 
2. Critically examine the level of transparency in the implementation 
of the LCP in the Nigerian oil and gas industry; 
3. Critically evaluate how transparency procedures have been 
integrated in LCP implementation in the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry; and, 
4. Identify and articulate a contextual LCP implementation strategy 
for the Nigerian oil and gas industry. 
1.4 Accountability as a theoretical framework 
The dialogue of accountability is critical since it highlights the potential sources 
of tension between the local understanding of accountability and the growing 
need for global legitimisation, for instance, by emphasising notions of efficiency 
and effectiveness (Ezzamel et al. 2007). Ovadia (2013), Tordo et al. (2013), 
and Tandice-B Solutions (2011), agree that there is an absence of an effective 
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operating framework for monitoring and assessing the LCP in the oil and gas 
industry. In addition, a theoretical structure is necessary as a means of ensuring 
a connection to existing theory and for enhancing the critical analysis of the 
phenomenon under study. This can then lead to an in-depth understanding of 
the phenomenon under consideration. This study chose an accountability 
framework, underpinned by institutional theory after the review of other 
theories such as legitimacy, growth and stakeholder theories, to critically 
evaluate the effectiveness of the LCP and the transparency practices associated 
with its implementation. 
1.5 Research methodology and methods 
The aim of the research is to critically evaluate the effectiveness of the LCP and 
the transparency practices associated with its implementation. Therefore, a 
qualitative approach was employed, whereby data was collected from key 
stakeholders in the Nigerian oil and gas industry via semi-structured interviews. 
These key stakeholders included regulatory bodies; international and 
indigenous oil and gas companies; the national oil company; and non-
governmental organisations.  
In addition, the study utilised purposive sampling in selecting participants that 
were likely to provide valuable data for the study. A semi-structured interview 
method was used to explore any unexpected topics or themes, whilst offering 
the participants the flexibility to further explore any theme that they considered 
important. Data collected from this study were managed using “NVivo,” which 
is a qualitative data analysis software tool for the management and analysis of 
the data collected. A thematic analysis approach was employed to conduct the 
data analysis, which was consistent with the interpretative philosophy adopted 
for this study. The themes generated from the data analysis are interpreted 
and explained in Chapter five.  
1.6 Research originality  
Considerable literature on the subject of LCP exists. For instance, previous 
studies investigated the effect of an enhanced LCP on welfare (Takechi and 
Kiyono, 2003; Veloso, 2006). Some studies have also analysed the economic 
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aspect of the LCP by evaluating the vertical integration and division of work and 
diffusion of technology transfer (Aharonson et al. 2007; Kwon and Chun 2009), 
and the effect of the LCP on Foreign Direct Investment (Lahiri and Ono 1998; 
Qui and Tao 2001). Furthermore, scholars such as Giroud (2007), Ivarsson and 
Alvstam (2009), and Adewuyi and Oyejide (2012) have examined the backward 
linkages between local suppliers and multinational companies. This backward 
linkage went beyond the fiscal exchange and brought in technical and financial, 
informational, managerial, and organisational externalities (Giroud 2007; 
Ivarsson and Alvstam 2009; Adewuyi and Oyejide 2012; Vaaland et al. 2012). 
Although these scholars focused more on the implementation of the Nigerian 
LCP and its benefits, this research extends the discussion to critically evaluate 
the effectiveness of the Nigerian LCP and its impact on the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry. 
Vaaland et al. (2012) analysed the interrelation between various actors and 
their capabilities and stressed the importance of understanding the LCP in an 
integrative way with the inclusion of several capacities. For example, the 
positive effect of the interrelation between actors and support organisation 
involved in the Brazilian oil and gas industry (Silvester and Dalcol 2009). 
Silvester and Dalcol (2009) found that correlations between factors related to 
multinational companies fostered the growth of the industrial base and level of 
national and local policies.  
The findings of Silvester and Dalcol (2009) and Vaaland et al. (2012) reveal 
interdependencies between the various industrial players and public institutions 
in Nigeria. They asserted that communication and interaction between the 
different actors in the Nigerian oil and gas industry are vital to achieving local 
participation. While agreeing with the findings of Silvester and Dalcol (2009) 
and Vaaland et al. (2012), this study focused on the impact of the Nigerian LCP 
and its effectiveness in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. Hence, the research 
outcome includes the identification of LCP implementation strategies such as; 
an LCP stakeholder perception model; and, an LCP implementation model which 
will potentially aid the effective implementation of the recommendations arising 
from this study.   
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Bakare (2011) analysed the impact of the Nigerian LCP on the Nigerian 
economy, using an experimental design combining theoretical consideration 
with empirical observation. His findings suggested that for the Nigerian 
economy to grow, effective implementation of the LCP in the Nigerian oil and 
gas industry is necessary, as the policy has the potential to generate 
employment and increase value addition for the economy (Bakare 2011). While 
Bakare (2011) employed a quantitative methodology, this research adopted 
qualitative research methodology to evaluate the effectiveness of the LCP and 
the transparency practices associated with its implementation. Generally, 
scholars have failed to investigate how transparent the implementation of the 
LCP in the Nigerian oil and gas industry has been. Therefore, this study 
assessed the level of transparency in implementing the Nigerian LCP and also 
evaluated how transparency has been integrated into LCP implementation. To 
investigate the transparency practices in the implementation of the policy, this 
research employed the framework of Klueh et al. (2007), which theorised that 
accountability, adequate metric/definition, efficiency consideration, information 
dissemination, and acknowledgment of spin-off benefits are the key principles 
for fostering the LCP. These principles were modified to develop an 
accountability framework employed to help design the study and guide the data 
collection process.  
1.7 Outline of thesis 
This study is organised into seven chapters. Chapter one introduced the topic 
of research by presenting a brief profile of Nigeria and the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry. It also presented a brief overview of the Nigerian LCP, the challenges 
of implementation and a rationale for the study by highlighting the importance 
of the LCP. Furthermore, the chapter also stated the aim, research questions 
and objectives for this research. A brief description of the subsequent chapters 
is presented below to guide the reader through the thesis. 
Chapter two provides an extensive literature review relating to the LCP and the 
oil and gas industry to inform the research. Due to the nature of this research, 
the literature review covers a number of distinct but related topics. This chapter 
presents an argument for and against the implementation of the LCP. The aim 
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here is to develop an understanding of LCP and its importance, not only in the 
oil and gas industry but also in its relationship with other sectors of the 
economy. The primary focus of the chapter is to demonstrate a clear 
understanding of the LCP in Nigeria, as well as in a global context, and the 
challenges in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. 
Chapter three provides a conceptual framework that incorporates the Klueh et 
al. (2007) principles of LCP in relation to different forms of accountability. The 
accountability framework was underpinned by institutional theory, which links 
accountability discourse to regulatory institutions, where organisations within a 
particular field are subject to pressures to seek legitimacy through socially and 
culturally authorised administrative routines intended to create accountability. 
Institutional theory was chosen after the review of various theories such as 
legitimacy, growth and stakeholder theories. Thus, this study chose an 
accountability framework, underpinned by institutional theory, to assess the 
level of LCP transparency practices in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. The 
framework helped to design the study and guide the data collection process. 
Chapter four presents an explanation and justification of the research 
methodology or approach taken.  This includes: the rationale for the research 
method employed; the sampling method adopted; data collection techniques; 
data collection process; data management; data analysis; and ethical 
considerations.  
Chapter five provides a detailed analysis of the outcomes of the data gathering 
process. The structure of the chapter is based on themes developed from data 
analysis. 
Chapter six presents the findings from the data analysis, resulting from 
comparing all collected data and theoretical aspects of this study with their 
relationship to the previously evaluated literature on the LCP. This leads to the 
development of two different LCP models: the LCP stakeholder perception 
model; and, the LCP implementation model.  
The final Chapter presents key findings and implications and further reflects on 
the overall contribution to knowledge made by this thesis. This chapter also 
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offers recommendations on ways to improve transparency in the 
implementation of the LCP and suggests directions for future research. 
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Chapter Two 
 Local Content from the Nigerian and Global Perspectives  
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter identifies appropriate areas of the LCP literature which supports 
this study. The aim of this study is to critically evaluate the effectiveness of the 
LCP and the transparency practices associated with its implementation. 
This chapter provides an overview of the existing research on the LCP, rationale 
for the LCP, its characteristics and the argument for and against the LCP. The 
chapter examines the conditions required to support LCP implementation and 
examines the policy from a global perspective. Finally, the chapter presents the 
history of the Nigerian local content policy and the challenges to LCP 
implementation in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. 
2.2 The Nigerian oil and gas industry  
The story of the Nigerian oil and gas industry began in 1903 after the 
amalgamation of the Northern and Southern territories (Yusuf and Omoteso 
2016). However, exploration was initiated by the efforts of a German company, 
the Nigerian Bitumen Corporation, which commenced exploration activities in 
the Araromi area, in the western part of Nigeria, between 1908 and 1914 
(Frynas 1993; Ogbimi 2013; Playfoot et al. 2013). The outbreak of the First 
World war in 1914 forced the German company to withdraw from Nigeria. 
However, when the war ended, the operation was resumed and in 1937 
permission was granted to a British company, Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum, to 
explore for oil (Frynas 1993; Ariweriokuma 2009; Ogbimi 2013; Playfoot et al. 
2013; Akinrele 2014; Yusuf and Omoteso 2016). The Second World War again 
interrupted exploration, however in 1946, Shell-BP, formed when Shell 
partnered with British Petroleum, was granted the only licence to explore the 
whole of Nigeria (Frynas 1993; Akinrele 2014). Before the discovery of oil in 
Nigeria, the country’s economy was dependent on the export of agricultural 
produce such as cocoa, palm kernel, palm oil, groundnut and solid minerals 
such as coal, bauxite, tin and other precious metals (Frynas 1993 and 
Ariweriokuma 2009). However, since the discovery of oil, oil production and 
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exploration has taken a dominant position in the Nigerian economy and pushed 
agriculture into the background (Frynas 1993; Odularu 2008, and, 
Ariweriokuma 2009). 
The first commercial oil discovery was in Oloibiri, in the Niger Delta, and 
encouraged by this early success Shell-BP expanded its exploration 
programme. The first oilfield came on stream in 1958 producing about 5100 
barrels of oil per day (bpd) (Frynas 1993; Akinrele 2014). In the same year, 
section 2 of the Mineral Oils Amendment Ordinance No.5 1958 was introduced 
expanding the rights of exploration to other foreign companies. Non-British 
Corporations thereby relinquished the sole exploration rights from Shell-BP 
(Odularu 2008; Obi 2010; Akinrele 2014). Due to the success of Shell-BP and 
the right of exploration given to non-British companies, new multinationals 
started expanding their exploration activities in Nigeria. Mobil was the first to 
obtain its exploration licence in 1955; America Overseas (Amoseas) followed in 
1961; Chevron in 1961; Tennessee in 1961; SAFRAP (Elf) in 1962; Agip in 
1962; and, Esso in 1965. Thus, all six major foreign companies, Texaco, Agip, 
Shell, Chevron, Elf, and, Mobil, dominated the Nigerian oil and gas industry and 
were all exploring and producing oil by 1971 (Frynas 1993 and Odularu 2008). 
Oil production reached 200 million barrels by the end of 1969 and by 1970 the 
total revenue generated from oil production grew to $718 million per year.  
Moreover, there was unprecedented production growth, which peaked in 1974 
at 384 MB in 1970 to 651 MB in 1975 (Frynas 1993 and Ariweriokuma 2009). 
Hence, crude oil became the primary source of foreign exchange and accounted 
for over 64% of the country’s foreign exchange (Odularu 2008). Following the 
Arab oil embargo of 1979, crude oil completely overshadowed agricultural 
export by accounting for over 95% of Nigeria’s export earnings (Odularu 2008). 
As the number of foreign companies in the industry increased, the Nigerian 
government sought ways to increase the level of indigenous participation. As a 
consequence, the Petroleum Act, known as the 1969 Act, was established to 
increase its control over oil production, which made it possible for Nigeria to 
create a statutory regime for the right to explore and discover oil in the country. 
Additionally, Nigeria joined the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
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(OPEC) in 1971 and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) was 
established in 1977 to regulate the Nigerian oil and gas industry (Playfoot et al. 
2013). This state-owned oil company not only controlled the Nigerian oil and 
gas industry, but also supervises all other sectors of the oil and gas industry, 
including the midstream and downstream sectors (Odularu 2008; KPMG 2014). 
The NNPC was later divided into 12 divisions to monitor other sectors within the 
industry. These sectors include the Ministry of Petroleum, which is the 
administrative arm of the government that deals with policy regulation, 
administers license bidding rounds, prospecting, exploration and mining (Huem 
et al. 2003).  
 The Department of Petroleum Resources is one of the main regulatory bodies 
and lies within the Ministry of Petroleum Resources. Its primary responsibility 
is to set standards to control and supervise oil and gas activities in the industry 
(Huem et al. 2003; Playfoot et al. 2013; KPMG 2014). NNPC, through its asset 
management subsidiary, the National Petroleum Investment Management 
Services (NAPIMS), manages agreements with multinational corporations 
(MNCs) in the industry by regulating and approving budgets and work schedules 
(Huem et al. 2003; Subai 2014). Through the Nigerian Content Development 
and Monitoring Board (NCDMB), the government implements the Nigerian Oil 
and Gas Industry Content Development (NOGICD) Act. The NCDMB also 
administers, monitors and manages the Nigerian content in the industry 
(Ogbimi 2013; KPMG 2014). There is also the Niger Delta Development 
Commissions (NDDC) whose primary role is the formulation of guidelines and 
policies for the development of the Niger Delta (KPMG 2014). Finally, the 
National Maritime Administration and Safety Agency’s (NIMASA) principal role 
is to monitor and promote the development of domestic shipping in 
international and coastal shipping trade (KPMG 2014).   
The oil and gas industry plays a major role in shaping the economy of Nigeria. 
One way of assessing its impact is by measuring the rent generated by oil. From 
1979-1999 $231 billion was generated in rent for the Nigerian economy (Ross 
2003). Furthermore, the industry accounts for about 83% of the federal 
government revenue and 98% of export earnings. Oil also generates more than 
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14% of Nigeria’s GDP, 65% of the government’s budget revenue and 95% of 
foreign exchange earnings (Nwosu et al. 2006; Ihua 2010; Vaaland et al. 2011; 
Okafor and Aniche 2014; Akinrele 2014). Despite all these benefits, the income 
generated from oil and gas production has failed to raise Nigeria’s standard of 
living. Rather, oil wealth has resulted in widespread corruption and rent-seeking 
activities due to the weak governance structure in Nigeria (Ross 2003; 
Idemudia 2012; Omoteso and Mobolaji 2014; Akinrele 2014). Perhaps, as a 
consequence, the country has been burdened by inter/intra community 
violence, kidnappings, illegal oil bunkering and political instability, which has 
led to poor macroeconomic management and inadequate infrastructure 
development particularly in the Niger Delta (Ross 2003; Idemudia 2012; 
Akinrele 2014). This reinforces Omoteso and Mobolaji’s (2014) claim that the 
poor economic performance of African countries can be attributed to corruption, 
inconsistent policy regimes, ethnic conflicts, complex institutional and 
administrative frameworks and weak institutions. 
Since its initiation, the industry has been dominated by cartel-type (foreign) 
organisations with a low level of indigenous participation. The main activities, 
which include drilling, exploration, production, well intervention and service 
provision have been controlled, exploited and managed by foreign multinational 
companies. For instance, 95% of oil and gas production in Nigeria is carried out 
by only five companies: Exxon, Shell, Chevron, Total and Agip (Nwosu et al. 
2006; Vaaland et al. 2011). It is estimated that $8billion annually is spent on 
operation services in the Nigerian oil and gas Industry and this figure is 
projected to reach $15billlion by 2017 (Ihua 2010). Despite the significant 
amount of money spent in the industry, only a small proportion of the accrued 
profit is available to indigenous oil servicing firms or expended in the 
development of the Nigeria industry base (Bakare 2011). Most of the money is 
remunerated to foreign oil and gas firms for services such as Front End 
Engineering Design (FEED), conceptual designs and seismic studies (Ihua 
2010). This has led to capital flight as most of the profits from contracts are 
sent abroad where the majority of the equipment and products are produced 
and manufactured (Nwosu et al. 2006; Ihua 2010; Bakare 2011).  
  
32 
Likewise, Nwosu et al. (2006) claimed that despite numerous activities in the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry, there is little value added to the local economy. 
Environmental pollution is at a very high level implying low local sustainability 
caused by the destruction of local agriculture, thereby leading to high 
unemployment and economic depression. Similarly, the Nigerian Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) claim that besides the loss of 
revenue, oil theft or illegal bunkering has also resulted in the loss of life (NEITI 
2013). The effects of this have been demonstrated through conflicts, youth 
restlessness, hostage taking, upheavals and equipment seizures leading to the 
disruption of operations (Nwosu et al. 2006). Yusuf and Omoteso (2015) opined 
that violence in the Niger Delta is the indigenes’ response to MNC activities that 
have seemingly not complied with their corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
objectives. Moreover, Ihua et al. (2011) observed that in 1960, Indonesia and 
Nigeria had the same level of per capita income; however, Indonesia has 
quadrupled its per capita income, while that of Nigeria has stagnated. Heum et 
al. (2003) also stated that the Nigerian GDP growth rate is lower than those of 
non-oil producing countries. This may be due to the inability of the Nigerian 
government to transform oil wealth into long-term welfare and industrial 
development, as seen in Malaysia and Indonesia that have industrialised rapidly 
(Heum et al. (2003). This has led to a nationwide outcry for the Nigerian 
government to facilitate indigenous participation in the oil and gas industry in 
order to raise the average standard of living (Neff 2005). Demands were made 
that the government create an enabling environment to favour local contractors 
by offering government tenured loans to indigenous firms which would allow 
them to execute projects and to foster alliance and partnership between 
Nigerian and foreign firms (Heum et al. 2003; Neff 2005). 
2.3 The local content policy 
Most of the literature available analyses the welfare and resource allocation 
effects of Local Content Requirements (LCRs) (see for example: Grossman 
1981; Hollander 1987; Richardson 1991, 1993; Lopez-de-Silanes et al. 1996; 
Lahiri and Ono 1998; Qiu and Tao 2001). Early efforts were prompted by the 
frequent use of LCRs in developing countries and concentrated on the resource 
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allocating effects of LCRs, and on modernising the local intermediate goods 
industry (Veloso 2001).  
Many scholars consider Grossman (1981) to be the first contributor in academic 
literature in the field of LCP (Veloso 2006). Grossman (1981) identified a 
content protection scheme reminiscent of the Local Content Requirement (LCR), 
which was a permutation of a tariff imposed on the imported intermediary input 
and a subsidy provided for the final goods produced. Grossman (1981) 
systemically analysed the results of content protection on resource allocation, 
with focus on intermediate goods (Richardson 1993; Belderbos and Sleuwaegen 
1997; Veloso 2006; Kazzazi and Nouri 2012; Ado 2013). Likewise, several 
researchers argued that the LCR (or content protection) might result in 
unforeseen and undesirable results (Krishna and Itoh 1988; Davidson et al. 
1985 Chao and Yu 1993; Belderbos and Sleuwaegen 1997). However, a few 
studies revealed that the LCR policy could improve the welfare of a country in 
certain situations (Richardson 1993 and Hollander 1987). Furthermore, Qiu and 
Tao (2001) examined both the positive and negative aspects of the LCR and 
derived an optimal LCR policy. Although the LCP might be an entirely new 
concept, it has become a recognised catchphrase in the oil and gas industry.  
2.3.1 Definition of local content  
The concept of LC has been defined in many ways and from various 
perspectives. Local content, which is also referred to as “community content,” 
“national content,” “content protection” and “domestic content,” connotes the 
competitive and gainful participation of citizens and the private sector in an 
economic activity (Jackson et al. 2010). It states that it should have “a set 
amount of inputs (value or quantity) in a given industrial output to be of 
domestic origin”, which leads to knowledge transfer, value addition, 
enhancement of economic multipliers and that it is the basis for economic 
growth and development of citizens (Richardson 1993; Qiu and Tao 2001; 
Veloso 2006; Jackson et al. 2010; Ado 2013).  
According to Kalyuzhnova (2012 pg. 1), “LCP builds the locally owned and 
adapted knowledge of the community and its capacity to appropriate technical 
expertise and managerial skills from external sources and to transfer this onto 
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others in the locality and the wider economy”. There are strong arguments to 
justify why the government should pay close attention to the development of 
the LCP in the host country including broadening the knowledge base of local 
capacity (Adegbite and Erhimona 2008; Kalyuzhnova 2012). Qiu and Tao 
(2001) and Blederbos and Sleuwaegen (2002), defined LCP as the utilisation of 
a specific proportion of local components in production, or the inclusion of an 
indigenous firm in production and manufacturing (Vaaland et al. 2012). 
Additionally, it is the occurrence of local inputs (labour, capital and intermediate 
products) in the various stages of a value chain (Kolstad and Kinyondo 2015). 
For instance, when it comes to employment, the LCP’s objective is that there 
are more domestic employees. It can even go as far as imposing a legal 
requirement on companies to employ domestic workforce in a way that 
facilitates the transfer of technology from the foreign workforce to the domestic 
workforce (Ramdoo 2016). 
From the experience of resource-rich countries, it is evident that the 
government can maximise the value of the oil and gas sector through non-fiscal 
instruments, which includes local participation and the LCP (Kalyuzhnova 
2012). Long-term government intervention is required to increase the share of 
sales or local employment in any sector at every stage of the sector’s supply 
chain (Warner et al. 2013). Through the creation of LCP regulation, the 
government's aim is to create a favourable environment for the transfer of skills 
and output to the host country's economy (Kalyuzhnova 2012; 2016). The LCP 
is part of a policy intervention entitled Productive Development Policies (PDP), 
which is an initiative aimed at supporting the productive arrangements of a 
nation’s economy (Tordo et al. 2013). The initiatives of PDP include 
programmes or policies that improve the competitiveness and growth of 
different sectors of an economy. However, despite the good intentions of the 
LCP or regulations, if not implemented properly, these policies can lead to 
significant economic and commercial problems. They can also create less 
predictable environments for investors, as well as increments in cost. 
Furthermore, there is also the risk of creating a climate of permanent 
protection, inferior infrastructure and weak/slow industry development 
(Richardson 1993; Qiu and Tao 2001; Veloso 2006; Jackson et al. 2010; Ado 
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2013), which could result in a fall in economic growth by wealth consummation, 
rather than value creation. 
A familiar scenario in the oil and gas history is when a country discovers oil 
reserves and questions how to initiate a policy that promotes the LCP by 
involving local businesses as well as utilising the local workforce and resources 
in the extraction of the oil and gas resources (Kolstad and Kinyondo 2015). 
Developing countries with natural resources usually suffer from a lack of 
economic development. Hence, the governments of developing countries are 
always seeking ways of introducing policies to help them derive benefit from 
their oil and gas activities, thereby creating economic and social benefit for the 
nation (Martini 2014; Ramdoo 2015; Kalyuzhnova 2016). To achieve this, the 
government of these countries initiated a series of reform policies in order to 
capture more benefits from the oil and gas industry (Ramdoo 2015). One such 
policy was the LCP (Ramdoo 2015), which was employed to foster better local 
partnership and create more local jobs within the oil and gas industry.  LCP is, 
therefore, the value added or the number of jobs generated within a local 
economy as a result of the activities of oil and gas companies. This can be 
referred to as the domestic jobs created around the area of the host community 
(Tordo et al. 2013). Similarly, Appiah-Adu (2013) defined the LCP as the 
domestic participation in the oil and gas industry with the aim of contributing 
and creating value to the social and economic development of the host country. 
While Ramdoo (2015) argued that it is a policy utilised by the government for 
the generation of economic benefits for the domestic economy.  
Countries also have different motivations for designing and implementing the 
LCP. For instance, the definition of the LCP under the Nigerian Oil and Gas 
Industry Content Development Act is “the quantum of composite value added 
to or created in Nigeria through utilization of Nigerian resources and services in 
the petroleum industry resulting in the development of indigenous capability 
without compromising quality, health, safety and environmental standards” 
(NNPC 2016). The Act places emphasis on value addition through the 
mandatory training and employment of Nigerians by oil and gas companies 
(Asiago 2016). Similarly, in Ghana LCP is defined as “the quantum/percentage 
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of locally produced materials, personnel, financing, goods and services 
rendered to the oil industry and which can be measured in monetary terms” 
(Petroleum Commission Ghana 2016).  
The Ghanaian policy promotes value addition through the utilisation of local 
expertise in order to gain control of the oil industry through equity participation 
with Ghanaians in regard to development initiatives for domestic stakeholders. 
This is undertaken by considering local suppliers, developing local capacities 
and strategies for increasing the minimum in-country spending and local 
employment levels (Asiago 2016). In Tanzania, the LCP is the value added from 
oil and gas activities in the country from the participation and development of 
local businesses and the development of Tanzanian citizens through technology, 
goods, services, national labour, capital and research capability (Nwapi 2015). 
Thus, from another perspective, Tanzania defines the LCP as the value addition 
brought to a host country (host communities) through the activities in the oil 
and gas industry (Nwapi 2015). From the above definition, recognition must be 
given to host communities in the implementation of the LCP. It also indicated 
that for the policy to be fulfilled, indigenes would have to be employed or 
included in providing services in the industry. Here, the mention of host 
communities and regions differs from the position of other oil producing 
countries. It gives special recognition to communities where oil is being 
extracted and mandates oil and gas companies to contribute to the growth of 
the host communities (Nwapi 2016). 
From the above definitions, it can be said that the LCP means different things 
to different stakeholders or countries. However, there is a consensus among 
countries that foreign investors/companies must utilise local goods, and 
services (Asiago 2016). LCP encourages foreign companies to employ locals, 
but it also recognises that activities in the oil and gas industry cannot 
significantly contribute to the employment of the local workforce without 
linkages to other sectors in the country (Ovadia 2014). LCP ensures that oil and 
gas companies utilise local businesses to supply goods and services and these 
companies then invest in facilities for local manufacturing, thereby adding value 
to the economy (Ovadia 2014). 
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2.3.2 Rationale for LCP 
On the economic front, the main rationale for the utilisation of the LCP is to 
develop or strengthen the domestic industrial base to create jobs and stimulate 
local industrial development (WTI 2013; Ramdoo 2016). Here limited periods 
of protection are used to boost domestic industries up to a level of productivity 
where they become internationally competitive (Stephenson 2013; Kolstad and 
Kinyondo 2015). This occurs mostly in developing countries that have low 
value-adding activities and where there is a poor linkage between large 
industries and the rest of the manufacturing industries (Stephenson 2013). In 
some oil producing countries, the revenue and demand associated with oil 
production have led to capital flight, high exchange rates, and a disregard of 
investments and goals to reduce business costs. This has also contributed to a 
great tendency for consumption and a neglect of other sectors of the economy, 
for example, the agricultural and manufacturing sectors that would have 
contributed to the value adding activities in the country (WTI 2013; Nwapi 
2015). Hence, the government of these oil-producing countries utilises the LCP 
as a means of moving the economic base away from a rent base and 
consumption industry, to an indigenous production industry focused on 
domestic value-adding activities (WTI 2013).  
The LCP is also a means of addressing market deficiencies or failure through 
employment and creation of opportunities in the domestic markets (WTI 2013; 
Tordo et al. 2013; Nwapi 2015). For instance, the oil and gas industry poses 
technological complexity and requires high levels of investment and specialised 
input, which is often a hindrance to local participation (Tordo et al. 2013). 
Hence, new entrants find it difficult to participate because of the high level of 
market concentration. The LCP can help countries with low industry capacity to 
develop sectors through lowering entry barriers and encouraging indigenous 
participation can be developed efficiently; more so if high aggregated demand 
is expected (Tordo et al. 2013). It can also help minimise the gap between 
private and social returns for specific Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) activities 
and reward business activities undertaken by indigenous companies or sanction 
foreign companies that impede local capacity development (WTI 2013). For 
instance, where indigenous capacity can be developed, or is available to meet 
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long-term demand, the government tries to ensure the integration of local 
contractors in the procurement strategies through a combination of mandatory 
requirements or incentives for local contractors to foster the development of 
the local supply chain (Tordo et al. 2013). 
Furthermore, Tordo et al. (2013) state that information asymmetry is another 
form of market inefficiency that occurs in the oil and gas industry. It is a 
condition whereby participants do not have access to the information needed 
for their decision-making process, which can lead to market failure. Further, 
where countries have a minimum target for the procurement of goods and 
services, qualified indigenous suppliers might not be informed of the market 
opportunities because foreign companies might be reluctant to share 
information. Also, foreign companies’ procedures are designed to target only 
established foreign companies. To solve this problem, the government includes 
a regulation in their LCP that improves transparency and access to information 
for oil and gas industry suppliers (Tordo et al. 2013). For instance, Kazakhstan 
created the KCA register in 2010, whereby companies are required to upload 
all procurement information and documents to make the procurement process 
transparent for both local and foreign suppliers (Ospanova 2010; Warner et al. 
2013). Furthermore, by improving access to information, countries that rely on 
revenue from oil and gas production have also utilised the LCP to redistribute 
rents arising from oil production (WTI 2013).  
In designing the policy, policy makers tailor the LCP according to the set targets 
and the specific industry in question (WTI 2013). The LCP gives the government 
the opportunity to divert the rent generated from oil production to other sectors 
of the economy. This ensures host communities benefit from the profit 
generated from oil production (WTI 2013; Nwapi 2015). 
One of the many disciplines used by developing countries to advance the 
process of learning and adopting technologies from developed countries is the 
use of performance requirement (WTI 2013). Technology transfer and 
knowledge spill-over have a positive impact on the economic development and 
productivity of domestic companies (Stephenson 2013). According to Kokko 
(1994); Borensztein, de Gregorio, and Lee (1998); Xu (2000) cited in Warner 
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et al. (2013), countries that impose low trade barriers benefit more from 
technology transfer and knowledge spillover. This occurs when the technology 
gap between domestic and foreign companies is not too wide and there is a 
mandatory minimum level of foreign workforce. Furthermore, the level of 
domestic ownership affects the degree of technological and knowledge spillover 
as it does not necessarily produce positive spillover (Tordo et al. 2013). This is 
because the oil and gas industry utilises complex technology and specialised 
input and the success of technological and knowledge spill-over is key to the 
successful development of value addition to the local economy. Therefore, oil-
producing countries have adopted the LCP as a medium to foster the transfer 
of knowledge and technology (Warner et al. 2013; Cimino et al. 2014). For 
instance, the Brazilian government requires operators to invest 1% of oil 
revenue into oil and gas related research and development (Warner et al. 
2013). 
2.3.3 Characteristics of local content  
Depending on their various economic situations, resource rich countries have 
different perspectives in regard to LCP implementation and maximising the 
benefit from their natural resources. In addition, LCP has various unique 
characteristics, including value addition or creation. Resource-rich countries 
maximise the benefit from their natural resources by retaining value generated 
from the exploitation of these resources (Appiah-Adu 2013). These countries 
have designed various policy instruments to maximise the benefit gained from 
these resources, some of which are aimed at increasing participation and local 
sourcing from indigenous companies (Ramdoo 2015). To increase participation 
and local sourcing, both must occur along the value chain within and outside 
the host community and country. Through this, LCP will increase the utilisation 
of local workforce, goods, and services (Appiah-Adu 2013). These policies can 
take the form of a mandatory partnership with indigenous companies and 
include sourcing materials locally to enhance the quality of local suppliers 
(Appiah-Adu 2013; WTI 2013; Ramdoo 2016). According to Appiah-Adu (2013) 
and WTI (2013), LCP implementation has been successful in broadening and 
enhancing capabilities. This can also be seen in the international 
competitiveness of indigenes and local businesses through collaborations that 
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include equal participation of local citizens, as illustrated in Figure 2.1 below 
(WTI 2013; Appiah-Adu 2013; Ramdoo 2015). 
 
Figure 2.1 The relationship between transfer of knowledge, and technology in regard 
to value addition (Appiah-Adu 2013 pg. 178). 
Another characteristic is the development of domestic industries. The 
development of indigenous suppliers to participate in the oil and gas industry 
is another primary objective of the LCP. This objective can be achieved in 
several ways: 
 Priority is given to the purchase of local goods and services when they 
are competitive in regard to quality, price, and availability (WTI 2013). 
 Consideration is given to companies registered domestically, regardless 
of the nationality of management or investment (Ramdoo 2016). 
 The compulsory partnership between indigenous companies and foreign 
investors (Ramdoo 2016). The goal of this objective is to minimise the 
market power of foreign companies whose global sourcing reduces the 
capabilities and competitiveness of local suppliers (WTI 2013).  
 
Promoting technology transfer also characterises LCP. Technology complexity 
has been a barrier for indigenous companies in the oil and gas industry. LCP 
often requires foreign companies to bring a level of technology into the 
countries so that indigenous companies can benefit from technology transfer 
through the use of state of the art technology (Ramdoo 2015). In some cases, 
  
41 
governments also create incentives for indigenous companies to encourage 
them to invest in developing technology that can place them globally in 
strategic positions (Ramdoo 2016). 
Perhaps the most pervasive characteristic of the LCP is that it encourages 
foreign companies to develop employment and the capacity of locals; it creates 
employment at different stages of oil production; promotes the transfer of skills, 
training of locals and technology transfer between companies and locals 
(Ovaidia 2014; Ramdoo 2016). To create employment opportunities, oil-
producing countries have utilised different regulatory instruments, such as 
setting minimum targets for training and hiring locals (Ramdoo 2014). 
Furthermore, companies must invest a proportion of their turnover in training 
programmes for local staff. However, the LCP adopters acknowledge that the 
oil and gas industry cannot be the sole employer of locals without a direct 
linkage to other sectors of the economy (Ovadia 2014). LCP mandates that oil 
and gas companies utilise local goods and services and invest in facilities for 
local manufacturing (Ovadia 2014; 2016).  
What appears to be a robust LCP can change because of the evolving 
circumstances and factors in an industry or country; therefore, an overarching 
characteristic or principle of LCP is that it must be flexible in nature. Changing 
circumstances can include the movement of the resource base to a geographical 
certainty, continuous development of the domestic skill base and supply chains, 
and the internal and external environment becoming less or more favourable 
(Marcel et al. 2016). To facilitate these changes, a periodic assessment of the 
policies is required to ensure they are ambitious enough, capable of maximising 
the benefit from oil and gas production, do not deter investment or lead to 
ineffective LCP investment (Marcel et al. 2016). Hence, LCP should be dynamic 
in nature as it moves across the oil and gas value chain. Furthermore, LCP 
should be predictable enough to attract foreign companies to invest, even when 
the oil price is low and the government insists on LCP requirements (Marcel et 
al. 2016). For example, the government may wish to increase the proportion of 
revenue they receive and adopt a strict LCP if the price of oil rises (Marcel et 
al. 2016). In countries with low economic development, it is essential to have 
flexible LCP. Where there is inadequate human capability and capital that can 
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hinder the completion of an oil and gas project, oil and gas companies may be 
given the opportunity to change their approach to LCP. It is expected that new 
oil producing countries possess a high level of flexibility during oil exploration 
to reduce the risk to foreign investors, which means little is achieved in regard 
to local content. However, when the resource potential is attained the 
government tightens their LCP, as countries are eager to enter into the industry 
(Marcel et al. 2016) 
2.4 Argument for and against LCP 
The oil and gas industry purchases input (both raw material and labour) for its 
activities, which are both imported and supplied domestically. The importation 
of inputs creates a leakage in the host country, while domestic inputs retain 
value and benefit for the host country (Tordo et al. 2013). For instance, buying 
goods from a local company requires the local company to purchase its raw 
materials and labour to be able to manufacture its output.  Thus, this indirect 
input will be produced locally. Further, the domestic workforce will spend their 
salaries on locally produced goods, which in turn will help create more jobs 
(Warner et al. 2013). Therefore, the share of domestic employment and 
domestic sales at every stage of the supply chain is referred to as local content. 
Similarly, Grossman (1980) defined LCP as a given percentage of the domestic 
component value input in a final product. LCPs, in general, are government 
interventions that aim to improve, in the long term, the share of domestic 
employment and sales to an industry that is locally supplied at each stage of 
the value chain. This form of intervention is categorised under the policy 
interventions called Productive Development Policies (PDP) (Warner et al. 2013; 
Nwapi 2016). As a form of PDP, it helps correct market failures by ensuring 
companies assist in the development of local skills to meet the market and 
industry requirements. It also enhances local participation by enforcing the 
employment of an indigenous workforce, using local raw materials and utilising 
local companies and local procurement (Nwapi 2016). LCP has also been 
created as a form of behind-the-border tariff to achieve its localisation 
objectives (Hufbauer 2013). During the recession of 2008, more constrained 
governments avoided the traditional form of protection (quota and tariffs) 
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(Hufbauer 2013). Thus, they favoured the opaque Non-Tariff Barriers (NTB) 
and this has gained popularity since the recession of 2008. While other forms 
of protection focus on the percentage of import value, the LCP concentrates on 
the percentage of a project that is given to indigenous firms, or the subsidy 
made available to indigenous companies (Hufbauer 2013). 
2.4.1 Argument for LCP 
There are many reasons why governments increase the use of the LCP in the 
extractive sector. One of these grounds is to correct market failures (Warner et 
al. 2013; Nwapi 2015; 2016). Market failure occurs when an industry/country 
cannot access the necessary knowledge, technology, capacity to participate in 
an open market without the assistance of foreign companies. Therefore, 
indigenous workers cannot obtain jobs because they lack the skills and they 
cannot obtain the skills because they are not offered jobs or training (Warner 
et al. 2013). Consequently, from a domestic point of view the market fails 
because locals have inadequate domestic skills to participate in the industry. 
This in turn affects the allocation of resources to the market (Nwapi 2016). The 
government, through the LCP, corrects market failures by supporting the 
development of skills and capacities to meet the demand of the market. One 
way of developing local skills is by mandating foreign companies to engage in 
the local workforce empowerment to meet the technical expertise required by 
the industry (Klueh et al. 2009). Another means of skills development is created 
by the partnership between foreign and local/indigenous companies. When local 
companies partner with foreign companies, the local company gains knowledge 
through technology transfer from the foreign company (Klueh et al. 2009). Part 
of the argument in favour of LCP, especially in developing countries, is that it 
creates jobs in the local communities and protects the nascent industry (e.g. 
renewable industry), until it is capable of competing in the international market 
(Stephenson 2013). By protecting infant industries, it presents an attractive 
solution as it allows industries to become competitive internationally by offering 
local companies incentives to produce, innovate and lower their production 
costs over a specific period of time (Stephenson 2013). 
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2.4.2 Arguments against LCP 
One major issue relating to LCP is its conflict with international regulations 
(Warner et al. 2013). For instance, concerns have been raised about the conflict 
between LCP and international trade agreements applicable to members of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), specifically the Agreements on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (ASCM), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and Trade-Related Investments Measures (TRIMs) (Nwapi 2015; 
Ramdoo 2016). These agreements require WTO member countries to treat one 
another in the same way they would treat their citizens. However, these 
international trade tools limit the LCP (Ado 2013; Warner et al. 2013; Nwapi 
2015). Furthermore, most countries use performance requirements to attract 
foreign direct investment (FDI). The LCP is a performance requirement as it is 
utilised for the creation of jobs and technology transfer (Ado 2013).  
Foreign investors, however, do not agree with the use of performance 
requirements as it interrupts their investments, and contravenes some trade-
related investment measures. For example, the LCP as its requirements violate 
Article III of General Agreements on Tariff and Trade (GATT) (Ado 2013; 
Warner et al. 2013).  Trade-Related Investments Measures (TRIMs), for 
example, prohibit the LCP requirements that mandate a specific level of 
domestic purchase by a company, such as the requirement of minimum targets 
for the participation of indigenous suppliers/contractors. Thus, LCP may be 
contrary to a country's WTO undertakings (Warner et al. 2013). Therefore, the 
LCP may have an adverse impact on trade as it discourages foreign importation 
and suppresses competition between foreign and domestic companies. Its 
effect depends on the percentage of the LC needed and the effectiveness and 
efficiency of existing companies (Stephenson 2013). For instance, in a country 
with inefficient companies, a higher degree of LCP hinders competition. 
However, according to Rodrik (2007), although the LCP breaches international 
trade agreements, it is a necessity that aids developing countries to pursue 
their economic development goals (Nwapi 2016). 
Another argument against LCP is the requirement for companies to purchase 
domestic inputs, which are likely to be more expensive than foreign inputs 
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(Stephenson 2013). LCP sometimes operates in an opaque manner, thus its 
effects on downstream operators in regard to quality and price is hard to 
calculate; therefore, it can be challenging for responsible officials and legislators 
to evaluate the benefit of the LCP (Cimino et al. 2013; Stephenson 2013). The 
protection offered by LCP also insulates domestic companies from foreign 
competition, which can lead to delays in adopting novel technology and defeats 
the aim of a healthy infant industry (Cimino et al. 2013). Furthermore, foreign 
companies believe that imposing domestic labour hiring conditions on them is 
unfair, especially when the current domestic labour lacks the necessary skills 
to undertake the job. This not only puts pressure on companies but also 
discourages further investments in the host nations (Nwaokoro 2011; Nwapi 
2016).  
Consequently, this makes LCP susceptible to corruption, which is another 
argument against LCP. Although LCP is a policy intended to help oil rich 
countries benefit from their natural resource, if it is not implemented properly, 
it opens avenues for corrupt practices. Government policies are vulnerable to 
corruption especially in the area of trade and investment policies (Cimino et al. 
2013; Hufbauer 2013). Furthermore, the reason for adopting LCP might be 
aligned with the investors’, local elites’ and public officials’ interests rather than 
the benefit of the nation (Esteves et al. 2013; Martini 2014). This may further 
minimise competitive solutions to problems (Marcel et al. 2016). Many of the 
new oil producing nations have very low tax bases, encouraging political elites 
to look to other sources of income to use as sponsorship to gain political loyalty. 
Here the LCP discourages local capacity development and promotes rentier 
behaviour (Marcel et al. 2016). Furthermore, the LCP can create delays and 
increase the cost of projects as they depend on the supply and demand 
conditions of the local economy (Cimino et al. 2013; Hufbauer 2013). 
2.5 Necessary conditions to support local content policies 
Despite the positive characteristics of LCP, it has often failed to meet countries’ 
expectations. Evidence has highlighted the failure of countries to retain value 
from oil and gas production in their various countries (Warner et al. 2013; 
Nwapi 2015; 2016; Ovadia 2014; 2016). Therefore, when a government 
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decides to implement LCP, it is crucial to understand the risks associated with 
the policy. 
2.5.1 Thorough understanding of the situation in the oil and gas 
industry 
Firstly, there must be an agreement between stakeholders (indigenous 
companies, MNCs, local communities and government) and the outcome of this 
understanding will determine the success of the LCP (Ramdoo 2016). The LCP 
should be guided by a vision that explains how to prioritise different policy 
objectives and identifies the industries of strategic importance to the 
government. The government should also be clear about which policy objectives 
should be prioritised, for example, job creation. Coordination between 
government, oil and gas companies and other relevant industries will help 
construct the countries’ vision and avoid partisan approaches to long-term 
planning (Marcel et al. 2016).   
2.5.2 Capacity and capability to deliver LCP 
Developing countries endowed with natural resources often have frail private 
sectors, with private companies often lacking competitive advantages to 
participate in the oil and gas industry (Marcel et al. 2016). While LCP mandates 
oil and gas companies to procure materials locally, most local businesses lack 
the capacity to operate in the oil and gas sector. Furthermore, some of these 
countries have an unrealistic LCP, which has led to cost inflation and 
compromised the viability of their oil and gas industry (Marcel et al. 2016). 
Therefore, when capabilities are insufficient, the government must create 
opportunities to support them. Government and policy makers should have a 
baseline of existing capabilities and should periodically assess the progress of 
indigenous companies against the baseline. Thus, will maximise short-term 
opportunities and plan since knowledge of the resources is available and its 
impact well-known (Marcel et al. 2016). 
2.5.3 Institutional readiness 
Institutional readiness is the key to the success of LCP. However, the lack of 
transparency and corruption in implementing LCP is a major hindrance. 
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Furthermore, developing countries must adopt the approach whereby local 
suppliers are given the opportunity to gradually build their competencies to be 
able to compete with foreign companies (Stephenson 2013). LCP will also be 
more valuable if local companies are engaged in training through learning by 
doing, for example taking locals as understudies to establish high-skilled 
workers (Stephenson 2013). Furthermore, access to information is an 
important aspect of LCP success. Limited information on the availability of 
competencies and qualified local suppliers can cause foreign companies and 
operators to seek outside help (Marcel et al. 2016). Therefore, free flowing 
information between the government, local companies and international oil and 
gas companies is essential to the success of LCP. 
2.5.4 Local content requirement should be industry specific 
LCP requirements are mostly generic as governments may lack necessary 
information and understanding of industry needs or requirements (Marcel et al. 
2016). This leads to a poor implementation strategy that makes reporting and 
measurement complex (Marcel et al. 2016). It also does not consider the 
regulators capacity to measure and monitor performance and results in poor 
enforcement that influences the corruption of regulatory officers. Therefore, it 
is vital that the government has a consistent definition of local content, local 
companies and suppliers (Marcel et al. 2016). In general, these terms have 
different connotations when it comes to trade agreements and government 
procurement laws. Thus, defining terms critical for measurement, performance 
management, and target setting is imperative (Marcel et al. 2016). 
2.6 Local content policy in global context  
Many states have established Local content rules for companies intending to 
operate in their countries (Munson and Rosenblatt 1997). As a result, these 
rules have compelled companies to purchase a certain amount of goods and 
services from local suppliers. 
In resource-rich countries, governments are searching for opportunities to 
develop economic linkage between the extractive sector and the rest of the 
economy (Playfoot et al. 2015 and Ramdoo 2016). Hence, a number of these 
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states have introduced the LCP to promote the use of local resources such as 
capital, labour, goods and services in order to create value in the local economy 
and thus, expand the various countries’ industrial sectors (Esteves et al. 2013).  
However, diversification of these oil producing countries has been monolithic.  
The experiences of these countries show that many different routes have been 
taken at various times during the countries’ development (Ramdoo 2016). 
These developments have been defined by the systemic and political systems 
of the individual countries, as well as the demand and supply of goods and 
services, technological changes and the cyclic behaviour of commodity prices 
(Ramdoo 2016). These are the motivations behind the implementation of the 
LCP. These incentives are linked to the socio-political and economic 
considerations that consist of reasons such as the need to stimulate local 
industrial development, create jobs and in response to the need to address 
policy failures (Ramdoo 2015). The type of intervention used by countries to 
address these policy failures vary according to the countries’ resource 
endowments, the level of development and industry maturity (Ramdoo 2016). 
Moreover, the industry’s various stakeholders also have their reasons for 
encouraging the use of the LCP (Ramdoo 2016). Where the government are the 
regulators, the implications, interventions and results may differ. In addition, 
oil and gas companies may implement the LCP in order to obtain a license to 
operate, or to stimulate supplier development (Ramdoo 2016). While a number 
of these companies have been successful in developing domestic businesses 
and capacity, other companies have created avenues for corruption, or have 
failed in their LCP objectives (Esteves et al. 2013). Thus, it may be challenging 
for international oil and gas companies and governments to agree on definitions 
and parameters, which may vary from country to country and on how to 
effectively regulate and measure LCP implementation in the various oil and gas 
industries (Bordman 2010). An examination of the LCP practices of oil producing 
countries will help to highlight the main issues. 
2.6.1 Indonesia  
In Indonesia, oil production began in 1890. However, foreign companies ran 
the industry until the 1950s when the government introduced new regulations 
stating that the government and government-owned companies would take 
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over oil and gas development activities (Heum et al. 2003). In 1968, the 
Indonesian national oil company Pertamina was formed, and its sole 
responsibility was negotiating and managing Production Sharing Contracts 
(PSCs) with international oil companies. It also had a monopoly over the 
industry’s downstream sector. Heum et al. (2003) state that the LCP’s minimum 
target in the Indonesian upstream oil and gas industry was 25%. However, in 
2013 the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR) issued new 
regulations concerning LCP in the upstream sector (Asiago 2016). One of these 
regulations was that preference should be given to domestic suppliers. The 
regulation also set individual targets and provided timeframes for the 
implementation of LCP in different services in the oil and gas industry. MEMR 
also changed the LCP target of 25% to vary across the various departments in 
the industry (Ramdoo 2016). This ranged from 35% to 90% depending on the 
activities in the industry (Asiago 2016). For instance, the LCP’s target in the 
offshore oil and gas drilling rose from 35% to 45% (Ramdoo 2016). The 
recruitment of a domestic workforce in Indonesia relies on the approval of the 
regulator. Furthermore, indigenous oil and gas companies operating in the 
downstream sector are mandated to give priority to local employment, which 
should be undertaken in coordination with the regional government (Warner et 
al. 2013). 
2.6.2 Malaysia  
Oil production in Malaysia began in 1910 (Heum et al. 2003), but offshore 
production commenced in the 1950s (Klueh et al. 2007). The national oil 
company, Petronas, was established in 1974 and is the largest contributor to 
the government’s tax revenue.  In 2010, it accounted for over 40% of tax 
revenue (Tordo et al. 2013). The main objective of the Malaysian government 
is to maximise benefit through the building of local capabilities and an industry 
base to support its growing offshore and onshore oil and gas industry (Klueh et 
al. 2007). To achieve this, Petronas used its role to increase the government’s 
take of the oil revenue and mandated an increase in participation of Petronas 
in the production sharing contracts with foreign companies. This gave the 
government greater cash flow and increased its opportunities for technology 
transfer (Klueh et al. 2007; Warner et al. 2013). Petronas has been a key driver 
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in the development of LCP in Malaysia. Companies that wish to participate in 
the upstream sector must obtain a license from Petronas. To obtain the licence, 
oil and gas companies must be registered with Petronas, create an incorporated 
business with local equity participation in Malaysia, acquire all materials locally 
and purchase directly from the manufacturer if not available locally (Klueh et 
al. 2007; Warner et al. 2013). Foreign companies are given permission to 
operate in the oil industry and partner with indigenous companies, but are 
restricted to a 30% equity stake (Warner et al. 2013). Furthermore, Petronas 
has invested in the development of the skilled workforce, technology and 
supports the local supply industry through the establishment of several 
management-oriented and technical institutions. One such institution is the 
Institut Teknologi Petroleum Petronas (INSTEP), which has been a major 
supplier of competent, skilled manpower for companies operating in the oil and 
gas industry (Warner et al. 2013). LCP has been an integral part of the 
economic transformation plan of Malaysia, where it has improved the 
competitiveness and performance of local business and strengthened domestic 
skills through the integration of incentives for foreign and domestic investors 
and the enforcement of regulations and requirements (Warner et al. 2013). 
2.6.3 Trinidad and Tobago 
Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) is a small but resource-rich country in the Caribbean 
(Ugursal 2011), which gained independence in 1962. T&T has been 
characterised by its heavy dependence on the production and exploration of oil 
and gas (Ugursal 2011 and Tordo et al. 2013). T&T’s continuous growth since 
the early 1990’s is due to its tight monetary policy and economic reforms, as 
well as the strong markets for export commodities (Ugursal 2011). Also, owing 
to its considerable dependence on energy and petrochemical exports and low 
domestic energy prices, energy consumption in T&T has been on the rise more 
than anywhere else, making T&T one of the highest consumers of energy in the 
world. In T&T the need for a greater local content, including local ownership 
has been extensively debated (Ngoasong 2014). The government adopted an 
LC participation framework policy for the oil sector together with its entire value 
chain. This framework was established to determine the guiding principles – the 
key mechanisms necessary for LCP participation and capacity development. 
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These include: how, where and by whom these will be delivered; the assurance, 
reporting process and performance measures that will be utilised; and, major 
areas for priority focus (Ministry of Energy and Industry 2004). 
The framework defines LCP in regard to the level of ownership, control and 
financing by citizens, in agreement with internationally accepted standards and 
the principal terms of the international agreement, such as General Agreement 
on Trade and Services (GATS) (Ministry of Energy and Industry 2004). In T&T, 
LCP is driven by the traditional approach whereby first consideration is given to 
local suppliers if their service quality is at the same level as international 
competitors (WTI 2013). Also, recognising that not all projects can be delivered 
or sustained locally, T&T’s government directed efforts to defining and 
maximising LCP regarding the levels of local financing and local ownership and 
control. Efforts were also directed towards considering local suppliers by 
ensuring that the principal operator gives local suppliers assurances and 
preference (WTI 2013). Regarding people development, the government 
focused on the main areas that will give locals the opportunities to take more 
analytical, value added and decision-making roles that make sure that existing 
regulations are aligned to ensure compliance with strategies and policies (WTI 
2013). With regard to monitoring of activities in the industry, the T&T 
government created the Permanent Committee on the LCP in 2004 to monitor 
the activities in the oil and gas sector to ensure that all energy projects include 
avenues for the development of expertise of nationals and maximise the level 
of the LCP and local participation. This committee creates strategies and policies 
that facilitated the transfer of knowledge and technology and helps improve 
local capabilities. Also, the committee updates the LCP and participation policies 
and ensures compliance with set policies (Tordo et al. 2013). 
2.6.4 Kazakhstan 
Since Kazakhstan gained independence, there has been a strong desire by the 
government to create an environment that includes local businesses and up- 
skills the population whenever possible (Kalyuzhnova 2016). In Kazakhstan, 
the term LCP refers to the level of work, goods and services purchased from 
Kazakh companies, of Kazakhstan origin as stated in the subsoil usage contracts 
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or law (Asiago 2016; Kalyuzhnova 2016). According to the Subsoil Law, the LCP 
is the cumulative share value of local goods used in operational activities, or 
the number of Kazakhstan citizens; the fund is paid to the manufacturer of 
services (Work) minus the cost of the products utilised in carrying out the 
service and the price of the subcontracts (Asiago 2016). The Kazakh LCP first 
appeared in the Petroleum Law of 1995. The law required subcontractors in the 
oil and gas sector to be mostly Kazakh-owned (Ospanova 2010; Kalyuzhnova 
2016). In addition, the 1996 law on Subsurface and Subsurface Use was created 
which mandated companies to propose their LCP commitments at the initial 
stage. However, the LCP was vaguely presented and companies were given free 
passes in the activities in the industry, which led to difficulty in monitoring LCP 
levels. Hence, key objectives have not been achieved (Ospanova 2010; Ramdoo 
2016).  
This prompted the regulators to adopt a more rigid approach. As a result, in 
2007 more detailed LCP requirements were established (Ospanova 2010). It 
included a comprehensive procurement process, monitoring, measurement 
procedures, and provided a clear definition of local content. In the localisation 
of the labour force, the quota of the expatriate workforce and work permit rules’ 
mandate is that medium and large businesses have 90% LC for technical 
personnel, 70% for company executives and a 95% minimum employment 
requirement for Kazakhstan citizens (Ospanova 2010). The protection of 
nationals against discriminatory hiring and remuneration practices (Olcott 
2007) was also mandated, as well as the allocation of minimum funding for the 
training and education of Kazakhs. In the procurement of goods and services, 
there must be a minimum of 20% LC for goods and 15% for services and 
construction. In addition, a company that had more than a 50% foreign 
shareholding was considered foreign and excluded from participating in public 
procurement tenders (Olcott 2007). Additionally, institutional responsibilities 
were highlighted. These included: 
• Policy formulation and design by the Ministry of Oil and Gas and the 
Ministry of New Technologies. 
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• Certificates for domestic producers to be issued by the Technical 
Regulation and Metrology Committee. 
• The Kazakhstan Contract Agency (KCA) is assigned to promote the LCP 
in the oil and gas value chain, to assist local manufacturers in meeting 
industry standards and requirements and to carry out LCP 
implementation analysis. 
• The Expert Council on LC participates in: (a) developing working 
programs for Kashagan, Karachaganak and Tengiz and sees to the 
interest of domestic suppliers; and, (b) in the assessment of the LCP 
implementation for major projects. The council is also under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Oil and Gas (Olcott 2007). 
• The LC in employment is monitored through work permit applications.  
• KCA monitors the education budgets. Unspent monies are put forward 
and spent before the end of the relevant petroleum contract. 
• There is a special formula for calculating LC in goods, works, and 
services as set out in the 367/2010 decree (Olcott 2007). 
2.6.5 Norway 
Norway has been a major oil producer on the world scene for the past 20 years. 
The country is recognised for its administrative system in which it assigns oil 
sector functions to three state controlled institutions, each having a distinctive 
role (Thuber, Hults and Heller 2010). First, there is the National Oil Company 
(NOC) Statoil, the commercial entity, which carries out extensive oil operations 
in both Norway and abroad. Second, the organizational structure includes the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, the Policy-making body (Huem 2008, Thuber, 
Hults and Heller 2010; Kalyuzhnova et al. 2016). This Ministry collaborates with 
the country’s political leadership in setting targets and goals for the oil sector 
and runs the licensing process (Thuber, Hults and Heller 2010; Kalyuzhnova et 
al. 2016). Finally, there is the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD), the 
regulatory and technical advisory agency which collects fees from oil operators, 
compiles data on all hydrocarbon activities on the Norwegian Continental Shelf 
(NCS), sets hydrocarbon regulations within its areas of responsibility and 
advises the Ministry on technical matters. According to Thuber, Hults and Heller 
(2010), the separation of roles and responsibilities between policies and 
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commercial and regulatory bodies became recognised as the “Norwegian Model” 
of oil sector governance. 
Moreover, Norway has witnessed the macroeconomic distortions created by oil 
industries elsewhere in the world and was concerned by the intrusion of the 
industry into the traditional way of life of coastal communities. Therefore, the 
government decided to pursue a “go-slow” policy regarding the development of 
the petroleum industry (Wolf and Pollitt 2009; Thurber, Hults and Heller 2010). 
The Norwegian government stated that absolute control of the petroleum sector 
would be the best means of guaranteeing the correct pace of development and 
ensuring that industrial expertise was built domestically instead of abroad (Wolf 
and Pollitt 2009; Thurber et al 2010).  
In Norway, local industrial competence has been developed to serve the 
offshore oil and gas activities with goods and services on a rather broad basis. 
Moreover, in Norway, the demand for LC services from operating petroleum 
activities is very high, for instance, in the investment in developing new fields, 
LC level is at 50-60% (measured in value added), whereas in maintenance and 
operations, it is approximately 80% (Heum 2008). Furthermore, the significant 
share of LC in Norway can be explained partly by the advantage of geographical 
proximity, but also because the technical competence of local service providers 
and suppliers in the oil and gas industry has proven to be truly competitive by 
international standards (Heum 2008). This supports the fact that the degree of 
success in LC development in Norway is not measured by domestic 
employment, but more importantly, that service providers and suppliers based 
in Norway serve markets and operate businesses all over the world. Essentially 
this suggests that it is possible to generate industrial value-added capacity that 
will benefit society if industrial competence is domestically based and 
internationally competitive (Heum 2008). 
As already stated, these policies have been quite significant to Norway’s success 
in offshore oil and gas activities. For example, the administrative system in 
which it assigns oil sector functions to three state controlled institutions, each 
with its distinctive role (Thuber et al 2010), has allowed politics to be conducted 
with transparency and business to be conducted away from politics. Also, in 
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Norway there is strong intolerance of corruption among civil servants and 
business people and this has further assured the separation of business and 
politics (Heum 2008). As Joseph Stiglitz (2007 pg.30) sceptically remarked, “By 
most accounts, Norway’s state oil company was both efficient and incorruptible; 
probably few countries have been able to realise for its citizens a larger fraction 
of the potential value of a country’s resources” (Wolf and Pollitt 2009). Norway 
is also known for its proactive approach to the development of strong local 
services and construction sector associated with oil exploration and 
development. This approach includes favouring local involvement and ranges 
from supporting Statoil in the licensing round as it would increase opportunities 
for developing local suppliers and encouraging the use of locally produced goods 
and services.  
In the late 1970s, foreign operators entering the Norwegian industry were 
encouraged to form R&D partnerships and joint development programs with 
research institutions and Norwegian companies. The strategies and technology 
transfer of the operators were a crucial and determining factor in the licencing 
process (Accenture 2008). Again, Norway identified a list of institutional 
responsibilities that include: 
• Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD), the regulatory and technical 
advisory agency, which collects fees from oil operators, compiles data 
on all hydrocarbon activities on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS), 
sets hydrocarbon regulations within its areas of responsibility and 
advises the Ministry on technical matters (Thuber et al 2010). 
• NOC Statoil, the commercial entity, which carries out extensive oil 
operations both in Norway and abroad. 
• The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, the Policy-making body. The 
Ministry collaborates with the country’s political leadership in setting 
targets and goals for the oil sector’s plans for achieving these targets 
and runs the licensing process (Thuber et al 2010). The ministry also 
established the Petroleum Act (sections 8, 23, and 54), which delineates 
requirements regarding the oil companies’ purchasing policies, for 
example it ensures that genuine opportunities shall be given to 
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competitive Norwegian suppliers to secure orders. Also, operating 
companies are mandated to inform the Norwegian supply industry in 
advance of the bidding process. In addition, it is the duty of the operator 
to perform at least 50% of all required field development expenditure 
(Thuber et al 2010). 
2.6.6 Brazil 
In Brazil’s oil and gas industry, two organisations are prominent:  the State Oil 
Corporation Petrobras, which produces 92% of the gas and 98% of oil in Brazil; 
and the National Petroleum Agency (ANP), which is the regulatory agency for 
the sector (Prochnik 2011). These two organisations are responsible for 
implementing policy in the Brazilian oil and gas industry (Prochnik 2011). 
In Brazil, there has been a deliberate attempt by the government to balance 
local content requirement across the oil and gas industry and in other sectors, 
by exploring models that are realistic and sustainable and applying these 
models to the oil and gas industry in ways that will fit into the Brazilian context 
(Playfoot et al. 2015). Much effort has been put into developing the Brazilian 
LCP to align with the country’s economic growth strategies. According to Warner 
et al. (2013) and Playfoot et al. (2015), the Brazilian LCP has been successful 
in promoting indigenous participation and in doing so has created demand for 
skilled local labour. To increase indigenous participation, Brazil implemented 
the LCP as part of a wide macroeconomic structure (Playfoot et al. 2015). 
Hence, the Brazilian LCP strengthens the demand for the local market 
(manufacturing, construction and naval engineering) (Playfoot et al. 2015). As 
a result, it also improves the linkage to other sectors of the Brazilian economy. 
This has not only ensured indigenous participation in the oil and gas industry, 
but has also stimulated the growth of the Brazilian economy by creating 
employment in other sectors and supporting local companies (Prominp 2008; 
Mireftekhari 2013). The Brazilian LCP has two long-term goals: first, the 
development of technology and research sector; and second, the diversification 
of the petroleum industry (Playfoot et al. 2015). The R&D sector for the supply 
of technologies is vital to the diversification of the oil and gas industry, due to 
the strong network of research centres which allow local oil and gas companies 
to compete with international companies (Playfoot et al. 2015). In addition, 
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following the diversification of the Brazilian oil and gas industry, there is 
increased participation of local companies on a competitive base (Prominp 
2008; Justi et al. 2009; Mireftekhari 2013, and Playfoot et al. 2015). The 
diversification policy was led by the National Development Bank (BNDES) and 
Petrobras and chaired by the National Oil and Natural Gas Industry Mobilisation 
Program (PROMINP). The PROMINP was created in 1993, with the aim of 
increasing the involvement of local goods and service vendors in the oil and gas 
industry, in alignment with the Brazilian local content policy (Justi et al. 2009). 
Nevertheless, there are a number of exceptions as equipment for deep-water 
operations are still brought from outside Brazil.  Nonetheless, success was 
achieved as there has been an increase in domestic vendors competing for 
contracts with international suppliers. The success of the LCP in Brazil is due to 
the mechanism by which it was enacted. These mechanisms are the PROMINP 
and Petrobras (Playfoot et al. 2015).  The PROMINP played a crucial role in 
identifying the challenges to LCP implementation which were addressed through 
education and training (Justi et al. 2009). Thus, through the PROMINP, 
education and training was aligned and became the dual pillars of the LCP in 
Brazil (Playfoot et al. 2015).  In addition, Petrobras played an important role in 
LCP implementation in Brazil through the agreement made with Serviço 
Brasileiro de Apoio às Micro e Pequenas Empresas (SEBRAE), the national 
association that supports small businesses (Playfoot et al. 2015). As a result of 
this partnership, small and medium size businesses were included in the supply 
chain. This allowed Petrobras to map out business opportunities and channel 
funds into the most appropriate areas of training and offer necessary support 
to domestic companies (Justi et al. 2009). Thus, they were able to support the 
capacity and capabilities of local companies. 
Furthermore, to increase the capacity of local companies, the funding of training 
and education was linked to operations in the Brazilian oil and gas industry. The 
approach taken to spend and source labour and goods was developed during 
the licensing round and operators were mandated to invest 1% of the revenue 
generated from each oil field being explored and produced (Justi et al. 2009; 
Baroso and Macedo 2012). These funds are then used in research and 
development projects in the oil and gas industry. Moreover, it is further 
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stipulated that half of these funds must be used in Brazilian universities or 
institutes accredited by the ANP (Playfoot et al. 2015). By investing in the 
Brazilian education sector, international companies have established factories 
in Brazil due to its strong research base (Playfoot et al. 2015). These 
international companies have also partnered with local research institutions and 
are active in technology transfer for deep-water equipment. Partnership 
between the IOCs and local companies has been crucial in developing a local 
workforce skilled in pre-salt production (Playfoot et al. 2015). Pre-salt activities 
are normally expensive and require complex technologies, thus, without the 
LCP’s long term goals in research and development, Brazil would not be able to 
meet its pre-salt extraction targets (Playfoot et al. 2015). 
2.6.7 Angola 
Over the past two decades, Angola has become a significant player in the oil 
sector (Teka 2012). Sonangol, the Angolan state-owned/ national oil company 
that runs the Angolan oil operations under the Angolan Petroleum Activity Law 
(Law no. 13/76 of 1976), is the sole owner of Angola’s hydrocarbon resources 
(Klueh and Pastor 2008, Teka 2012). Sonangol owns 33.5% of the production 
equity, 6.7% of the deep-water production equity and 25.5% of exploration 
equity; these stakes were generated through Production Sharing Agreements 
(PSAs) with international oil companies (Teka 2012). 
However, Angola, despite being a resource rich country with a 3% annual 
growth per year, has shown that the development impact of oil activities has 
had limited effect on the rest of the economy and the country has not been able 
to develop the local industry (Wiig and Ramalho 2005). According to Power 
(2011), Angola is the world’s richest country among the poorest. Also, as stated 
by a civil society leader “Angola is developing rapidly regarding the economy, 
but this is not resulting in better quality of life for everyone” (Ovadia 2012: pg. 
389). However, compared to Norway and Brazil, Angola has placed new 
emphasis on the LCP, which it calls National content or Angolanisation, to 
promote local involvement in the national oil industry (Ramalho 2005; Ovadia 
2012; Teka 2012, Wiig and Ovadia 2013). According to Ovadia (2012) and 
Ovadia (2013), Angola’s LCP consists of two separate components: 
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Angolanisation that is focused on human resources and the procurement of 
Angolan goods and services. 
The Angolan government, through consistent prioritisation of the LCP, has been 
able to encourage IOCs to support LCP promotion in Angola. Moreover, 
Sonangol has played a key role in implementing the LCP (Ovadia 2014; 2016). 
Although Angola has no precise definition of the LCP, it enforces it through 
various legislative provisions and production sharing contracts with IOCs 
(Ovadia 2014; Asiago 2016). Furthermore, a department has been created 
under the Ministry of Petroleum called the National Directorate for Development 
of Angolanisation, to help increase the participation of Angolans in the oil and 
gas sector through a process called “positive discrimination” (Ovadia 2016). 
The government has also passed a law whereby tax incentives are provided to 
indigenous companies and has also implemented a law mandating the use of 
Angolan banks and ensuring that oil and gas companies pay their taxes and 
domestic contractors in Angolan currency (Ovadia 2014; 2016). Regarding 
training, Angolan companies are mandated to contribute $0.15 for every barrel 
of oil produced, on a yearly basis, towards the training of Angolans (Asiago 
2016).  
Finally, in terms of increasing local participation, the LCP on the domestic 
sourcing of goods and services has been effective, even though most of the 
local connections seem to involve generic products, essential services and 
imported goods (Warner et al. 2013). In the oil and gas industry, the 
percentage of local employment ranges from 51% to 90% (Asiago 2016) and 
there are also rules under the Decree-Law 127/03 that foreign companies 
operating in the Angolan oil and gas industry must contract goods and services 
from local companies (Asiago 2016). One of these rules states that all activities 
with low capital value should be carried out by Angolan companies (Asiago 
2016). A second rule states that there should be a competitive system whereby 
all businesses participating in the Angolan oil and gas industry must utilise local 
materials, services, and equipment. However, if the quality of the materials is 
not up to international standard or unavailable, they can be acquired from 
foreign companies (Asiago 2016).  
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Sonangol has also expanded into some sectors directly linked to the oil sector 
including: fabrication, drilling, industrial supplies, transportation, 
infrastructure, food retail and catering, civil engineering and real estate. Thus, 
Sonangol has been the primary tool for economic diversification (Warner et al. 
2013). In regard to monitoring, Sonangol monitors the domestic sourcing of 
goods and services and the Ministry of Petroleum monitors policy 
implementation with respect to the recruitment of foreign workers. However, it 
would appear there is no process or methodology guide in place to measure the 
impact of training activities and the effective utilisation of resources from the 
training funds, especially funds provided by the Ministry of Petroleum (Warner 
et al. 2013). Table 2.1 presents ta comparative analysis of LCP in the countries 
discussed above considering the variables that emerged from the review. 
 
 
  
61 
Table 2.1. Classification of local content policies of oil and gas producing countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Tordo et al. 2013; Lagoke 2014
 Angola Brazil Indonesia Kazakhstan  Malaysia Trinidad and Tobago Norway 
Year of 
discovery 
1990s 1939 1883 1899 1910 1866 1960s 
Year 
production 
commenced 
1990s 1940s 1890 1911 Exact year unknown 1901 1960s 
NOC/ Year 
of 
establishme
nt 
SONSNGOL 
1976 
PETROBRAS 
1953 
PERTAMINA 
1968 
KazMunayGas  
2002 
PETRONAS 
1974 
PETROTRIN 
1993 
STATOIL 
1972 
Exploration 
activities  
Onshore and 
Offshore 
Onshore and 
Offshore 
Onshore and Offshore Onshore and Offshore Onshore and Offshore Offshore Offshore 
Daily prod 
(million 
barrels) 
1.8 2.2 1.5 1.7 1.4 0.7 3.4 
Oil reserves 
(billion 
reserves) 
15.1 13.5 4.0 0.78 0.36 0.8 6.9 
Local 
content 
indices 
The LC is based on 
several laws for 
LCP. These include 
Petroleum Act 2004. 
Petroleum law 1978 
Decree 20/82 and 
decree 127/03. In 
addition, it engages 
in JVs and PSAs 
with other 
companies. 
LC is brazil is 
premised on the 
1997 Petroleum 
Law. The level of 
LC is between 80-
90 percent 
The LC in Indonesia is based upon Oil 
and Gas Law No. 22/2001 segregating 
regulatory role and commercial 
operations; Presidential Regulation No. 
54/2010 on procurement of domestic 
goods and services; Regulation No. 
258/PMK.011/2011 on caps applicable 
to expatriate costs; and Supply Chain 
Management Manual PTK 007/2009 as 
revised in 2011. 
The LC in Kazakhstan is based on 
the Law 291-IV/2010 on subsoil 
and subsoil users; Decree 
1139/2007 on the rules for the 
procurement of goods, works, and 
services for subsoil users; and 
PSAs, which contain LC 
obligations specific to the 
project/area of operation. 
The LC in Malaysia is based 
on the Petroleum Mining Act 
1966; Petroleum 
Development Act 1974; 
Petroleum sharing contracts; 
Companies Act 1965; and 
Economic Transformation 
Program 2010. 
T&Ts LC is based upon a 
LCP which highlights 
fiscal and non-fiscal 
measures to develop 
indigenous content. This 
policy is regulated by the 
Permanent Local Content 
Committee (PLCC). In 
addition, it operates JVs, 
PSCs. 
The LC in Norway is 
based on the Royal 
Decree of 1972. It 
established the 
Government Supplies 
Office (GSO) which is 
similar to OSO to 
promote Norwegian 
nationals. 
Main local 
content 
objectives 
Promoting Angolan 
employment and 
domestic sourcing of 
goods and services 
Development of 
local suppliers and 
technology, 
employment and 
income 
Knowledge transfer to enhance 
competitiveness at national, regional 
and international levels 
Increase the number of national 
workers, promote nationals’ skill 
development and restrict foreign 
workers  
Strengthen value-creating 
activities across the oil and 
gas value chain; encourage 
contractors to maximise the 
employment of nationals and 
transform the Malaysia into a 
hub for oil field services and 
equipment  
Increase the level of 
participation of nationals, 
technology and capital 
and country’s value 
through the development 
and the increase of local 
goods and services, 
businesses, people and 
financing within and 
outside T&T 
Enhance Norwegian 
presences in all facets of 
the oil and gas industry 
through capacity 
development  
Local 
content 
strategy  
Mandating operators 
to contribute 
financially to 
training of nationals; 
engagement of an 
NGO to provide 
linkage between 
global supply chains 
and local enterprise 
“Delayed 
gratification” and in 
–house capacity and 
capability 
development 
Increase share of spend on Indonesian 
personnel 
Support the economic 
diversification.  
Reduce economic dependency on 
the petroleum sector 
Train Malaysian workforce 
with the objective to replace 
expatriate workforce 
Maximisation of 
indigenous workforce to 
generate backward 
linkages to increase value 
addition and capacity 
development     
Local content policy; 
establishment of GSO 
Impact of 
local content 
policy 
Increase in local 
employment 
Active participation 
of Brazilian 
national both in the 
upstream and 
downstream sector. 
Development of indigenous capabilities 
that has enabled Indonesian citizens to 
engage in technical development 
exchange. 
Created opportunities for local 
human and industrial capacity in a 
wide range of activities that 
provides input and output in the oil 
and gas sector 
Improved the performance 
and competitiveness of 
indigenous businesses and 
strengthen local skills  
Development of 
indigenous capacities and 
establishment of 
partnerships 
Indigenous involvement 
in all areas of the oil and 
gas business as well as 
active participation I both 
the upstream and 
downstream of the oil and 
gas industry  
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2.7 LCP experiences of oil and gas producing countries   
From the analysis in Table 2.1, it is evident that all countries have the same 
goal, which is to maximise the benefit generated from oil exploration for the 
citizens of their country.  To do this, they all established a national oil company 
that is responsible for creating policies and managing the petroleum resources 
of their various countries. One such policy created by these countries is the 
LCP. These countries have established different frameworks to implement the 
LCP, some of which are through skills development, indigenous participation 
and promotion of employment. Furthermore, these policy frameworks vary 
according to the various countries’ legislations (LCP, laws, regulations, decrees) 
and the kind of special considerations stipulated in contracts (Faro 2015; 2017).  
When creating the LCP, many oil producing countries have employed different 
approaches – depending on their needs and reasons for the LCP, thus 
reinforcing the fact that the LCP cannot be applied in the same way in every 
country because of the challenges faced by these countries and the diversity of 
their economy. Therefore, the LCP is not a manual or book that can be 
replicated by every country (Faro 2015; 2017). Despite these differences, there 
are some similarities between the frameworks of these countries in the 
implementation of the LCP. For instance, agreements and contracts are 
common tools used by countries; they include requirements and clauses in their 
agreements and contracts that will help promote the LCP in their business. Laws 
are also common but are usually applied with a different focus. For example, 
Kazakhstan and Angola have specific legislation in place for the employment 
and training of their citizens and laws to promote public procurements. While 
Malaysia, Brazil, Indonesia and Trinidad and Tobago created different LCP 
principles in their petroleum law (Warner et al. 2013).  Moreover, decrees are 
used by different countries to enforce their requirements; Kazakhstan has 
instituted several decrees for the regulation of monitoring and procurement 
processes (Ospanova 2010). They also have a decree protecting against 
discrimination in employment, similar to the Angolan government’s Decree 
(13/10) (Olcott 2009; Faro 2015; 2017). 
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Furthermore, Norway has been identified as a good example of LCP 
implementation in the oil and gas industry.  By developing its workforce and 
industrial base, Norway has made its LCP competitive abroad (Faro 2015; 
2017). Furthermore, Norway has a developed institution and stable economy 
that enabled the design and implementation of a successful LCP, which had a 
positive spin-off effect on other sectors of its economy (Heum et al. 2007). It 
is important to note that the oil producing countries mentioned in this study 
were established producers before Norway began its oil production (Faro 2015; 
2017). This is a different scenario for countries like Nigeria, Indonesia and 
Malaysia, as they needed to establish enabling institutions and to develop key 
sectors of the economy (Faro 2015; 2017). According to Huem et al. (2007) 
and Faro (2015; 2017), this is the reason why Norway did not experience the 
challenges faced by other oil producing countries in the adoption of the LCP. 
For instance; Nigeria and Angola have had to contend with bureaucracy and 
corruption in the implementation of the LCP. With regard to indigenous 
participation, foreign companies face challenges in integrating with indigenous 
firms due to the latter’s lack of experience (Warner et al. 2013). 
2.8 History of the LCP in Nigeria 
The need to capture the benefits of extractive resource development is driving 
resource-rich countries to implement policies, most notably local content policy, 
geared at maximising revenue generated from the extractive industry (Nwapi 
2010).  LCP increases the utilisation of domestic human and material resources 
in the extractive sector. In the case of the oil and gas industry, LCP domiciles 
oil and gas activities in the country that was previously done abroad (Ovadia 
2016) it promotes indigenous participation, encourages the development of 
manufacturing geared towards linkages to other sectors of the economy 
(Ovadia 2014). 
In Nigeria, the Obasanjo administration initiated the Nigerian Local Content 
Policy in 2000, to drive the increase of indigenous participation in the industry 
(Ovadia 2013; Okafor and Aniche 2014; Monday 2015). Before the passage of 
the policy, several attempts were made to address the issue of training and 
employment of Nigerians in the industry (Atsegbua 2012). One of these 
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attempts was the Petroleum Regulation of 1969 which mandated holders of 
operating licences to train and employ Nigerians in the industry within ten years 
of the lease and to ensure that 75% of the total number of employees on the 
project were Nigerian (Atsegbua 2012; Akinrele 2014 and Anyadike 2014). 
However, the regulation and training provisions provided in the act failed to 
produce the desired impact on indigenous participation in the oil and gas 
industry (Atsegbua 2012). Thus, in 2001, the National Committee on Local 
Content Development (NCLCD) was established by NAPIMS to identify ways to 
improve the LCP and indigenous participation in the oil and gas industry (Ovadia 
2013). The NCLCD produced a report in 2002 highlighting that the level of LC 
in the upstream sector of the industry was at 5%. This shows that 95% of the 
annual expenditure had left the country (Huem et al. 2003; Ovadia 2013).  
The NCLCD proposed an LC level of 40% in the oil and gas industry by 2005 
and 60% by 2010 and recommended that a Nigerian Content Development Bill 
be drafted. The same year the DPR established a Nigeria Content Unit with the 
sole aim of producing research on the LCP in Nigeria. The Norwegian Agency 
for Development Cooperation (NORAD) commissioned the research under 
Heum et al. (2003) in collaboration with Norway and Nigeria (Nwaokoro 2011 
and Ovadia 2013). Although the bill was not passed by the end of President 
Obasanjo’s tenure, some of the recommendations from the research were 
implemented. For instance, in 2005 the Nigerian Content Division (NCD) was 
established by the NNPC to work with the MNC to develop strategies for the 
implementation and compliance of directives by oil and gas companies 
(Nwaokoro 2011). The NCD was charged with monitoring compliance, 
indigenous capacity building and planning (Nwanolue and Iwuoha 2012). One 
of the strategies was to change the original Nigerian content target to 45% in 
2005 and 70% by 2010 (Ovadia 2013; Okafor and Aniche 2014).  
To enhance the contribution of the NCD, the NNPC with the support of some 
key stakeholders, some of which were MNCs in the industry, set up the Nigerian 
Content Consultative Forum (NCCF) (Nwanolue and Iwuoha 2012). The forum 
was created for these stakeholders to brainstorm and find ways of improving 
the LCP in the industry. The NCCF was divided into eight divisions covering 
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banking, fabrication, manufacturing, insurance, shipping, engineering, logistics, 
petroleum engineering and subsurface (Nwanolue and Iwuoha 2012). 
Furthermore, through the NCD and NCCF, the NNPC ordered all IOCs in Nigeria 
to establish an NCD in their various companies with a general manager heading 
the division (Nwanolue and Iwuoha 2012 and Ovadia 2013). However, this had 
little success in improving the LCP in the industry as there was resistance from 
IOCs to implement the LCP in their activities (Ovadia 2014). 
In addition to these changes, in 2010 the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content 
Development Act (NOGICD) was passed into law by President Goodluck 
Jonathan (Nwaokoro 2011). 
The Act stated that: 
“Compliance with the provisions of this Act and promotion of Nigerian Content 
development shall be major criteria for the award of licences, permits and any 
other interest in bidding for oil exploration, production, transportation and 
development or any other operations in the Nigerian oil and gas industry”. S. 
3(3) 
The NOGICD Act has 106 clauses and is divided into three parts and a schedule. 
Figure 2.1 below illustrates the structure of the NOGICD Act. 
Figure 2.2 Structure of the NOGICD Act (Ado 2016 pg. 78) 
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The NOGICD Act gave preference to indigenous companies in the award of oil 
licences and oil blocks in the Nigerian oil and gas industry (Nwaokoro 2011; 
Ovadia 2013; Okafor and Anchie 2014). To enforce the NOGICD Act, the 
Nigerian Content Monitoring and Development Board (NCDMB) was created to 
ensure compliance and build the capacity of indigenous companies in the 
industry (Ovadia 2013). In addition, as stated in S. 69 of the NOGICD Act:  
“There is established the Nigerian Content Monitoring Board (in this Act referred 
to as "the Board") which shall have the functions and powers conferred on it by 
this Act.” 
Furthermore, the Act extensively states that the function of the NCDMB is to 
include administering, coordinating, monitoring, supervising, appraising and 
managing LCP implementation (Ado 2010). The NCDMB is also responsible for 
the development of indigenous companies’ capabilities, making guidelines for 
LCP implementation and administering the joint qualification system (JQS) 
(Ihua 2010; Ado 2016). According to Okusami (2010) the key responsibilities 
of the NCDMB include, employment and training of locals, integration of local 
suppliers, promotion of indigenous companies and the establishment of 
essential infrastructures. 
Additionally, the Nigerian Content Development Fund was established to 
implement the LCP in the industry. The fund was financed by a mandatory 1% 
of every contract awarded in the Nigerian upstream oil and gas industry 
(Nwaokoro 2011). This fund was meant to assist indigenous companies to 
participate in the activities of the petroleum industry. As well as complying with 
the policy, IOCs were to act as enforcers by ensuring that their partners, 
contractors and subcontractors reported their Nigerian content information and 
vice versa. In this way, this would ensure compliance with the policies 
(Nwaokoro 2011).  
In addition to this, all operators are mandated to submit a Nigerian content 
plan as part of the conditions for bidding on all tenders and licence permits. 
They also needed to comply with a range of regulations designed for the 
domiciliation of activities relating to the Nigerian oil and gas industry (Nwaokoro 
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2011; Ovadia 2013). The NOGICD Act further stipulates there should be a 
maximum of 5% foreign workforce management positions and a minimum level 
of Nigerian content in any project, including fabrication, manufacturing, 
engineering, research and development, procurement services, shipping and 
logistics (Ovaida 2013). The NOGICD Act gave the NCDMB the authority to 
impose a fine of 5% of the project value, or to cancel the project for any breach 
or non-compliance (Nwaokoro 2011; Ovadia 2013). An additional measure is 
that every operator is required to submit a Nigerian Content Performance 
Report of all the year’s activities to ensure compliance (Nwaokoro 2011; Ovadia 
2013).  
From the discussion above, it is clear that the Nigerian oil and gas industry 
intended to improve the LCP in the industry and to help indigenous companies 
participate in the petroleum industry by building the capacity of Nigerians 
through local capacity development. However, the policy has had little impact 
on the Nigerian oil and gas industry. Thus, the challenges facing the 
implementation of the LCP are outlined in section 2.8.1   
2.8.1 Challenges facing the Nigerian local content policy 
Olsen (2008) stated that the LCP is a means to an end. The purpose of the LCP 
is to create more employment for locals and increase national wealth through 
economic growth (Ovadia 2013). The LCP in Nigeria also represents an attempt 
to move beyond the indigenisation policies of the 1970s. The main aim of the 
Nigerian local content policy is the “domiciliation” of economic activities in 
Nigeria. The emphasis on domiciliation is to undertake work in Nigeria that was 
previously conducted abroad (Ovadia 2013). This would ensure that the 
percentage of locally produced materials, personnel, goods and services 
rendered to the industry was increased, thereby generating more employment 
and economic empowerment (Omenikolo and Amadi 2010). This was also 
supported by Ihua (2010), who stated that the LCP was aimed at transforming 
the industry into an economic hub for promoting SMEs participation, job 
creation and a base for industrial growth, as well as slowing capital flight from 
the country. In addition, the fundamental need for this policy was re-
  
68 
emphasised when the speaker of Nigeria’s House of Representatives was quoted 
in the media as saying:  
“It is important to note that while the oil and gas industry 
clearly dominates the Nigerian economy, a successful local 
content policy must be a part of a comprehensive industrial 
and economic growth strategy for Nigeria as a whole” 
(Ihua 2010 pg. 2).  
This should include both a plan for the development of infrastructure and a 
proposal for capacity building initiatives that will help broaden Nigeria’s 
industrial base (Ihua 2010). 
Nigeria is reputed to be among the world’s leading countries in hydrocarbon 
production, currently ranked among the first ten leading producers of oil and 
gas. Indeed, the country exports about 2.0 million barrels per day with a daily 
production of about 2.4 million. 
Table 2.2 illustrates how the price of crude oil has risen since the 1980s; 
however, the revenue from the Nigerian oil and gas industry has not been truly 
translated into meaningful development, due primarily to poor leadership and 
corruption. This may be because in Nigeria corruption remains an endemic 
challenge, with accountability and transparency being inhibited by corruption. 
This has resulted in economic subversion (Erhun 2015). Rampant corruption 
has created significant impediments to the enforcement of the LCP (Erhun 
2015); one of which is the IOCs’ resistance to comply with the policy while 
operating in the country (Bakare 2011). This resistance has led to conditions 
such as bribery that have distorted the policy objectives and consequently 
hindered the policy’s objectives (Adedeji et al. 2014). 
 
 
  
69 
 
Table 2.2. Average prices of Nigerian Bonny Light (2000 - 2016) 
Source: Adapted from Energy Information Administration (EIA) 2017 
 
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
2000 25.64 28.40 29.58 25.46 25.86 31.22 31.19 31.91 32.86 32.90 33.46 31.12 
2001 30.76 28.84 27.16 28.81 29.92 28.14 27.63 28.10 29.59 23.49 22.23 20.42 
2002 21.47 21.17 25.74 27.17 25.61 25.78 27.47 26.00 30.79 30.71 27.73 29.82 
2003 32.73 37.02 34.18 28.85 29.34 30.09 30.36 31.09 29.99 30.79 31.57 32.67 
2004 33.09 34.65 36.38 36.91 38.33 37.71 41.02 44.92 46.16 52.66 46.75 44.72 
2005 46.11 48.96 55.61 54.44 52.46 58.27 60.23 66.99 67.25 64.56 61.70 61.80 
2006 68.86 66.61 66.27 69.53 72.37 72.71 76.7 75.16 67.03 60.96 63.92 62.46 
2007 59.87 61.78 66.32 69.87 74.03 69.15 81.61 77.15 82.87 90.44 95.14 96.63 
2008 99.18 97.66 110.74 117.59 124.53 138.51 138.95 126.26 98.23 81.31 58.31 47.77 
2009 48.61 43.18 48.97 50.65 58.81 72.69 73.55 73.68 72.48 81.03 79.55 81.55 
2010 82.74 80.04 81.26 81.45 86.19 78.45 79.45 82.52 77.85 87.74 87.41 94.04 
2011 103.58 106.28 109.68 126.85 103.39 123.11 122.36 113.50 90.21 93.96 102.59 101.29 
2012 103.22 108.49 108.09 103.2 106.17 84.03 96.89 97.03 92.44 92.24 87.05 91.85 
2013 97.98 97.48 97.24 97.23 96.29 98.46 106.41 107.93 108.67 104.15 94.74 99.94 
2014 98.25 103.46 101.73 104.33 105.01 107.95 106.06 97.86 83.26 82.96 77.85 56.91 
2015 52.22 53.56 51.41 56.25 57.59 61.51 50.59 42.45 45.55 47.3 46.12 37.13 
2016 36.61 26.17 36.67 40.88 48.16 50.52 45.55 42.78 43.85 50.3 44.62 53.75 
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Furthermore, there are a number of vulnerable aspects of the policy, including 
the statement that the NCDMB, which is responsible for implementing the 
policy, can accept gifts from members of the public if the provisions attached 
to the gifts are not contrary to the function of the NCDMB under the policy 
(Nwapi 2015). 
The level of infrastructure has also been a challenge in the implementation of 
the LCP in the industry, due to the weak industrial base, lack of water, power 
and other necessary infrastructures required to support an expanding 
manufacturing base and growing SMEs in the country. Compared to other 
emerging resource-rich countries, Nigeria is behind in almost all metrics, from 
GDP to indigenous participation in the industry (Bakare 2011). There is also the 
challenge of funding from financial institutions, which has limited the exposure 
of indigenous companies to complex projects, thus making them less 
competitive in the industry (Otombosoba and Dosunmu 2016). Moreover, there 
is also the IOCs’ resistance to partner with indigenous companies as they often 
believe that indigenous companies lack the capability to operate in the capital-
intensive industry (Nwosu et al. 2006; Okafor and Aniche 2014).  
In addition, Nwosu et al. (2006) stated that the Nigerian oil and gas industry 
has side-lined the interests of local contractors to participate in the industry, 
which has led to insincerity and the corruption of local stakeholders. He also 
claims that local financial investment in the oil sector is at a very low level and 
has resulted in an almost complete foreign monopoly. This has added to the 
frustration of local entrepreneurs attempting to participate in the industry. In 
Nigeria, the general perception is that the activities in the oil and gas sector are 
too capital intensive and technology oriented to involve local contractors 
(Nwosu et al. 2006). Other reasons include the alleged poor reliability and 
inferior technical capability of the local workforce. This has resulted in fewer 
opportunities for local entrepreneurs, underemployment of Nigerians and job 
gain for foreign companies with cash flow haemorrhaging from Nigeria (Nwosu 
et al. 2006).   
A further complication, which has been another source of concern, is the lack 
of adequate training facilities in the country, (Bakare 2011). Additionally, the 
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lack of funding from the federal government has compromised research and 
technical initiatives (Erhun 2015). The capacity building capabilities in Nigerian 
universities has also been unsustainable because of the dynamics of the 
universities’ economic and political situation (Ozigbo 2008). The reason for this 
is that when there are insufficient skills in a production system it results in poor 
quality output which hinders capacity building and the country’s sustainable 
development. Thus, it is challenging to produce the indigenous workforce 
required to satisfy the LCP in the industry (Erhun 2015). Another challenge to 
the implementation of the LCP is the deficient performance of the NCDMB, the 
board responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the LCP in the 
industry.  
According to Nwanolue and Iwuoha (2012), the NCDMB lacks the institutional 
alertness to monitor oil and gas companies’ compliance in implementing the 
LCP. Consequently, NCDMB officials can distort the instruments of the policy for 
their own interest (Adedeji et al. 2014). The lack of monitoring has created 
instances where IOCs have merged with indigenous companies. However, these 
companies often act as a mere front, allowing foreign oil companies to operate 
as Nigerian companies to satisfy the LCP guidelines. (Nwanolue and Iwuoha 
2012; Ovadia 2013). Although the board uses the Joint Qualification System 
(JQS) for awarding contracts, they lack the impetus to deploy officers for site 
visits to monitor compliance at the implementation phase of the project to 
curtail sharp practices (Nwanolue and Iwuoha 2012). Amanze-Nwachukwu 
(2007) stated that poor implementation was due to the unwillingness of 
multinational companies to adhere to the Nigerian LCP initiatives. The non-
adherence of multinationals and the inefficiency of the NNPC to enforce 
compliance is due, primarily, to the lack of legal backup which forces the NNPC 
to depend on the existing laws which are insufficient to ensure effective 
enforcement (Aniche 2014).  
Further, Nwanolue and Iwuoha (2012) stated that the NCDMB only subjects 
itself to the mere appraisal of the contract awarding process and neglects to 
monitor the LCP at the implementation phase of the project. This incipient 
process, where the NCDMB fails to carry out their monitoring responsibility 
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beyond the preliminary state of pre-qualification, significantly evades the 
essential task of checkmating violations of the policy.  Omo and Hector (2008) 
also noted that most MNCs, while ready to comply with the directives at the 
contracting stage, default at the implementation stage. As stated earlier, to 
fulfil the requirements of the contracting stage many MNCs form joint ventures 
with Nigerian oil companies, but default at the implementation stage by 
outsourcing to foreign companies (Nwanolue and Iwuoha 2012). Also, Nigeria 
as a rent seeking state, which means it relies on the oil revenue gained from 
the royalties paid by multinationals from their oil and gas activities (Nwanolue 
and Iwuoha 2012; Okafor and Aniche 2014). This shows that the country does 
not depend on taxing its citizens for revenue generation, but rather it derives 
revenue from royalties gained from its oil and gas activities (Okafor and Aniche 
2014). Hence, the public sector dominates the private sector, thereby making 
the government a major labour employer which creates a situation whereby the 
administration is ineffective and lacks efficiency (Okafor and Aniche 2014).  
The reasons stated above contextualise the poor implementation of the Nigerian 
LCP; namely that the NNPC and NCDMB lack the institutional and administrative 
capacity to monitor and enforce compliance of the Nigerian content policy 
(Okafor and Aniche 2014).  Nwanolue and Iwuoha (2012) further observed that 
Nigeria’s rentier class mentality is the cause of this institutional laxity. In the 
same way, Nigeria’s heavy reliance on external rent from oil and gas activities, 
as opposed to other ways of generating revenue, means that the Nigerian state 
inadvertently reduces its administrative capacity (Okafor and Aniche 2014). 
This rentier class also predisposes the technical weakness of indigenous 
companies, subjects the NCDMB to operate a weak monitoring system, which 
then creates opportunities for foreign companies to largely contravene and 
challenge the LCP (Nwanolue and Iwuoha 2012).  In a societal context, the 
rentier state of Nigeria has created a rentier class whereby a group of 
government functionaries colludes with foreign companies to disrupt the 
Nigerian content policy by making way for them to operate under their local 
business name to win contracts, in return for an agreed proportion of the 
proceeds (Okafor and Aniche 2014). Besides acting as a front for their foreign 
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counterparts, the rentier class also appears to be more preoccupied with the 
consumption of national wealth rather than generating it. 
The BGL study highlights the argument made by some industry stakeholders 
that over 70% of the contracts awarded to Nigerian companies are executed 
overseas. This defeats the primary objective of Nigerian content development 
which is to develop the country’s capacity by executing contracts in Nigeria 
using Nigerian local resources (Balouga 2012). Also, the problems of local 
companies revolve around executive capabilities and critical mass with technical 
and financial wherewithal (Emielu 2005). Usually most local companies are 
small, fragmented and not capable of packaging or attracting loans (Emielu 
2005). Few companies can deliver turnkey projects without giving into some 
form of partnership agreement for equipment, expertise or technical support 
(Balouga 2012).  At present very few indigenous companies can execute or 
provide services that require sophisticated expertise or technology. Thus, this 
policy inadvertently creates a class of middlemen, with indigenous companies 
gaining contracts and outsourcing to IOCs to implement while retaining some 
margin as profit.  
Several issues continue to plague the implementation of the LCP in the Nigerian 
context. Firstly, the NCDMB, which is responsible for setting the policies and 
guidelines while in the pursuit of its ambitious programme to improve the 
Nigerian content, is still mandated to issue and fine or cancel projects. However, 
the enforcement of the Nigerian content is still quite informal (Ovadia 2013).   
Another area of concern for the LCP in Nigeria is the approach taken by the 
NCDMB in providing targets for the Nigerian content that are challenging to 
achieve. This has resulted in a system of granting ministerial waivers that are 
vulnerable to abuse (Ovadia 2013). There is also concern regarding the value 
of the information available to the public. Although Nigeria is much more open 
about its LCP programme than other oil producing countries, there is still much 
room for improvement. For example, a review conducted by Tandice-B solutions 
(2011) in Ovadia (2013) revealed a number of the key challenges faced by the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry (Ovadia 2013). These challenges include: lack of 
transparency in the bidding process for indigenous companies; accountability 
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in the award of oil blocks leases and contracts; the absence of a standard 
operating framework for monitoring the effectiveness of LCP implementation 
and accountability; and inadequate compliance reporting (Ovadia 2013).  This 
reinforces the need for the current research as it invites the question whether 
Nigerians are earning adequate social, environmental and economic rewards 
from LCP implementation in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. 
2.9 Chapter conclusion  
This chapter has outlined the history of the Nigerian oil and gas industry and 
presented that despite all the benefits and income generated from oil and gas 
production, ordinary Nigerian citizens have not been benefiting from the wealth 
created. Hence, the Nigerian government formulated and subsequently 
implemented a LCP.  In attempting to provide some conceptual clarification the 
chapter introduced LCP by reviewing various definitions, its characteristics, and 
arguments for and against LCP. 
The chapter has also reviewed the LCP of other oil producing countries. It 
revealed that these countries have established different frameworks for LCP 
implementation. These countries employ different approaches when creating 
LCP, depending on the need and reasons for the LCP. Hence, the LCP of one 
country cannot be directly applied in the same way in another, as different 
countries have different challenges and economic conditions.  But while there 
are some differences there are also a number of similarities the countries’ LCP 
implementation frameworks. For instance, agreements and contracts are 
common tools, with these including requirements and clauses that help promote 
the LCP. Furthermore, Norway was recognised as being a good example of LCP 
implementation. Norway has developed its workforce and industrial base, 
thereby making it more competitive overseas (Faro 2015; 2017). Moreover, 
Norway has seen its institutions evolve and with a stable economy LCP has been 
implemented successfully. As a by-product there have also been positive spin-
off effects on other sectors of the economy.  
The chapter concluded by reviewing the history of LCP in Nigeria and the 
challenges of policy implementation. It has been outlined that the main purpose 
of the Nigerian LCP was the domiciliation of economic activities in the country, 
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thereby, creating jobs and utilising local resources and generating economic 
empowerment. However, there have been a number of challenges to the 
implementation of the policy. 
The chapter has identified the level of infrastructure as a hindrance to LCP 
implementation. Also, the difficulty of obtaining funding from financial 
institutions has limited the exposure of indigenous companies to complex 
projects, making them less competitive in the industry. As a consequence, this 
has led indigenous companies to collaborate with foreign companies in an 
attempt to evade LCP rules. Furthermore, the chapter showed that the NCDMB, 
in charge of enforcing the policy, lacks the institutional alertness to monitor oil 
and gas companies’ compliance in implementing LCP. 
It is against the backdrop, that this study aims to improve LCP implementation 
in the Nigerian oil and gas industry by critically evaluating the effectiveness of 
the LCP and the transparency practices associated with its implementation. The 
next chapter now focuses on the theoretical framework employed to inform the 
data collection process for this research. 
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Chapter Three 
Institutional Theory and Accountability Framework  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework employed for this study. The 
chapter developed a conceptual framework based on accountability which will 
be helpful when designing the research instrument. After the review of various 
theories (growth, stakeholder and legitimacy theories), the accountability 
framework was underpinned by institutional theory to critically evaluate the 
effectiveness of the LCP and the transparency practices associated with its 
implementation. 
3.2 Growth theory 
Various theories exist which would have been used to underpin this research. 
For instance, Growth theory developed in the 1960s by economic theorists 
Solow, Stigitz and Uzawa (Lagoke 2014). There are three main factors that 
determine growth: (i) the growth of individual skills, (ii) the progress of science 
and productive knowledge, and (iii) incentives. LCP can be classified within the 
first two categories (the growth of individual skills and the progress of science 
and productive knowledge). For instance, literature abounds on capacity 
building and skills development (Klueh et al. 2007; Tordo et al. 2013); and 
progress of science and productive knowledge (Jegede et al. 2013, Heum 
2008). Authors on growth theory (such as Martina and Sunley 2008) argued 
that the growth and productivity in recent times compared to pre-industrial era 
indicates that growth was developed and sustained from within the country, 
and not as a consequence of external results. However, in developing countries 
such as Nigeria, the constraint on growth comes from the lack of capacity to 
absorb opportunities and to put existing ideas into practice, hence, creating a 
skills gap. Furthermore, technology can be transferred across different 
countries, although these technologies will be manned by external manpower 
as a result of the above-mentioned skills gap. Sustaining the growth rate of any 
economy is dependent on the technology advances in the form of new skills, 
capacity building, and infrastructural development (Lagoke 2014). This aligns 
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with Solow (1956) neo classical model of endogenous growth which argues that 
growth of per capita is as a result of capital accumulation and technological 
advancement. 
It can be argued that growth theory supports competitiveness in any industry 
which can stimulate competitive advantage that can lead to opportunities in 
developing skills in a specific area. 
3.3 Stakeholder theory 
Freeman (1984, p.31) defined stakeholder as “any group or individual without 
whose support, an organisation ceases to exist”. The concept of stakeholders 
in organisations has become common in management literature (Donaldson 
and Preston 1995). Stakeholder’s theory has attracted considerable attention 
through the publication of books, articles and papers (see Freeman 1984, 
Alkhafaji 1989 and Clarkson 1991). Stakeholders in organisations comprises of 
customers, creditors, employees, and government bodies. These groups play a 
fundamental role in ensuring the existence of an organisation. Hence, 
stakeholders are groups or individuals whose actions can either affect or is 
affected by the organisation’s objectives or achievement (Freeman 1984). 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) provided a perspective to stakeholder theory by 
dividing it into three different approaches namely: descriptive, instrumental and 
normative. The descriptive approach describes what the corporation is 
(Donaldson and Preston 1995; Lagoke 2015). It defines how organisations 
manage or interact with stakeholders (Freeman 1999). However, descriptive 
approach is rarely utilised because it has no purpose beyond the description of 
the relationship between a particular phenomenon and its stakeholders 
(Donaldson and Preston 1995; Reed et. al 2009).  
The instrumental approach establishes a framework for examining the 
relationship/connections between the practice of stakeholder management and 
the achievement of various corporate performance targets (Donaldson and 
Preston 1995). The instrumental approach is more pragmatic because the 
approach is aimed at understanding the ways policy makers in organisations 
identify and manage stakeholders’ behaviour (Reed et al. 2009). Natural 
resource management literature has used the stakeholder instrumental 
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approach to overcome barriers to the adoption of novel technologies, adapt 
technologies to relevant user groups or transfer technologies to different groups 
(Johnson et al. 2004). Hence it can be argued that stakeholders’ analysis is 
instrumental in enabling information to be sought from a wide range of sources, 
providing a broad knowledge base to develop natural resource management 
initiative. 
The normative approach describes how organisations ought to treat their 
stakeholders. It attempts to offer guidance and interpret the functions of 
corporations/organisations on the basis of some philosophical principles or 
underlying morals (Donaldson and Preston 1995). According to Lagoke (2015), 
the normative approach is grounded in business ethics and corporate social 
responsibility. It places emphasise on the legitimisation of stakeholders’ 
empowerment and involvement in a decision-making process, where 
stakeholders are employed to legitimise the decisions that are made through 
the involvement key figures (Donaldson and Preston 1995).  
These three stakeholder approaches have their perspective value. For instance, 
the descriptive approach reflects and explains the past, presents and future 
state of an organisation and their stakeholders (Donaldson and Preston 1995). 
Instrumental approach utilises stakeholder theory to connect stakeholders 
approach and the desired organisational outcome such as profitability and 
organisational performance (Donaldson and Preston 1995). While the 
normative approach offers guidance to organisations on the basis of 
philosophical principles (Donaldson and Preston 1995). The normative and 
instrumental approaches share a common view, they express more or less the 
choices of the decision makers although they rest entirely on different bases 
(Donaldson and Preston 1995). For instance, instrumental approach is 
essentially hypothetical as it tells the path to take to achieve the desired 
outcome, while the normative is categorical as it reflects on how stakeholders 
should be treated based on the principles of fairness and common good (Philips 
1997 and Lagoke 2015). 
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3.4 Legitimacy Theory 
Legitimacy as defined by Lindblom (1994, p.2) “is a condition or status when 
an entity’s value system is congruent with the value system of the larger social 
system of which the entity is a part”. Suchman (1995, p.574) states that 
“legitimacy is a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially construct 
system or norms, value, beliefs, and definitions”. The above definitions have 
several distinctions between them which Suchman describes as legitimacy 
dynamics (Mobus 2006). What might be considered as legitimate at a time 
might be seen as illegitimate in the future as a result of changing community 
attitudes (Hoque 2006). In addition, legitimacy is also "place dependent", as 
what might be considered as good business practice in one country might be 
unacceptable in another. As a result of the dynamic nature of legitimacy, it can 
be studied from both a strategic and institutional perspective (Suchman 1995 
and Mobus 2006). The strategic view adopts a managerial perspective and 
underscores the way in which organisations manipulate and deploy symbolic 
gestures to gather societal support or an effort to obtain legitimacy status from 
a relevant audience (Suchman 1995 and Mobus 2006). While the institutional 
perspective provides insight on norms and audiences; it perceives legitimacy 
as a set of constitutive beliefs held by a relevant audience (Mobus 2006). 
Suchman (1995) divided legitimacy into three types (Pragmatic, moral, and 
cognitive). Pragmatic legitimacy rests on the evaluation of an organisation’s 
immediate audience (Suchman 1995). It focuses on incorporating constituents 
into policy making which also constitutes a measure of performance (Mobus 
2006). Moral legitimacy lies on the positive attributes of organisations, and their 
activities (Suchman 1995). Cognitive legitimacy shows the world as a chaotic 
environment, where participants much struggle to arrange their experiences 
into logical and coherent accounts. It comes from the availability of cultural 
models that provide a reasonable explanation for organisations and their 
activities (Suchman 1995). 
Legitimacy theory has been embraced by researchers, especially researchers 
within the area of environmental and social accounting (Hoque 2006). 
Legitimacy theory is centred on the idea that a social contract exists between 
  
80 
society and business (Branco and Rodrigues 2006). Hence, it overlaps with 
several other theories, notably institutional theory and stakeholder theory 
(Hoque 2006). Under legitimacy theory, organisations are expected by the 
society to exist and have rights, and in turn, these organisations are required 
to fulfil their expectations about how their operations should be conducted 
(Branco and Rodrigues 2006). As the expectation of the society changes 
organisations must adapt to the changes or their survival will be threatened 
(Hoque 2006). An organisation must ensure that their activities agree with the 
values and norms of the society because if the society values and expectations 
are not met or fulfilled, a breach of contract exists and a legitimacy gap is 
developed (Branco and Rodrigues 2006 and Hoque 2006). Thus, Legitimacy 
theory studies propose that companies in industries with a high visibility are 
expected to exhibit greater concern to improve the corporate image as this is 
inclined to influencing sales and may be considered more likely to make social 
responsibility disclosure (Branco and Rodrigues 2006). With organisations that 
have greater public exposure disclosing more information than its counterparts. 
Since legitimacy theory is based on perception, any response by an organisation 
must be complemented by disclosure, for actions which are not publicised will 
not be effective in changing external parties’ views of the organisation (Cormier 
and Gordon, 2001). 
In summary, legitimacy theory argues that organisations use disclosure to 
shape stakeholder impression of the role and responsibility of the organisation 
and the degree to which the organisation is satisfying those responsibilities 
(Magness 2006). 
3.5 Institutional theory 
Research and theories on institutionalisation have created valuable insights into 
the processes that define and explain institutionalisation in organisational 
environments and their influence on organisational conformity to the 
environment (Oliver 1991). Previous scholars of institutional theory, for 
instance, Selznick (1949, 1957) and Berger & Luckmann (1967) place specific 
emphasis on the lack of concern for institutional myths, rules and beliefs, as a 
shared social reality, and on the processes by which organisations tend to 
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become instilled with value and social meaning. Institutionalism, as stated by 
Diermeier and Krehbiel (2003) is particularly suited for comparative research, 
between either constitutions and committees, or institutional comparisons. 
Oliver (1992) identified three main sources of pressure on institutional practises 
or norms: social, functional and political sources. With regard to pressure, 
institutional change and deinstitutionalisation are influenced by social pressures 
associated with the differentiation of groups, for example, increasing workforce 
diversity, the existence of discordant beliefs and practices and changes in laws 
that may hinder the continuation of practice (Dacin et al. 2002). Functional 
pressures on institutionalisation are those that arise from perceived problems 
in performance levels. These pressures may be linked to broad environmental 
changes, such as intensified competition for resources (Dacin et al. 2002). 
Political pressure results from shifts in interests and underlying power 
distributions that have supported and legitimated institutional arrangements. 
These types of shifts can occur in response to performance crises and other 
factors that compel organisations to question the legitimacy of a given practice 
(Dacin et al. 2002). Furthermore, Hall and Taylor (1996) identified three schools 
of thought regarding institutionalisation: namely, the rational choice approach, 
the historical approach and the sociological approach.  
Historical institutionalisation defines the term institution as the formal or 
informal procedures, norms, routines and conventions embedded in the 
organisational structure of the polity or political economy (Hall and Taylor 1996; 
Alexander 2005; Otitoju 2010). This can range from the rule of constitutional 
order to conventions governing trade union behaviour (Hall and Taylor 1996). 
Alexander (2005) further claims that historical institutionalism focuses on path 
dependency and a heightened awareness of unintended consequences. While 
rational choice institutionalism is associated with institutional economic, it is 
also greatly influenced by the work of North and Williamson (Alexander 2005). 
According to Hall and Taylor (1996), it draws analytical tools from the new 
economics of organisation, which emphasises the importance of rent seeking, 
property rights and the transaction costs of the operation and development of 
institutions. This was supported by Breukers (2005) who defined the term 
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institution as the structure of incentives that make up the constraints and 
opportunities for rational actors. 
Moreover, rational choice institutionalism has three notable features (Hall and 
Taylor 1996). First, it adopts a behaviour assumption character. This suggests 
that rational actors have a fixed set of tastes or preferences, which strives to 
maximise the attainment of these preferences, employing a strategic manner 
that presumes extensive calculation. Secondly, rational actors have a unique 
impression of politics. They see politics as a series of collective action dilemmas. 
These rational actors work in a way to maximise the attainment of their 
preference, which is likely to produce an outcome that is collectively sub-
optimal (Hall and Taylor 1996). Finally, another feature of rational actors is 
strategic interaction, which implies that the behaviour of rational actors is more 
likely to be driven by a strategic calculus rather than impersonal historical 
forces.  
The sociological institutional approach began as a subfield of organisation 
theory and focuses mainly on institutional forms and procedures in the 
organisation (Alexander 2005). This approach argues that institutionalisation 
was not due to a strategic search for maximum efficiency; instead, the 
procedures and forms should be culturally specific practices, such as the 
ceremonies and myths devised by societies and integrated into organisations. 
This is not necessarily done to enhance their formal means-ends efficiency, but 
due to the type of processes associated with the transmission of cultural 
practices (Hall and Taylor 1996). According to Alexander (2005), this approach 
broadly defines the term institution, as it includes symbolic systems, societal 
norms and moral values. It blurs the distinction between institutions and 
culture, and regards culture as an institution itself/in its own right (Alexander 
2005).   
3.6 Theoretical conceptualisation  
To construct a framework for this research, it is necessary to establish a 
relationship between institutional theory and accountability. Powell and 
DiMaggio (1983) defined the organisational field as being a set of organisations 
that in the collective, constitute an area of organisational life, resources, key 
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suppliers, regulatory agencies, product customers and other organisations that 
produce similar products or services. The purpose of this definition is to signify 
the organisational field as a site for common purpose and an arena of strategy 
and conflict. 
Scott (2001) argued that the emergence of the concept of an organisational 
field provides a new level of analysis suited for the study of the institutional 
process, allowing an investigation into the mesolevel system that mediates 
between societal structures and private organisation. The discourse of 
accountability offers a critical perspective on the potential sources of tension 
between a local understanding of accountability and the pressure for global 
legitimisation, for instance emphasising notions of efficiency and effectiveness 
(Ezzamel et al. 2007).  
The first process links accountability discourse to regulatory institutions where 
organisations in a field are pressured to seek legitimacy through socially and 
culturally sanctioned administrative routines intended to render accountability 
(Scott 1995; Ezzamel et al. 2007). The second process refers to the more tacit, 
private organisational dialogue in which, when relating the actions of 
organisational members to themselves, the motives and rules that justify such 
actions are also embedded (Ezzamel et al. 2007). Therefore, the concept of 
accountability, which is to give an account of action, links to the notions of folk 
norms of accountability and the tradition of ethnomethodology (Ezzamel et al. 
2007). Furthermore, neo-institutional theory suggests that a rationalised form 
of accountability, accounting requirements for instance, in institutionalised 
fields are imposed upon organisations by external constituencies such as 
interest groups, public opinion, the State and professional associations 
(Ezzamel et al. 2007). Hence, compliance with the demand of accountability, 
as well as voluntary accountability by an organisation is assumed to be 
rewarded in the form of increased social lawfulness and the avoidance of the 
charge of irrational behaviour in the eyes of society (Scott 1995; Meyer and 
Rowan 1997). 
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3.7 Definition of accountability 
Accountability is often considered as a vague value-laden concept, which makes 
it difficult to define. This is evidenced in Bovens (2007) who indicated that this 
apparent lack of clarity might occur due to the different meanings attached to 
various people or organisations. However, the term accountability is often used 
as a synonym for many loosely defined political requirements such as 
transparency, good governance, equity, democracy, responsiveness, efficiency, 
responsibility and integrity (Mulgan 2000; Behn 2001; Dubnick 2007; Bovens 
2007). Blind (2011) corroborates that accountability is abstract and value-laden 
as it is associated with the notion of responsibility, fairness, justice, integrity 
and democracy. He further states that the first step to accountability is broad 
and refers to the state of being answerable. However, Kohler (1975) and Black 
(2009) suggest that the second phase is narrower and is given to obligations 
that evidence management or performance imposed by government, law, 
regulation or agreement. The World Bank’s view is different from Blind’s (2011) 
claim and states that accountability has two distinct stages: answerability and 
enforcement. Adding to this concept, Dubnick (2003) views accountability as 
an action taken in response to social expectation. This expectation is relevant 
to providing an explanation for human behaviour and can be considered in two 
dimensions.  First, in relation to the specific action of an actor (i.e. 
answerability). Second, in relation to the expectation of an environment or a 
setting (i.e. imposed by law). 
Reflecting on the overarching definition of accountability, Mulgan (2000) 
indicates that it is a complex and chameleon-like term that has become 
commonplace in literature on public administration. Mulgan (2000) went further 
to state that accountability has lost its former candour and has come to involve 
consistent interpretation and increasingly sophisticated categorisation. This is 
because a word that was rarely used a few decades ago has now become 
prominent in literature, performing all forms of rhetorical and methodical tasks 
and bearing most of the responsibility for democratic governance (Dubnick 
1998, cited in Mulgan 2000). However, one aspect of accountability that is 
agreed upon by most authors is that it is associated with the process of an 
individual being called to account by an authority for their actions (Jones 1992). 
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Thus, accountability is a broad concept, which allows knowledge of one person’s 
actions to be gained by someone else, who in turn demands reasons for this 
conduct. The reason for such action is then justified by the first person 
(Garfinkel 1967). Broadbent and Laughlin (2003) also proffer a definition of 
accountability as the willingness and capacity to explain conduct, explaining 
how an individual has carried out their responsibilities. It is also the process of 
holding organisations, or people, responsible for their performance as 
accurately as possible (Wit and Akinyode 2008).  
Day and Klein (1987), Mulgan (2003), and Bovens (2007) regard accountability 
as a social mechanism, a formal relation or arrangement in which an actor can 
be held to account by a forum. Mulgan (2000) draws attention to what he calls 
the “core sense” accountability. In this sense, he defines accountability as being 
answerable to an authority for one’s actions’, or the process of giving an 
account (Mulgan 2000; Dubnick 2005). Finally, Grisard (2012) defines 
accountability as a means involving two entities defined at a specific level. 
These two entities exchange information to clarify their actions (Roberts 1991; 
Scweiker 1993; Willmott 1996) and adjust their behaviour to co-exist in the 
same environment. Furthermore, Boven (2007) distinguishes two main 
concepts of accountability, namely accountability as a virtue and accountability 
as a mechanism. This model of classification is normally adopted as it separates 
the human component (virtue) of accountability from the system component of 
accountability (mechanism) (Akpanuko and Asogwa 2013). 
3.8 Accountability as a virtue  
Accountability is also used as a normative concept, a set of standards for the 
evaluation of the behaviour of public actors (Bovens 2007; Akpanuko and 
Asogwa 2013). Dialogically, ‘accountable’ is used as an adjective, describing 
how government, public actors or officials should behave in a responsible 
manner. From the above usage, it is evident that accountability is recognised 
as a virtue, a positive feature of civil servants or organisations (Boven 2007). 
Thus, from a broad perspective, accountability is used positively to qualify the 
performance of an actor or a state of affairs. This comes close to a sense of 
responsibility and a willingness to act in a transparent, fair and equitable way 
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(Boven 2007). However, accountability is substantively difficult to define. Thus, 
accountability as a virtue is easily challenged, given that there is no general 
agreement about the standards for accountable behaviour, as standards differ, 
depending on institutional context, role, and political perspective (Boven 2007; 
Akpanuko and Asogwa 2013).  
Due to the multiplicity of the usage of the concept, Koppell (2005) sub-
categorised accountability into five different dimensions: liability, transparency, 
controllability, responsiveness and responsibility. However, these dimensions 
are ideographic concepts, as they need extensive operationalisation to be 
enacted. It is therefore, difficult to be evaluated and these dimensions are not 
often measurable along the same scale (Boven 2007). Thus, it is challenging to 
offer a single definition or standard for public accountability as a virtue, because 
standards will differ across the range of political systems, public organisations 
and perspectives (Bovens 2007). However, the Global Accountability 
Framework developed (GAF) (Blagescu et al. 2005) and made a successful 
attempt to operationalise accountability as a virtue by using a broad, active 
notion of accountability and applied it to large transnational organisations. GAF 
surmise that accountability constitutes being responsive and engaging with 
stakeholders whilst considering their concerns and needs. In this framework, 
accountability is more of a learning process than a mechanism of control 
(Blagesu et al. 2005).  
Blagescu (2011) also created some standards for the behaviour of transnational 
actors, which included: the ability to connect with their stakeholders, to engage 
and provide explanations, and the willingness to learn. The Global 
Accountability Framework established guidance for organisations on how to 
operationalise this understanding of accountability by identifying four 
dimensions to make organisations more accountable to its stakeholders (Boven 
2007; Blagescu 2011; Akpanuko and Asogwa 2013). These dimensions include 
participation, transparency, evaluation, and complaint and response 
mechanisms. These four dimensions were created as a standard for accountable 
behaviour. Thus, to be accountable, an organisation must integrate these four 
dimensions into its policies, practice and procedures at all stages and levels of 
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decision making and implementation, in relation to both internal and external 
stakeholders (Boven 2007; Blagescu 2011; Akpanuko and Asogwa 2013). 
Although these standards were developed for transnational actors, they can be 
adapted to fit specific local, national, political and institutional variations 
(Akpanuko and Asogwa 2013).  
3.9 Accountability as a mechanism or social relation 
The real notion of being held to account points to a more traditional concept of 
accountability, whereby the relationship between the actor, principle and 
agents is the defining element. Tracing its historical and etymological roots, 
accountability can be approached as a specific social relation or mechanism that 
involves an obligation to explain and justify conducts (Bovens 2007). According 
to Akpanuko and Asgowa (2013), it is perceived as an institutional relation or 
arrangement whereby an actor is held to account by a forum. This implies a 
relationship between an actor, accountor, and a forum, the accountee or the 
account holder (Boven 2007; Akpanuko and Asogwa 2013).  
This pertains not only to the provision of information regarding performance 
but also opens up the possibility of debate, questions from the forum requiring 
answers from the actor and finally the forum passing judgement on the actor 
(Boven 2007). Moreover, the judgement here may imply the imposition of 
formal, or informal sanctions, on the actor in the event of underperformance or 
even a reward in the case of adequate performance. This is regarded as passive 
accountability as the actor’s conduct is held to account by the forum. 
Furthermore, Bovens (2007) then defines accountability in a passive sense as 
the relationship between an actor and a forum, whereby the actor is obligated 
to explain and justify his conduct. Here the forum poses questions and passes 
judgement and the actor may face the consequences (Boven 2007). Therefore, 
accountability is a relationship of power, which entails a specific variation of 
power, the power to demand justification for one’s behaviour and the capacity 
or ability to impose a penalty for underperformance (Akpanuko and Asogwa 
2013). In the realm of governance, this is known as answerability for one’s 
action and behaviour, defined by the relationship of responsibility (Akpanuko 
and Asogwa 2013). Therefore, intuitively accountability exists only if the public 
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officer or actor anticipates questions within, and after, their stewardship to the 
society (Asechemie 1995).  
Furthermore, regarding the relationship between the actor or steward and the 
public or forum, the actual account given consists of at least three stages 
(Boven 2007). Firstly, the obligation of the actor to inform the forum about his 
or her conduct is undertaken by providing various data about the task 
performance, outcome and procedures (often in the case of incidents or 
failures). This also demands the provision of explanations and justifications 
(Akpanuko and Asogwa 2013).  Secondly, there is the possibility for the forum, 
or public, to cross-examine the actor, or the steward, and to question the 
accuracy of the information or the legality of the conduct. This buttresses the 
connection between accountability and answerability (Akpanuko and Asogwa 
2013). Finally, judgement may be passed on the behaviour of the actor or 
steward by the forum. It may denounce a policy, or publicly condemn the 
behaviour of an agency or official. When passing an adverse judgement on the 
conduct of the steward or actor, the forum may impose a sanction on the actor 
or steward. Consequently, accountability as a mechanism exists where it is the 
responsibility of the government, its agencies, public officials and employees to 
provide information about their decisions and actions (Akpanuko and Asogwa 
2013). The following section outlines the various types of accountability and 
their functions. 
3.10 Types of accountability 
As stated earlier, accountability’s dualistic nature makes it difficult to define 
(Blind 2011). From one perspective, accountability is abstract and value-laden 
and on the other hand, highly concrete and value free (Blind 2011). This 
dualism, combined with the need for frugality in social science, has 
predominantly caused accountability to be analysed dichotomously in the 
literature. This dichotomy can be said to emerge along longitudinal operational, 
descriptive and prescriptive dimensions (Blind 2011). 
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3.10.1 Prescriptive dichotomies  
Lloyd (2008, in Blind (2011) Pg. 3) in writing on the challenges of including 
accountability into the culture of an organisation, referred to the “hardware” 
versus “software” of accountability. The software encompasses the cultural 
precepts, for example the behaviour, attitudes, perceptions and mind-set, 
whereas the hardware, or the structures of accountability, are the procedures, 
processes or mechanisms. Boven (2007) distinguishes two main concepts of 
accountability, namely accountability as a “virtue” and accountability as a 
mechanism. This model of classification is adopted as it separates the human 
component (virtue) of accountability from the system component of 
accountability (mechanism) (Akpanuko and Asogwa 2013). Accountability is 
then a positive quality in an organisation whose actual behaviour is the focus 
of attention (Blind 2010), whereas, the latter is an institutional arrangement 
where an accountee is held to account by a forum (Pollitt 2003; Akpanuko and 
Asogwa 2013).  
Furthermore, while the virtue perspective encompasses a discussion on good 
governance and trust in government, the mechanism view of accountability 
leads to public management discourse. Ackerman (2005) talks about two 
variants of accountability: accountability as “honesty” and accountability as 
“performance”. The first variant is associated with the rule concerning 
bureaucrats who restrain from being non-procedural, and the second variant, 
with proactive decision makers who are expected to perform efficiently and 
effectively. Ackerman (2005) indicates that the first “honesty” version is 
“process-oriented” and associated with “negative” accountability because public 
servants are evaluated based on the extent to which they comply with the 
standard operating principles. The second “performance” is associated with 
“result-driven” and “positive” accountability where accountability is perceived 
as the ability to produce effective policies, which are evaluated at the end of 
the project (Blind 2010). Other scholars such as Martin and Webb (2009) 
employed a similar dichotomous approach to accountability. Their comparison 
consists of the “user-choice” versus the “social justice” dimensions of 
accountability.  
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3.10.2 Descriptive dichotomies 
The counterpart of prescriptive dichotomies is the descriptive domain, which at 
the risk of oversimplification includes political versus legal accountability, 
market-based versus administrative accountability and social versus 
institutional accountability (Blind 2010). However, Jabbra and Dwivedi (1980), 
Smith (1991) and Romzek (2000) stated that to some extent, these related 
categories subsume the more enumerative and less analytical categorisations 
such as professional, organisational, managerial, fiscal and moral 
accountability. 
3.10.2.1 Market-based versus administrative accountability  
Market-based accountability regards citizens as consumers who must be 
accounted to regarding the services they receive. Market-based accountability 
also relates to performance accountability (Erkkila 2007), which refers to output 
oriented responsiveness, or performance as a means of accountability. 
Compared to market-based accountability, administrative or organisation 
accountability refers to rules, regulations and the norms of hierarchical 
obligation to answer to one’s superior (Blind 2010). Administrative 
accountability is also referred to as professional accountability (Rand 2008); 
this focuses on conforming to standards and codes of conduct for professional 
behaviour, which is checked by peers through their professional institutions. 
Both Rand (2008) and Blind (2010) agree that professionals are bound by codes 
of conduct and are answerable to their professional association in respect for 
the public interest. 
3.10.2.2 Political versus legal/judicial accountability 
The concept of political accountability is tied to the concept of democracy and 
legitimacy (Mulgan 2003; Erkkila 2007). It can be defined as the obligation of 
the elected officials to answer to the public and for the public officer to be 
answerable to the elected officials. Those who govern are answerable to the 
public for their actions, either directly when politically elected or appointed, or 
indirectly as aides of politically elected bodies (Erkkila 2007; Rand 2008 and 
Blind 2010). According to Levitt et al (2008) the mechanism of political 
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accountability is implemented in three dimensions. Firstly, the election of 
political representatives or parties.  Secondly, ministerial appointments, where 
accountability is applied indirectly through ministers who are held accountable 
for the affairs of their ministry.  Finally, through legislation stated in 
constitutional or other equivalent documents. Legal accountability is assured by 
the judiciary that checks whether politicians and officials are acting within the 
boundaries of their prescribed jurisdictions (Goetz and Gaventas 2001). Courts 
and quasi-judicial accountability systems play a central role in legal 
accountability as it is mostly concerned with checking the integrity of 
organisational and individual behaviour (Levitt, Janta and Wegrich 2008). 
Bovens (2005) also argues that the importance of legal accountability is 
increasing because of the formalisation of social relations and the shift of trust 
from parliaments to courts. The public reserves the right to address any 
violation of law through the designated authorities that are legally conferred 
with specific responsibilities (Levitt, Janta and Wegrich 2008).   
3.10.2.3 Institutional versus social accountability 
This is also referred to as supply driven versus demand led, or top down versus 
bottom-up accountability. Institutional accountability has been enumerated by 
researchers as being the electoral system, parliament, the judiciary and the 
myriad audit organisations, thus narrowing institutional accountability largely 
to legal and political realms (Ackerman 2005). On the other hand, social 
accountability has been described as social relations, largely made up of ad hoc 
initiatives of direct and indirect civil society and citizen engagement in public 
affairs aiming to exact accountability (Ackerman 2005).  
Social accountability is an approach used to build accountability that depends 
on civic engagement; that is situations whereby civil society organisation and 
citizens participate directly or indirectly in exacting accountability, for instance, 
holding government officials to account for their actions whilst in office 
(Ackerman 2005). This kind of accountability is also sometimes referred to as 
society driven horizontal accountability. Moreover, it has also been largely 
linked to the drive to guarantee effective, sustainable, and more importantly, 
pro-poor development (Ackerman 2004 and 2005; Malena et al. 2004). In 
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addition, some researchers have divided social accountability into two sub-
components, namely the voice-led social accountability and the control-
oriented social accountability. The former is defined by citizen participation in 
policy-making, advocacy and deliberation processes (Arroyo 2004, Malena et 
al. 2004), hereas, the latter is defined by the citizens’ watchdog role, often in 
cooperation with other societal actors, such as the media and professional 
associations (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006, Orlansky and Chucho 2010). From 
the literature above, social accountability is related to personal and moral or 
ethical accountability as they deal with internal and shared values, ethics and 
beliefs (Blind 2010). Examples of social accountability practices include 
advocacy, protests, investigative journalism, campaigns, participatory 
budgeting, public interest lawsuits, participatory data collection and analysis 
tools, public expenditure tracking, citizen report cards, social audits, community 
scorecards and other forms of citizen monitoring and evaluation in public policy-
making and service delivery (Blind 2010). 
3.11 Operational dichotomy 
All forms of accountability, either in prescriptive or descriptive terms, operate 
through “horizontal” or “vertical” channels. On the one hand, answerability can 
be referred to as within state or internal accountability (Blind 2010). Horizontal 
accountability is the capacity of a network of relatively autonomous power or 
institutions that can call into question and ultimately punish inappropriate ways 
of discharging the responsibilities of a given official (Stapenhurst 2008). 
According to Blind (2010), horizontal accountability is where public servants are 
held accountable to their peers and public administrators are held accountable 
to relevant ministers. Horizontal accountability is also linked to political, 
institutional administrative and market-based accountability.  
On the other hand, vertical accountability is the medium by which citizens, civil 
society and mass media seek to enforce standards of good performance on 
officials (Stapenhurst 2008). Blind (2010) also refers to vertical or external 
accountability as the oversight provided by citizens, groups, civil society, mass 
media and the private sector. This oversight includes communities, citizens and 
independent media (Malena et al. 2003), as well as the citizens’ electoral choice 
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organisation (Goertz and Jenkins 2001). Additionally, Blind (2010) also divided 
vertical accountability into: (i) the informal mechanism of vertical 
accountability, which includes positive or negative press releases, public 
pressure, media coverage, protest movements, interface meetings between 
civil servants and citizens, (ii) the formal medium of vertical accountability, 
which includes citizens’ appeals to the institutions of horizontal accountability, 
for instance, by presenting evidence to a corruption control agency or filing a 
claim through a court system (Blind 2010). Another form of operational 
accountability has emerged in literature, - diagonal accountability. Diagonal 
accountability refers to the direct participation of citizens in the state-owned 
internal mechanism of accountability (Blind 2010). According to Stapenhurst 
(2008), diagonal accountability seeks to engage citizens directly in the working 
of horizontal accountability institutions. Ackerman (2005) also states that 
diagonal accountability aims to invite society into the inner chambers of the 
states rather than sending sections of the state to the society. This results in 
ending the state’s monopoly over the responsibility for official executive 
oversights. 
3.12 Economic criteria and framework to foster local content policies  
Internal and external factors have been influential on the local authorities’ 
stance on the LCP, for example, Nigeria’s interest in taking control of its oil and 
gas industry that is dominated by foreign companies (Klueh et al. 2007);  T&T’s 
proactive engagement with the business community in the capacity building 
and technology development in small businesses in the gas industry; and 
following the first oil shock the UK government’s realisation that British firms 
were not capturing a significant amount of business in the supply of goods and 
services in the North Sea oil industry. Therefore, after reviewing oil and gas 
producing countries’ experiences of fostering local content in their various oil 
and gas industries, Klueh et al. (2007) developed the following principles to 
improve LCP implementation: 
3.12.1 Accountability 
The creation of an independent government authority responsible for 
monitoring LCP in the oil and gas industry and securing guarantees for which 
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local vendors can apply and compete for contracts. Examples include Norway’s 
Goods and Service Office (GSO) and the UK’s Offshore Supplies Office (OSO), 
with their qualified accounting personnel knowledgeable in industry practices 
(Klueh et al. 2007). 
3.12.2 Adequate metric/ efficiency consideration 
The development of a clear-cut definition of what constitutes local content. 
Monitoring employment, value-added gains and project expenditure have a 
direct impact on the local economy and are good proxies for assessing the LCP 
during the different stages of the projects (Klueh et al. 2007). Efficiency 
consideration entails the assessment of the LCP and target needed, for example 
by considering technological considerations and capacity constraints that affect 
the level of economic benefits that can be captured at a specific point in time. 
Therefore, efficiency consideration is a means of assessing the impact of LC on 
a particular sector/industry. 
3.12.3 Information dissemination 
The establishment of a public outreach and analysis office is also integral to 
ensuring accountability. Firstly, it creates a registry of competent and qualified 
local vendors. Secondly, it offers advice to locals on potentials for joint ventures 
and other mechanisms of co-operation with foreign companies. Finally, it 
supports plans for local capacity building, training, research and development 
(Klueh et al. 2007). 
Acknowledgement of spin-off benefits is also important.  Monitoring and public 
dissemination of complementarities between the oil industry and the rest of the 
economy, for instance, the spill-over effect from the oil to the hospitality or 
agriculture industry might be a suitable method of ensuring accountability. The 
above criteria, or principles, according to Klueh et al. (2007) illustrate a 
framework that can be used to foster the LCP in the oil and gas industry, as 
illustrated in Figure 3.1 below.  
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Figure 3.1 Diagram of framework for local content (Adapted from Klueh et al. 2007 
pg.12) 
3.13 Conceptual model for accountability and local content principles 
3.13.1 Accountability and local content principles 
To create a theoretical framework for this research, the criteria or principles to 
foster the implementation of the LCP: adequate metric/definition, efficiency 
consideration, information dissemination and acknowledgement of spin-off 
benefit were included. Furthermore, it will be argued that these criteria are all 
related to the different types of accountability. According to Bovens (2010), the 
Global Accountability Framework identified four core dimensions that make 
organisations more accountable to their stakeholders: participation, 
transparency, evaluation and complaint and response mechanisms.  
 3.13.2 Information dissemination/acknowledgement of spin-off 
benefits 
Transparency entails the provision of accessible and timely information to 
stakeholders (Bovens 2010). According to Corrigan (2013), the recent trend of 
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promoting accountability and transparency to reduce the adverse effects of 
natural resources has emerged. These initiatives include “Publish What You 
Pay”, The Kimberly Process and the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative. Additionally, these initiatives, in general, seek firstly to improve the 
process through which actors and institutions can effectively bring the 
government to account and also contribute effectively to enhanced 
development outcomes such as equal distribution of wealth and better socio-
economic condition (Acosta 2013). This is because transparency opens up the 
channels of communication and permits scrutiny of the revenues gathered from 
resources, as well as identifying how these resources are generated and 
extracted.   
In theory, the freedom of information law was intended to increase 
governmental transparency and to advance accountability (Relly and Sabharwal 
2009). Informing citizens of the decision-making process allows them to 
understand the norms and processes involved. Transparency ensures that the 
government remains committed to the needs of their people and not only to 
the revenue generated, which ensures they stay in power. Stiglizt (1999) states 
that the adverse effects of secrecy by the government, oil companies and 
entrenched incumbents discourages public participation in the domestic process 
and reduces the ability of the press to efficiently check whether there has been 
government abuse. Further, non-openness or secrecy weakens the quality of 
decision-making and increases corruption, which has adverse economic 
consequences (Stiglizt 1999). From the literature, the above information 
dissemination is related to the descriptive and operational dichotomies of 
accountability. Administrative and horizontal accountability plays a major role 
in information dissemination as it deals with the regulation and norms of the 
hierarchical obligation to answer to stakeholders. In addition, political 
accountability also ensures that the needs of the people remain central to the 
government. Moreover, investigative journalism and citizen watchdogs also 
play a role in social and vertical accountability as it is concerned with 
information dissemination. According to Bovens (2010) participation is a key 
feature of accountability as it requires the engagement of all stakeholders in 
the decision-making process and in activities that affect them. Furthermore, 
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the acknowledgement of spin-off benefits, which is relevant to monitoring and 
public dissemination, is closely related to political, social, institutional and 
administrative accountability. 
3.13.3 Efficiency consideration and adequate metric/definition 
Evaluation requires that the organisation monitors and reviews whether its 
progress is in line with the stated goals and objectives, it then takes into 
account the findings in future planning, and reports on the results of the process 
(Bovens 2010). Efficiency consideration is associated with performance 
accountability and market-based accountability, which perceives citizens as 
consumers who hold the seller or provider of a service accountable for the 
services they receive or purchase. It is also a way for the consumer to assess 
the performance of services rendered by the seller. This is based on the New 
Public Management Theory (NPM) of the 1990’s, which emphasises the 
transferability of market forces to the public sector in order to improve the 
efficiency, accountability and competitiveness of government institutions 
(Bartley 1999). According to Mulgan (2000), performance accountability is 
closely related to market-based accountability due to its market and client 
oriented nature and market-type mechanisms. Public bureaus are now 
controlled by results rather than rules and regulations (Jorgensen 1993). 
Furthermore, there has been a shift in the citizen’s role, as they are now 
increasingly seen as clients or customers, instead of active participants in policy 
progress (Jorgensen 1993; Mulgan 2000). This shows there is a clear 
relationship between the NPM theory and enhanced performance as a perceived 
type of accountability. Market-based and performance accountability are 
associated with regulatory bodies in the oil and gas industry who supervise the 
implementation of policies in the oil and gas industry. Finally, this also relates 
to the complaints and response mechanisms developed by organisations, 
whereby stakeholders can file complaints on issues of non-compliance, which 
are then reviewed and acted upon (Bovens 2010). Thus, the complaint and 
response mechanism is associated with institutional, administrative, legal and 
social accountability.  
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Figure 3.2 is a modified version of Klueh et al.’s (2007) model used to represent 
a conceptual model for the LCP in relation to accountability. This framework 
was instrumental in designing the research instrument.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 Accountability framework for local content policy (Adapted from Klueh et 
al. 2007 pg.12) 
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3.14 Relationship between accountability and local content 
As indicated in section 3.10.1, this section seeks to establish a relationship 
between accountability and local content. 
3.14.1 Adequate metric 
The quest to expand the economic benefits of the oil and gas industry to other 
non-oil producing sectors in oil producing nations is not a new concept. It can 
be traced back to the exploration of the North Sea in Scotland and the 
establishment of state-owned companies in many countries around the world 
(Klueh et al. 2008). This includes the UK’s 1970s model for monitoring the LCP 
by the Offshore Supplies Office, which is related to institutional accountability, 
as it deals with political organisations, market institutions and independent 
regulatory bodies (Klueh et al. 2008). As well as the UK’s 1970s model, 
reporting and auditing procedures were also introduced to monitor purchases 
made by oil companies.  This is linked to social, administrative, institutional and 
performance accountability as it deals with information dissemination and 
transparency (Klueh et al. 2008). According to Mireftekhari (2013), LCP has 
become a strategic issue in global projects. For example, it was a requirement 
of national oil companies and the government that international oil companies 
(IOCs) must have a plan to include LC in their project. The Nigerian 
government, for instance, required a 70% increase in LC by the end of 2010. 
In addition, the government required every international oil company in Nigeria 
to deposit a minimum of 10% of their annual profit into Nigerian banks 
(Mireftekhari 2013). Furthermore, at least 50 percent of the assets of any oil 
company seeking to execute oil and gas projects in Nigeria must be domiciled 
in Nigeria (Menas 2008). LCP, therefore, has become part of an obligation that 
the government requires IOCs to adhere to when executing their projects. As a 
result, oil and gas companies have become more accountable to the National 
oil companies and government. The requirements listed above are consistent 
with the elements, which fall under political, administrative, performance and 
institutional accountabilities.  
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3.14.2 Efficiency consideration 
Research has also shown that internal and external factors have played a 
catalytic role on the local authorities’ stance regarding the LCP (Klueh et al. 
2008). For instance, the engagement of the UK government with international 
oil companies in the 1970s was caused by the first oil shock, and by the 
realisation that British firms were not capturing a significant amount of work by 
supplying goods and services to an expanding North Sea (Klueh et al. 2008). 
These factors are related to market-based accountability as the citizens hold 
the British government accountable for proactively engaging local business 
communities in training, technology development and capacity building to 
actively take part in the oil and gas industry (Klueh et al. 2008).  
3.14.3 Acknowledgement of spin-off benefit 
Currently, LCP is considered a facet of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in 
most emerging countries. For example, TOTAL refers to CSR as improving the 
LC aspect of projects in such a way as to enhance capacity building and skill 
development in host nations and in turn stimulates social and economic growth 
(Mireftekhari 2013). This shows that the LCP can have a positive impact on both 
country and company. In addition, the LCP includes wider economic 
diversification; for instance, in Norway, the baseline for the success of the LCP 
development is remaining dedicated to the fundamental tasks. One of the 
baselines according to Heum (2008) include enhancement of the domestic 
knowledge base through an agreement that allows for industrial and 
technological development that expands domestic competencies and 
capabilities to a competitive level. The main aim here is to ensure the local 
industry is protected in such a way that local companies can compete both 
within and outside the oil and gas industry. Hence, it is evident that social, 
political and institutional accountability plays a major role in the 
acknowledgement of spin-off benefits. 
3.14.4 Information dissemination  
The oil and gas industry recognises the vital role it plays around the world in 
fuelling economic development and social progress. It also identifies the need 
to be mindful of stakeholders’ concerns, including those related to 
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sustainability, which is of ever-growing significance. Oil and gas companies 
have begun to communicate how these concerns are being addressed by issuing 
sustainability reports (Boyle et al. 2006). As a consequence of organisational 
diversity and the complexity and scale of many oil and gas companies, 
producing appropriate, accurate and complete report content is a difficult 
challenge; as is choosing performance indicators (adequate metric), which 
allows for the consistent and transparent presentation of information (Boyle et 
al. 2006). Stakeholders are increasingly demanding consistent and clear 
disclosure from the oil and gas industry on how significant issues and risks are 
managed (Boyle et al. 2006). However, the oil and gas industry is not alone in 
facing this challenge; other sectors ranging from retail to finance also face the 
same pressure. Though different sectors acknowledge these drivers for 
sustainability reporting, it is felt more in the oil and gas industry due to the 
economic importance of its products and services, its links to the government, 
its activities in developing nations and its environmental and safety obligations 
(Boyle et al. 2006).  Thus, factors such as those listed above make transparency 
a particularly important strategic consideration for the industry.  
Furthermore, the emergence of voluntary reporting is an important tool in the 
way companies respond in order to meet its demand. It should be argued that 
sustainability reporting can improve business value by demonstrating risk 
management and building investor confidence. Thus, improving internal 
operations by increasing understanding of organisational issues as well as 
facilitating decision-making (Boyle et al. 2006). Finally, from an external 
perspective, reporting also helps to strengthen the relationship with 
stakeholders and acts as a useful accountability mechanism for communicating 
performance and disclosing commitments (Boyle et al. 2006).  
From the analysis above, the four pillars of accountability, adequate metric, 
information dissemination, efficiency consideration, acknowledgement of spin-
off benefit as seen in fig 3.2, all seem to be interrelated. On the one hand, 
adequate metric deals with the monitoring of the LCP in the oil and gas industry, 
while, efficiency consideration is concerned with resources available and 
performance assessment. Furthermore, information dissemination involves 
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publishing reports from information contained within the performance 
evaluation report. Hence, the revenue generated from oil and gas activities is 
evaluated in order to assess the benefit of these activities in non-oil producing 
sectors, which is associated with the acknowledgement of spin-off benefits.  
3.15 Chapter conclusion  
This chapter explored conceptual linkage to make a theoretical argument for 
this study. The framework was underpinned by the institutional theory which 
links accountability discourse to regulatory institutions, where organisations 
within a particular field are subject to pressure to exhibit legitimacy through 
socially and culturally authorised administrative routines that are intended to 
render accountability. The discourse of accountability highlighted the potential 
sources of tension between the local understanding of accountability and the 
pressure for global legitimisation, for instance, the emphasis on concepts of 
efficiency and effectiveness. 
The chapter was used to establish a connection to an existing theory and for 
enhancing the critical analysis of the phenomenon under study. This can then 
lead to an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon under consideration. 
Thus, the study chose an accountability framework, underpinned by 
institutional theory, to critically evaluate the effectiveness of the LCP and the 
transparency practices associated with its implementation. 
Following the presentation of the theoretical framework employed for this 
research, the next chapter presents the methodology and method used for this 
research. 
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Chapter Four 
Research Methodology 
4.1 Introduction   
This chapter outlines a critical evaluation of the methodological approach 
adopted for this research. It also illustrates the strategy utilised for the 
literature search and literature review. The preceding chapter will present the 
methods selected for the data collection and justifies why this method was 
employed. Furthermore, the process of data analysis and management is also 
presented in this chapter.  
A systematic means of solving problems is known as research methodology 
(Kothari 2004). Kothari (2004) indicates that it is important for a researcher to 
understand not only the research methods and techniques but also the research 
methodology. According to Cobuild (1987), methodology is a system of 
principles and methods of doing something. This definition is echoed by Jonker 
and Pennik (2010) who defined methodology as the route, or path, a researcher 
needs to take to achieve, or obtain a specific result, knowledge, insight or 
solution. In addition, Kothari (2004) also defined methodology as the necessary 
steps taken by a researcher in studying or analysing researcher problems along 
with the reasons or logic behind them. 
A difficult step in the research process is the choice of research methodology. 
This has long been a problematic area for researchers (Walker and Myrick 
1996), and they usually search existing literature for ideas on how other 
researchers have tackled similar problems. There are various ways for selecting 
and justifying research methods. According to Agarwal (2011), this could be 
based on the philosophical issues surrounding the research design, the research 
methods used in the past in similar studies and in choosing the most 
appropriate method to achieve the research aims and objectives. 
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4.2 Philosophical considerations around research design/research 
strategy  
The research philosophy a researcher chooses to adopt will contain important 
assumptions of how the researcher views the world. Johnson and Clark (2006) 
state that in management and business research, it is not important how 
philosophically informed a researcher is, but rather how the research reflects 
the researcher’s philosophical stance against any alternatives the researcher 
could have adopted.  
Most researchers agree that ignoring the philosophical aspect during the 
research design process can seriously affect the research process (Easterby-
Smith et al. 2012). The philosopher’s toolkit of ontology and epistemology 
(Burrell and Morgan 1979) dissected social science based on an assumption 
concerning the nature of social science and the nature of society (Hassard 
1991). To analyse social science, they suggest it is useful to conceptualise four 
sets of assumptions, which are related to human nature, epistemology, 
methodology and ontology (Hassard 1991). These assumptions are concerned 
with the essence of phenomena (ontology), the nature of knowledge 
(epistemology), the relationships between human beings (human nature) and 
the systematic investigation of the world (methodology) (Burrel and Morgan 
1979; Hassard 1991). 
The assumptions discussed above are important aspects that influence a 
researcher’s worldview or research paradigm. Saunders et al. (2009) claimed 
that paradigm is a term that is frequently used in social sciences but has the 
tendency to lead to confusion because of its multiple meanings. According to 
Gummesson (1999), paradigm can be defined as the underpinning rule and 
value that govern the behaviour and thinking of researchers (Jonker and 
Pennink 2010). In addition, paradigm is defined as “a term which is meant to 
stress the commonality of perspective, which holds together the work of a group 
of researchers or theorists in a way that will be usefully regarded as 
approaching social theory within the boundary of the same problem” (Jonker 
and Pennink 2010 pg. 157). In other words, a paradigm according to Guba and 
Lincoln (1994) is a belief system or worldviews that guide researchers 
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(Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998). Many models have been developed to define 
the term paradigm. However, the model that has attracted considerable 
attention was developed by Burrell and Morgan (1979) (cited in, Hassard 1991). 
Through the intersection of subject-object debates in the theory of social 
science with consensus-conflict discussions in the theory of society, Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) defined the four paradigms for organisational analysis. These 
four paradigms, produced by Burrell and Morgan (1979), are the interpretive, 
humanist, functionalist and radical structuralist perspectives (Hassard 1991 and 
Saunders et al. 2009). Functionalist paradigm is typified by an objective view 
of the organisational world with a focus towards the maintenance of the status 
quo (Gioia and Pitre 1990). The humanist paradigm has a subjective view, with 
an orientated ideology towards changing constructed realities. Radical 
structuralist takes an objectivist stance, with an ideological concern for the 
radical change of structural realities (Gioia and Pitre 1990). The interpretive is 
the direct opposite of functionalist paradigm, interpretive is characterised by a 
subjective view with a specific concern with regulation or lack of concern with 
changing the status quo (Gioia and Pitre 1990). This study adopts the 
philosophical perspective of interpretivism. Interpretivists believe that the 
world is experienced, constructed and interpreted by people during interaction 
with each other and their environment (Ulin et al. 2005). They believe that 
people develop an understanding of events as a result of their beliefs, 
expectations, understanding and experience. Hence, they are placed to 
comprehend the meaning and circumstances that affect, or influence, the 
meaning associated with persons or a group. Under this paradigm, it is 
important to have access to the way people think, feel, and communicate, as 
well as being able to observe their body movements (Flower 2009).  
As one of the objectives of this research is to examine the transparency 
practices in the implementation of the LCP in the Nigerian oil and gas industry, 
this requires the philosophical view of interpretivism, as interpretivism argues 
that social studies objectives should be to explain how the research participants 
understand/view their actions (Russell 2010). In addition, interpretivism allows 
the opportunity to develop and test a theory. To justify the selection of this 
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approach, a brief description of deductive and inductive theories is provided in 
Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.  
4.2.1Deductive theory 
The deductive theory represents a simple view of the nature of the relationship 
between social research and theory (Bryman 2008) and involves the 
development of a principle that is exposed to rigorous tests. In natural sciences, 
the deductive theory tends to be the dominant approach whereby laws present 
the basis of the explanation, which permits the anticipation of phenomena, 
predicates their outcome and allows them to be controlled (Saunders et al. 
2009). In addition, the deductive theory possesses several vital characteristics. 
Firstly, it is the search to explain the casual relationships between variables. 
Secondly, it ensures that concepts are operationalised in a way that enables 
facts to be measured quantitatively. Here, the researcher must skilfully deduce 
a hypothesis and translate it into operational terms. This implies that the 
researcher must explain how data can be gathered in relation to the concept 
that makes up the hypothesis (Bryman 2008). Therefore, deductive analysis 
refers to data analysis that sets out to test whether data are consistent with 
previous theories, assumptions, or hypotheses constructed or identified by a 
researcher (Thomas 2006).  
4.2.2 Inductive theory 
The inductive approach is concerned with the relationship between research 
and theory in which theory is generated from research (Bryman 2008).  Here, 
the research makes sense of the data collected by analysing the findings. The 
results from the data analysis will then be used for the formulation of a theory 
(Saunders et al. 2009). Inductive theory is achieved via a systematic approach 
to analysing qualitative data whereby specific evaluation objectives guide the 
analysis. It makes use of raw data to develop themes and identify concepts 
through interpretations made from the data by the researcher (Thomas 2006). 
The researcher starts with a field of study and allows the theory to develop from 
the data. The primary purpose of the inductive theory is to permit research 
findings to develop from the significant theme essential in raw data, without 
the constraints enforced by structured methodologies (Thomas 2006). As 
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identified in the previous chapters, a gap in the literature exists in terms of 
deriving a qualitative understanding of the phenomena under study. This study 
adopts an inductive approach.  It gives the researcher the chance to collect 
data pertaining to the research (Russell 2010; Bryman 2015) and progress to 
analysing the data using inductive logic in interpretative research (Russell 
2010). It also allows the researcher to change the research approach as new 
information emerges from the data collection.  Since this study is exploratory 
in nature, it is important to move back and forth as new issues and ideas 
emerge. This fits with the epistemological approach of inductive research where 
the researcher does not make assumptions arising from the data collected prior 
to making observations, but discovers and analyses the data as part of the 
research process (Russell 2010). 
4.3 Literature search strategy 
LCP is a growing area of research, as oil and gas producing countries continue 
to seek ways to maximise the benefit from their petroleum resources. Although 
there are no dedicated journals for LCP, much has been written on LCP by 
different scholars (see for example: Grossman 1981; Lahiri and Ono 2003; 
Heum 2008; Klueh 2009). From the Nigerian perspective, research on LCP has 
been published by Nwosu et al. (2006), Ihua (2009) and Ovadia (2013; 2014). 
Likewise, governments and different organisations such as The World Bank 
(Tordo et al. 2011) have published books on the subject of the LCP. 
The interdisciplinary nature of LCP means that researchers can study it from a 
number of perspectives including policy development, LCP enhancement, a 
country’s perspective on local content, and corruption vulnerabilities in LCP. 
Although this research has been focused on evaluating the effectiveness of LCP 
and the transparency practices in the implementation of LCP, the literature 
review during this research incorporated works from other fields to present the 
main argument. 
The primary method of literature searches for this study focused on using 
bibliographic databases. Journal databases such as OnePetro, ScienceDirect, 
Emerald, Business Source Complete, OGEL, Google Scholar, British ethos, Web 
of Science and RGU OpenAir were consulted. In addition, various books and 
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articles were discovered by citation chaining and by examining the references 
of relevant articles found during the initial literature search. With the help of 
the librarians at Robert Gordon University (RGU), various keywords were 
created for the literature search, which were then used to create citation alerts 
using Google (alert) in order to keep up to date with the literature. The search 
process was repeated at various points during the research to obtain the latest 
information on the subject.  
4.4 Research methods  
Qualitative research is an approach used to explore and understand the 
meaning that individuals, or groups, ascribe to human or social problems 
(Creswell 2014). Devine (2002: p197) viewed qualitative methods as being a:  
“generic term that refers to a range of techniques including; individual 
interviews and focus groups interviews which seek to understand the 
experiences and practice of key informants and to locate them firmly in 
context”.  
The procedures of qualitative methodology are considered as emerging, 
inductive and formed by the researcher’s knowledge of collecting and analysing 
data (Creswell 2014). Whereas in quantitative research, interpretation of the 
data entails the researcher setting the horizon of expectations for the study by 
pre-selecting the variables that will be explored and then drawing conclusions 
from the results of statistical tests, which are based on assumptions 
(Sandelowski 2000).  This leaves the researcher less scope for the 
unanticipated. In qualitative research, the research strategy constructed 
emphasises quality rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of 
data, such that it represents the different ideas of the world and the nature of 
experiences.  Indeed, this sometimes portrays competing and conflicting views 
about social reality (Flick 1998). Additionally, it overrules the practices and 
norms of the natural scientific model and of positivism, in particular, and 
emphasises  the ways in which individuals deduce their social world.  Moreover, 
it mostly displays an inductive approach to the relationship between theory and 
research, whereby emphasis is placed on the generation of data (Bryman 
2008). 
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Quantitative research emphasises the measurement and analysis of causal 
relationships between variables and not processes (Denzin and Lincoln 2003). 
It is an approach for testing objective theories by examining the relationship 
among variables (Creswell 2014). In addition, it is a method whereby the 
researcher principally uses post-positivist claims in developing knowledge (e.g., 
use of measurement and observation, test of theories). It employs strategies 
of investigation such as experiments and surveys, and collects data on 
predetermined instruments that yield statistical data (Creswell 2003). 
Therefore, quantitative research may be constructed as a research strategy that 
accentuates quantification in the gathering and analysis of data which 
represents a view of social reality as an external, objective reality.  Moreover, 
it takes a deductive approach to the relationship between research and theory, 
where importance is placed on the testing of theories.  
This research employs a qualitative research approach, as it offers a wide range 
of technique/methods that can be employed to understand the experiences and 
practices of oil and gas companies in the implementation of LCP in the Nigerian 
oil and gas industry. 
4.5 Data collection techniques 
An in-depth review of the LCP literature indicated a range of data collection 
methods had been used in previous research. They included primary research 
methods such as interviews and field research; and secondary methods such 
as documentary research (Grossman 1981; Davidson et al. 1985; Hollander 
1987; Krishna and Itoh, 1988; Richardson, 1991, 1993; Chao and Yu 1993; 
Lopez-de-Silanes et al. 1996; Lahiri and Ono 1998; Qiu and Tao 2001). They 
also included both small and large scale questionnaires (Heum et al. 2003; Neff 
2005; Nwosu et al. 2006; Ovadia 2008; Ozigbo 2008; Ihua 2010; Bakare 2011; 
Ihua, Olabowale and Eloji 2011; Adewuyi and Oyejide 2012) which are then 
quantitatively analysed. While some of these studies provided the researcher 
with knowledge of the LCP, they also had their inadequacies, as quantitative 
studies have been found to provide a “less than accurate identification of 
boundaries” (Suzuki 1980, p.65). Furthermore, the use of questionnaires does 
not capture the thoughts and views of the participants which would have been 
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possible during a face to face interview (Ghauri and Gronhaug 2002). In 
addition the logistics, including the resources in terms of the cost and time 
involved in administering a questionnaire survey (postal or online) in Nigeria, 
suggested that a qualitative interview was most appropriate for this research. 
Most importantly, it is empirically reasonable to adopt qualitative exploratory 
research considering the dearth of research on local contents in Nigeria. As a 
result, it was determined that the purpose of this research, including its 
objectives, could be better addressed using the qualitative method.  
The approach employed in this research gave the researcher the opportunity to 
validate the accountability framework developed for this study. Qualitative 
research provides the study with a mixture of the explorative, rational and 
intuitive, where the researcher’s skills and experience play a major role in the 
analysis of the data (Ghauri and Gronhaug 2002). Thus, the researcher needs 
to think abstractly and critically to analyse situations, recognise and avoid any 
bias, and obtain valid and reliable information.  
Additionally, the study focused on events or social processes that were often 
difficult to analyse using the quantitative approach, as such, qualitative 
research was deemed more suitable for this process as it provides intricate 
details and understanding. It is also suitable for studying groups, organisations 
and individuals, as it tries to explain different areas of the research problem. 
Qualitative research complements this study as the aim of this study demands 
in-depth research into the effectiveness of the LCP and the transparency 
practices associated with its implementation. 
This study utilised two qualitative research tools, interviews and secondary 
sources. Interviews encourage the respondent to provide a rich description of 
phenomena while leaving the analysis to the researcher. In addition, the use of 
secondary sources provides access to online information (for example journals, 
government papers, articles, company information sites and white papers) and 
the opportunity to gain insights and information on the best practices 
associated with LCP in various oil producing countries whose LCP were 
reviewed.  
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4.5.1 Interviews 
Interviews are amongst the simplest strategies employed in qualitative 
research (DiCiccio-Bloom and Crabtree 2006; Bryman 2012). An interview is a 
verbal interaction or exchange between the researcher and the research 
participants, for collecting reliable and valid data to answer a specific research 
question (Parahoo 2006). It is a tool widely used to assess the experiences of 
people and their personal attitudes and perception of reality (Zhang and 
Wildemuth 2009). Interviews are used to obtain greater information about the 
interviewee or a particular subject; however, this knowledge differs according 
to the researcher’s area of discipline. For example, some studies are created to 
test a hypothesis, and usually employ a very structured interview format 
whereby the questions and approach to analysis are standardised. On the other 
hand, other researchers seek to explore meaning and perceptions to gain a 
better understanding or generate hypotheses. The second option requires some 
form of qualitative interview, as it encourages the respondent to offer a rich 
description of phenomena while leaving the analysis to the researcher. The 
main aim of the qualitative interview is to contribute to the body of knowledge 
that is theoretical and conceptual and is based on the meaning of the 
participants’ experiences (Bryman 2012). 
This research employed a qualitative interview method. This allowed the 
participants to be free and flexible in answering the interviewer’s questions. 
Additionally, qualitative interviewing can be either unstructured or semi-
structed.  Unstructured interviews are where the researcher has no predefined 
theoretical framework and as such no hypothesis or questions about the social 
realities being investigated. On the other hand, semi-structured interviews is a 
verbal exchange where a person, the interviewer, attempts to draw information 
from the respondent by asking questions (Clifford et al. 2010). In a semi-
structured interview, interviews have a loose structure comprising of 
predetermined open-ended questions on the area to be explored. Moreover, 
when an interview is conducted in a conversational manner, it allows the 
respondent room to discuss any issues they believe to be important. This type 
of interview may take place with an individual or a group of people. In addition, 
to execute a semi-structured interview, the researcher must be fully prepared, 
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both mentally and confident in their skills (Wengraf 2001). Compared to the 
structured interview, semi-structured interviews tend to be more efficient as 
they require considerable preparation before the session. It also entails 
discipline and creativity during the session, and additional time for 
interpretation and analysis after the session. This research employed qualitative 
data collection techniques, which included mainly face-to-face interviews and 
telephone interviews in order to obtain data  to adequately answer the research 
questions. 
From the analysis above, it was concluded that the form of interview that would 
best suit this research would be the semi-structured interview, as it gives the 
participants, who are all experts in the field of this study, means of expressing 
their feelings and experience about local content. Moreover, as a semi-
structured interview is normally conducted using open-ended questions, it 
offers the researcher greater scope to pursue an idea in more detail. This was 
supported by Carruthers (1990), who states that semi-structured interviews 
must have a degree of structure in their implementation. This can be achieved 
by creating an interview schedule where all participants receive the same 
questions.  This gives the researcher, or interviewer, the flexibility to maximise 
the opportunity to enrich the data. As each interview is carried out the 
interviewer gains more experience and a better understanding of the question, 
thereby acquiring a skill that helps him/her to identify and further explore the 
ideas arising from the participants’ answers (Bryman 2012). 
The flexibility of interviews makes it an attractive data collection method 
(Bryman 2016). The main data collection technique employed for this research 
gave the interviewer the opportunity to probe the participants for answers or 
build on their responses (Saunders et al. 2009). Additionally, the researcher 
could modify the questions when necessary, clarify doubts, and ensure that the 
responses were clearly understood (Uma and Bougie 2014). During the 
interviews the nature and significance of the study were stated at the start. The 
researcher also quantified how their involvement would contribute to the study. 
Most of the participants were sceptical initially, as the nature of the research 
suggested that they would be discussing sensitive topics that would expose 
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their companies. As stated by Davis (2007) in Agarwal (2010), the researcher 
must consider their presentation when meeting with their participants as some 
participants might be uncomfortable. Thus, to control this situation, efforts 
must be made to put the participants at ease. Hence, the participants were 
assured their identity would not be disclosed during this study. Further, when 
presenting the findings in Chapters five and six, a code was used to identify the 
participants and ensure their confidentiality. Additionally, the participants were 
assured that the information from the interviews would only be available to the 
researcher.  This assurance had a significant impact on the interview process 
as the participants felt more relaxed, which encouraged them to speak freely 
during the interview. The interview started with the participants stating their 
background and their job description within their companies. The participants 
then shared their knowledge of LCP and discussed how their companies have 
implemented the policy. Consequently, this enabled the exploration into the 
meaning of LCP, its implementation and its success from their point of view. 
Most of the interviews were conducted at the participants’ place of work or at a 
venue suggested by the participants; the environment was often conducive for 
discussion as it provided a quiet and familiar space for the interview. 
All the interviews were recorded to preserve the original format and content. 
Recordings of the interviews are essential and ensure that the interviewer is 
not distracted by note taking. Moreover, for analysis purposes, it is also 
necessary to have a complete account of the interview available (Bryman 
2015). Bryman (2015) further stated that, currently, qualitative researchers 
are not just interested in what the participants say, but also the way in which 
the information is delivered. Thus, recording the interviews allowed a full 
observation of participants and helped to identify other ‘telling signs’ such as 
facial expressions and gestures.  
After the interviews, the researcher tried to transcribe the interviews as quickly 
as possible in order to capture the originality, expression and interpretations as 
best as possible. As stated by Bryman (2015), transcribing interviews is time-
consuming, and Gibbs (2007) and Saunders et al. (2009) further stress that 
the researcher should not only reproduce the exact words of the interviewee, 
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but also the tone.  Moreover, they should capture the interviewee’s non-verbal 
communication as well. Furthermore, a second check of the transcript against 
the recording was undertaken. According to Saunders et al. (2009), this method 
is known as data cleaning and as previously stated, all interviews were 
anonymised. All this was done to ensure the reliability of the data and to 
maintain the confidentiality guarantee made to the participants. The next step 
was primarily reading, classifying and interpreting the transcripts, then forming 
categories, themes, and codes using a method called data reduction (Uma and 
Bougie 2014). A detailed explanation of the analysis approach is provided in 
Section 4.6. 
4.5.2 Sampling 
There are two main types of sampling; purposive (non-probability or non-
random) and random (probability) sampling (Ghauri and Gronhaug 2002; 
Saunders et al. 2007; Easterby-Smith et al. 2012). The research proposed a 
purposive type of sampling, which is described by Easterby-Smith et al. (2012) 
as where the entity or character being part of the sample is known. Here the 
sample is confined to a specific group of people, who can provide the 
information desired for this research (Uma and Bougie 2014). 
For this research, specific people and organisations were identified using 
purposive sampling employing the stratified sample method (Easterby-Smith et 
al. 2012). This method allows the population to be divided into homogeneous 
groups called the strata. The main idea of the strata is to ensure that every 
section of the population is adequately represented (Ghauri and Gronhaug 
2002). Thus, for this research, participants were identified from different 
sample groups according to their influence and characteristics in the Nigerian 
oil and gas industry. Each respondent was responsible for LCP operations in 
their various organisations. Hence, each was well equipped to provide the 
necessary information required for this research. During the interviews, a 
research participant invited the researcher to attend an oil and gas conference 
in Abuja with various oil and gas industry stakeholders (IOCs, indigenous 
companies and regulatory bodies). Subsequent introductions resulted in 
contacts being established within these companies and more interviews were 
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scheduled as a result. Other potential participants were recommended by these 
contacts in alternative locations in Nigeria. 
Saunders et al. (2009) and Bryman (2016) highlight that snowball sampling is 
beneficial when it is difficult to gain access to members of a specific population, 
in this case, oil and gas companies. Bryman (2016) further identified that both 
purposive and snowball sampling often complement each other. The process 
involves sampling the initial participants without the use of snowball sampling 
and then using these participants to broaden the sample population through 
the snowballing approach (Bryman 2016). This process of broadening out gives 
the researcher the opportunity to compare units of analysis and assess the 
adequacy of a sample to the point of data saturation (Bryman 2016; Bernard 
and Ryan 2010).  
4.5.3 Sample groups 
Sample groups were categorised from the research sample population, 
according to their relevance in relation to the LCP in the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry. The research divided the population into two sample groups. Group 
one included government organisations and agencies. These agencies and 
organisations implement policies and oversee the country’s oil and gas 
industry’s activities as well as perform revenue management functions. They 
also undertake oil exploration and production of contractual agreements for the 
government; and manage crude oil sales and oil and gas investments. A 
number of these government organisations perform regulatory functions, 
including the monitoring and assess of oil and gas companies’ activities and 
receiving oil and gas revenues. They also distribute oil and gas revenues and 
manage financial activities in the oil and gas industry. These government 
organisations include the: Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC); 
Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board (NCDMB); Directorate of 
Petroleum Resources (DPR); The National Petroleum Investment Management 
Services (NAPIMS); Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF); and, the 
Nigerian Petroleum Exchange (NIPEX). Table 4.1 below presents a summary of 
group one participants. 
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Table 4.1. Summary of group one participants 
Research Participants’ 
code 
Position in 
Organisation 
Type of Organisation 
NB1 Director Auditor 
RB1 Managerial Regulator 
RB2 Civil Servant Investment  
RB3 Managerial Investment  
RB4 Managerial Investment  
RB5 Managerial Regulator 
RB6 Managerial Regulator 
RB7 Managerial Capacity Development 
Source: Author 
Group two comprised of IOCs and employees of indigenous oil and gas 
companies operating in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. These companies 
carry out exploration and production activities and are compelled to implement 
the LCP in their activities. Table 4.2 presents a summary of group two 
participants. 
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Table 4.2. Summary of group two participants 
Research Participants’ 
code 
Position in 
Organisation 
Type of Organisation  
IOC1 Policy Advisor International oil and gas 
company 
IOC2 Executive International oil and gas 
company 
IOC3 Policy Advisor International oil and gas 
company 
IOC4 Senior Executive   International oil and gas 
company 
IOC5 Executive  International oil and gas 
company 
IOC6 Policy Advisor International oil and gas 
company 
LOC1 Executive Indigenous oil and gas company 
LOC2 Executive Indigenous oil and gas company 
LOC3 Executive  Indigenous oil and gas company 
LOC4 Executive  Indigenous oil and gas company 
LOC5 Executive  Indigenous oil and gas company 
LOC6 Executive  Indigenous oil and gas company 
LOC7 Executive  Indigenous oil and gas company 
Source: Author 
4.6 Data management and analysis 
 4.6.1 Data management 
The data analysis software NVivo was used to manage the data. It provides the 
opportunity to transcribe interviews into NVivo. This software keeps track of 
information and organises complex and disorganized data, including interviews, 
audio, video, images and diagrams for qualitative projects (Bazeley and Jackson 
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2013). It also organises and provides access to theoretical and conceptual 
knowledge generated during the research, as well as the data that supports it, 
while at the same time allowing access to the context from which the data 
originated (Bazeley and Jackson 2013). 
4.6.2 Data analysis 
There are various approaches for qualitative data analysis, namely content 
analysis and thematic analysis. Content analysis involves creating categories 
and counting the number of occurrences in which they are used in a text (Joffe 
and Yardley 2004). On the other hand, thematic analysis pays greater attention 
to the qualitative aspects of the data analysed. Thematic and content analysis 
share many procedures and principles (Joffe and Yardley 2004). For instance, 
the conceptualisation of theme and code are used interchangeably. However, 
content analysis researchers have been accused of removing meaning from its 
context. For example, the coding of the word ‘participation’ may occur 
frequently in discussions with a person or group of individuals for many reasons. 
The number of occurrences of the word ‘participation’ might mean involvement. 
However, it might also mean a ‘greater disposition’ to talk at length about the 
topic. Content analysis and thematic analysis share the same characteristics, 
but thematic analysis allows the researcher to combine the frequency of codes 
with the analysis of their meaning in context. Hence, creating the advantages 
of finesse and complexity of qualitative analysis (Joffe and Yardley 2004)  
Therefore, this study employs the thematic analysis, as the study was 
concerned with interpreting and understanding the meaning of the research 
participants’ experiences. Also, it was in line with the phenomenological and 
interpretative stand adopted for this study. Furthermore, thematic analysis is 
flexible and is one of the most commonly used analytical tools in qualitative 
analysis, including the top-down theory-driven and the bottom-up data-driven 
methods. Moreover, it can be used to answer most of the research questions 
(Braun and Clarke 2013).         
The first step in qualitative data analysis is data reduction, which refers to the 
process of selecting, coding and categorisation of the data from the transcripts 
(Sander, Lewis and Thornhill 2009; Creswell 2013 and Uma and Bougie 2014; 
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Bryman 2016). These transcripts were read and re-read to ensure that the 
researcher was familiar with the data. The researcher also approached the data 
with no theoretical or any other assumptions in mind. Thus, the first step in the 
data analysis process was to read the first five transcripts and to manually code 
the transcripts. Coding is an analytical process whereby the qualitative data is 
reduced and integrated to form a theory (Uma and Bougie 2014). It defines the 
data and involves identifying one or more text or sentences that show the same 
descriptive or theoretical idea (Gibbs 2007). It is also a means of categorising 
or breaking down texts to its component parts that appear to be either of 
potential theoretical importance or prominent within the social world of the 
subject studied (Gibbs 2007; Creswell 2013). After reading the first five 
transcripts, about 300 codes were recorded; these codes were then grouped 
into categories/themes, which were used to recode the five transcripts. This is 
known as pattern coding where codes are assigned to collected data in terms 
of paragraphs, lines or keywords and then grouped into themes/ categories 
(Bernard and Ryan 2010). 
This process then produced new codes, and a number of the categories/ themes 
had to be regrouped. This new code sheet was then used to code four new 
transcripts scripts.  During the process, new codes emerged and had to be 
grouped within the existing themes. Again, the process was repeated with some 
transcripts, but no new additional themes that could be grouped with the 
themes already identified emerged This confirms the principle of data saturation 
(Uma and Bougie 2014) and allows the researcher to develop the final code 
sheet covering all the categories, themes, sub-themes arising from the 
transcripts. Notwithstanding, a final coding of all the transcripts was carried out 
with the new code sheet to ensure that nothing was omitted. This resulted in a 
few new ideas that led to the rearrangement of the code sheet. The themes, 
sub-themes and other subcategories were then arranged in such a way as to 
make it easy for the researcher when reporting the findings in Chapter 5. A 
copy of the code sheet is presented in Appendix 3. Once the coding process was 
concluded on paper, a coding system was then set up using NVivo to bring 
together and link all quotations to their relevant categories, themes and sub-
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themes. This process made it relatively straightforward when writing up the 
research findings. 
4.7 Ethical issues 
In the field of research, qualitative researchers face many ethical issues during 
the process of data collection, analysis and writing up of qualitative reports 
(Creswell 2013). Lipon (2004, in Creswell 2013) categorised the ethical issues 
into: confidentiality towards colleagues, participants and sponsors; informed 
consent procedures; participants’ requests; the benefit of research to 
participants compared to the risks; deceptive activities; and originality of 
transcript (Gibb 2007). Each organisation that participated in this research w 
informed of the consent process, which they freely gave to become subjects in 
this research. A copy of the consent form is presented in Appendix 4. 
Furthermore, the participants were provided with the necessary information 
regarding the purpose of the research, what was involved in the research, and 
assurance that any data obtained would be reported anonymously. Creswell 
(2013) stated that this was necessary to avoid any deception surrounding the 
purpose of the study. Mason (1996, in Gibb 2007) indicated that the richness 
and detailed nature of qualitative data makes it difficult to maintain the 
confidentiality and privacy of the participants. Hence, this research used a 
unique code of identification for each participant. To adhere to the 
confidentiality agreement, all the interviews were transcribed by the 
researcher, with no external transcriber employed to undertake the work. 
4.8 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter discussed the research methodology employed for this research. 
An overview of the various research designs (deductive and inductive theories) 
was discussed and led to the researcher choosing the inductive theory. The 
various research approaches utilised in the field of LCP were reviewed and 
analysed. As a result of the discussion, this work adopted a qualitative research 
approach and justification for the use of a qualitative research approach was 
given.  
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The chapter presented the sample and sampling design suitable for this study. 
It also discussed various types of data analysis and provided justification for 
the use of thematic analysis. The chapter concluded with an overview of the 
ethical considerations. The next chapter presents the actual findings from the 
data analysis of the research. 
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Chapter Five 
Research findings  
5.1 Introduction 
As stated in Chapter 2, this research aims to critically evaluate the effectiveness 
of the Local Content Policy and the transparency practices associated with its 
implementation in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. To achieve this aim, the 
research sought to determine the research participants’ level of knowledge of 
the LCP; their views on the impact of the policy on the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry; and the resources available to the industry for the implementation of 
the LCP. Furthermore, the research sought to determine the research 
participants’ perspectives on the level of transparency and the procedures in 
place for ensuring transparency in the implementation of the policy. Moreover, 
the research analysed the barriers to LCP implementation and proposed 
strategies to improve the LCP in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. The findings 
of this research are reported in this chapter. 
5.2 Background of the Nigerian local content policy 
5.2.1 Reflection on the knowledge of the Nigerian local content policy 
Research participants displayed different levels of understanding/knowledge of 
the Nigerian LCP. Data arising from the interviews conducted suggested that 
LCP means different things to the research participants. A summary of the 
participants’ responses regarding their views/knowledge of the Nigerian LCP is 
listed in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1. Knowledge of the Nigerian local content policy 
Participants Knowledge of the 
Nigerian local content 
policy 
Quotations 
RB2 Active participation “It is all about increasing Nigerians’  participation in the oil and 
gas with the sole purpose of in-country value retention” 
LOC6 Active participation “More involvement of Nigerians in the exploration and 
production or the extraction of oil from our own reserves” 
IOC5 Active participation “There is more focus in trying to get Nigerians all over the world 
to some positions that ordinarily expatriates would have been 
utilized”  
IOC6 Active participation “Making sure that Nigerians participate and they actually get 
good economic benefit from the different value chains in the oil 
and gas industry”  
LOC7 Utilization of local 
resources and personnel 
“Yes, it is used to Nigerian Content Directive before a directive 
where the IOCs are encouraged to have a depth of the Nigeria 
content where they try to domicile majority of their purchases in 
Nigeria it later turned into a bill called Nigeria oil and gas content 
act or something” 
IOC5 Utilization of local 
resources and personnel 
“Utilization of Nigerian made materials in the oil and gas 
industry”  
RB4 Utilization of local 
resources and personnel 
“We are beginning to see a situation where a lot of our local 
goods and services are being patronized as compared to what it 
used to be before”  
IOC2 Role of company “Local content in our perspective means a lot of things it could 
be in terms of who performs the jobs and role in the company” 
NB1 Deliberate policy “The local content policy is a deliberate policy that was put in 
place to encourage Nigerian participation in the industry” 
IOC4 Value retention “You have increased capacity and also add value and export and 
earn a lot for your country”  
RB3 Value retention “Local content as a policy has really helped in rendering local 
participation and value retention in the country” 
IOC5 Value retention “Retain more value that is generated in the industry in country” 
RB7 Beyond human capital 
development  
“The implementation of the policy goes beyond, it’s not all about 
human capital development; human capital development is just 
one aspect” 
LOC1 Technology transfer “If you permit me to use that word technology transfer, that is 
essentially what it means, teach locals, get them involved in the 
business to a greater extent not just as suppliers, but as actual 
participants.” 
IOC3 Technology transfer “I think governments’ purpose is to develop local skills and 
knowledge in various aspects of the oil and gas industry” 
LOC4 Technology transfer “It is the process of building our local capacity, transferring 
technology, from the MNC to keep it in house so that we can run 
these business ourselves to a large extent “ 
RB4 Technology transfer “I see it as an instrument of building capacity in Nigeria and an 
instrument of enhancing our development 
RB3 Misconception “This is the misunderstanding, and that is why what we have 
now when you go they have Nigeria content and Niger Delta 
content. It is a different layers, one first you have to have the 
job in the country, if you have it in country, then how you share 
it.”  
Source: Author 
All the participants regarded the Nigerian LCP as the adequate participation of 
Nigerians, utilisation of local resources and personnel, and a deliberate policy 
established by the Nigerian government. Furthermore, the LCP was also 
perceived to concern the role of the company, value retention, and 
technological transfer and beyond human capital development. However, some 
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participants voiced strong views that the LCP is more concerned with the 
adequate participation of Nigerians: 
“It is all about increasing Nigerian participation in the oil and 
gas with the sole purpose of in-country value retention” RB3 
 
“It is all about enhancing participation of Nigerians” IOC4.  
 
Similarly, some of the research participants firmly believed that the 
Nigerian local content policy was about the utilisation of local materials 
and personnel. The executive of an IOC stated: 
“From input to raw material perspective and from even output 
perspectives, in that when you put the raw materials, and you 
are able to apply the Nigerian local content to it, you would 
have been able to create a lot of jobs” IOC4 
 
More so, a LC advisor from one of the regulatory bodies stated: 
“We are beginning to see a situation where a lot of our local 
goods and services are being patronised as compared to what 
it used to be before” RB4 
 
In addition, some of the research participants had strong reasons to believe 
that the LCP is concerned with the role of the company. The head of an 
indigenous company indicated that: 
“Given the fact that we have been in existence before then, 
some of our antecedents, experiences were actually brought 
into play in drafting the act that eventually became the law, 
so they interviewed me and sought my opinion but as far as 
the local content policy is concerned we basically have been 
local content before the local content law, all our staff here 
are Nigerians, all our work are being done by Nigerians there 
is nothing sent abroad at all” LOC3 
 
While, the LC advsior of an IOC believed that: 
“Local content in our perspective means a lot of things it could 
be in terms of who performs the jobs and role in the company 
“IOC2 
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Likewise, from the quotation below, it is evident that a number of participants 
were of the opinion that the LCP is a deliberate policy. For instance, an auditor 
from one of the NGO stated that: 
“The local content policy is a deliberate policy that was put in 
place to encourage Nigerian participation in the industry” NB1 
While the CEO of an indigenous company believed that: 
“I think the foreign workforce has dropped because I feel 
there is a deliberate policy to make Nigerians take over some 
of the…. I think I don't know what Shell calls their chief 
executive. Sumolu is a Nigerian he just left and another 
Nigerian has taken over recently so if at that level this is 
happening I am sure within the middle cadre a lot of 
movement in favour of the local content” LOC1 
 
Although the participants had varying levels of knowledge regarding 
the Nigerian local content policy, there was also consensus among the 
research participants. They all maintained that the LCP is concerned 
with technological transfer, enhancing  the capacity of Nigerians and 
involving them in oil and gas industry activities. For example:  
“Well that is if you permit me to use that word technology 
transfer, that is essentially what it means, teach locals, get 
them involved in the business to a greater extent not just as 
suppliers, but as actual participants” LOC1 
 
While some participants agreed that the LCP is concerned with technology 
transfer, LOC2 felt that it was the responsibility of the IOCs operating in the 
industry to train Nigerians in the oil and gas industry: 
“I feel Nigeria content policy to me is all about transfer of 
information and technology, from the foreign companies that 
have been predominately actively involved in oil and gas 
services over the years” 
 
Furthermore, a number of the research participants asserted that when 
the IOCs train Nigerians, the industry retains the value in Nigeria, 
which could benefit the country’s economy. This view aligns with the 
perception of the LCP as a deliberate policy to retain value in-country 
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in order to improve the Nigerian economy.  For instance, the head of 
an IOC indicated that:  
“Nigeria content policy is one of those things that came with 
this outgoing administration, part of the democracy that we 
are practising in Nigeria whereby we say to ourselves as a 
country we need to transfer knowledge and know how to 
Nigerians from the human capacity perspectives” IOC4 
“Local content to me means the process of building our local 
capacity, transferring technology, from the MNC to keep it in-
house so that we can run this business ourselves to a large 
extent” LOC4 
 
In support of the statement that the LCP is concerned with technological 
transfer, some of the indigenous companies went further by stating that the 
policy also encourages value retention in Nigeria: 
“Local content to me means is the process of building our local 
capacity, transferring technology from the MNC to keep it in-
house so that we can run this business ourselves to a large 
extent” LOC4 
 
IOC4 also stated that:  
“You have increased capacity and also increased your capacity to be able 
to add value and export and earn a lot for your country.”  
In addition, a local content advisor of one of the regulatory bodies (RB3) 
agreed with the idea that the LCP had value retention and indicated that:  
“It is all about increasing Nigerian participation in the oil and gas with 
the sole purpose of in-country value retention.”  
However, a LC manger from one of the regulatory bodies (RB1) indicated that: 
“On the contrary, policy is there to ensure that value addition 
is made to the oil and gas industry internally in Nigeria by 
Nigerians and companies that are not Nigeria to be domiciled 
in a way that adds value to oil and gas activities  
 
IOC5, a LC manager added that the LCP was geared to: 
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  “Retain more value that is generated in the industry in the country.” 
In addition to what has already been stated about the LCP in regard to adequate 
participation, value retention, and technological transfer, one of the participants 
(RB7) as stated in table 5.1, claimed that the LCP goes beyond human capacity 
development: 
However, a local content advisor from one of the regulatory bodies believed 
that there was a misconception regarding the nature of Nigerian local content 
policy: 
 
“That is the misunderstanding, and that is why what we have 
now when you go they have Nigeria content and Niger delta 
content, it is different layers one first you have to have the 
job in the country, if you have it in country, then how you 
share it, is another breaking it down” RB3  
 
It is clear that the opinions voiced by the research participants suggest that 
they have a detailed and appropriate understanding of what the LCP implies. 
The majority of the research participants argued in favour of the LCP as a means 
of technological transfer leading to the adequate participation of Nigerians in 
the oil and industry. Thus, it could be concluded that the opinions of the 
research participants suggest that they have a detailed and appropriate 
understanding of what the implications of the LCP. 
5.2.2 Impact of the Nigerian local content policy 
One of the fundamental aspects identified during the interviews was the impact 
the LCP has had since its implementation. While some of the IOCs claimed, the 
policy has been beneficial, others commented on some of the negative aspects 
of the policy. Further, the CEO of an IOC stated that:  
“It has led to delays, inefficiency, increased cost and in some cases, it 
has also led to efficiency gain so it is mixed” IOC2.  
IOC5 further highlighted the challenging nature of the policy and claimed: 
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  “Well for me, the policy is a mixed feeling [producing] both positive and 
negative [outcomes]”.  
However, despite these responses, a number of positive impacts were also 
identified by the participants. For instance: 
5.2.2.1 Investment 
The majority of the research participants argued in favour of retained 
investment as one of the main positive impacts the LCP has on the Nigeria oil 
and gas industry. This is because revenue generated within the economy is 
encouraged to be spent in Nigeria 
“what I can say to that is that since the policy came to play, I would say    
that it has attracted a lot of foreign direct investment“ RB7.  
In addition, these investments have helped develop infrastructure in Nigeria, 
and supported local suppliers participating in the industry. For instance, the 
local content manager of a regulatory body stated: 
“Now when we established the pack we identified the 
operators of the pack, we are also going to invest in the 
physical infrastructure development of the packs, so what that 
does for the local supplier that is complaining of high-cost 
goods, is that we are reducing his start-up investment outlay 
okay” RB5 
 
Furthermore, a local content advisor in support of retained investment as a 
major positive impact argued that the government is also making an effort by 
ensuring that the foreign direct investments coming into the country are 
regulated and retained: 
“Yes we do, RB4 that I work for, RB4, by the way, is a 
corporate service unit of NNPC who is charged with the 
responsibility of managing government investment in the oil 
and gas upstream, we also call ourselves investment 
managers, to that extent we ensure that in whatever activities 
we are engaged in, the Nigeria content requirement is taken 
into account, so we are active players as far as the 
implementation act is concerned” RB4 
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As a result of the policies, the CEO of one of the indigenous companies indicated 
that the revenue generated is spent in Nigeria, and this has benefitted the state 
of the economy: 
“But the local content initiative is a very laudable one, and it 
has really provided a shift in the revenue allocation and its 
usage between foreign companies and Nigerian companies, so 
we have seen a lot of domestication of the financials from 
activities in that sector, and that has helped the economy of 
Nigeria” LOC3 
 
5.2.2.2 Advantage to local oil and gas companies 
The research participants asserted that as a result of LCP implementation, 
indigenous companies have been able to enter into the oil and gas business. 
For instance, most of the onshore locations have been allocated to national 
companies  
“with the Nigerian local content policy most of the land locations and 
swamp locations are being reassigned to indigenous companies” IOC1 
Consequently, more indigenous oil and gas companies have entered the 
industry, as LOC3 states:  
“We have seen number of newly start-up companies are growing and 
they have improved.”  
Furthermore, the policy has helped develop indigenous companies into 
international brands that can compete on the same level as the IOCs. 
“Oh! It has tremendously, it has aided us. We are considered as one of 
Nigerians leading independent energy services provider, so in most 
projects, it gives us that edge, we are a recognised brand, and of course 
the brand is recognised with everything Nigeria, it gives us an advantage 
to pursue projects and opportunities” LOC6   
5.2.2.3 Employment  
Employment was also a positive impact resulting from LCP implementation and 
this fact was remarked upon by the research participants. This is supported by 
the excerpt below:  
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“It has affected it positively, in a way that, it has created a lot of jobs for 
people so I think the Nigerian content policy has affected the 
employment rate positively by making sure that people are being 
employed and gain useful employment” LOC2 
In addition, the head of one of the IOCs stated that as a result of the policy, 
more Nigerians had attained managerial positions in the industry: 
“In my specific industry, Nigerians to be employed is given up to a certain 
level but at the more managerial level i.e. if you look at the way we are 
structured we have 60% Exxon Mobil and we have 40% Nigerians” IOC4 
Furthermore, an NOC member of staff also added that the policy has had an 
impact on employment;  
“Yes because I do not have the actual figures, but I strongly believe that 
the figures will not be the same from where it was before” RB6 
5.2.2.4 Skill acquisition  
The majority of the participants argued that LCP implementation led to the 
emergence of skill acquisition in Nigerians. The following quotations are 
examples of what they meant when referring to the term skills acquisition, 
based on the figures taken from the NCDMB. One regulatory agency employee 
stated: 
“Most of these questions will be better answered in a 
qualitative manner by NCDMB, but I think that since the time 
that this policy was made if you are going by the NCDMB 
figures, there has been a substantial improvement especially 
in training of Nigeria locals” RB1 
 
In addition, an advisor of one of the regulatory bodies indicated that: 
 
 “It’s not only aided employment but skills acquisition, through this 
medium many Nigerians have gone into vessels” RB2 
A few of the research participants argued that the IOCs are making 
effort to train Nigerians and invest in Nigerian universities as a means 
of building local capacity in the industry:  
“the restriction in bringing in expatriates have compelled 
these companies to start investing and liaising with some 
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universities so that skills gap will be covered so Nigerians are 
having better chances now because of local content” RB3 
 
However, a number of the interviewees argued and concluded that 
training is included in the policies, therefore, companies must comply. 
For instance, a LC manager of one of the regulatory bodies believed 
that: 
“There are three ways of looking at it, the Nigerian content 
implementation model that we are practising has a provision 
for skilled development, capacity building”. RB5  
Furthermore, the CEO of one of the indigenous companies stated that: 
“We have been able to train them, develop them, empower 
them and now they have taken up those roles that expatriates 
once used to take”. LOC6  
5.2.2.5 Domestication 
A few of the research participants asserted that there had been 
domestication of activities in the Nigerian oil and gas industry due to 
LCP implementation. This is because some of the IOCs transferred 
ownership of the equipment to indigenous companies and thereafter 
provided assembling and maintenance support when necessary. As 
stated by one of the LC advisor of one of the IOCs:  
“sometimes, we transfer ownership of some of our tools to 
them, there are tools that are manufactured by us, we now 
see the ownership of those tools, but we still provide assembly 
and maintenance support to the local content companies such 
that they are able to continue to run these tools while we do 
the maintenance” IOC1 
 
In addition, the policy has resulted in all vessels being manned by Nigerians, 
which has created opportunities for locals to own vessels in the industry. 
“…. for instance which is the prerequisite of foreign 
companies, we don’t have vessels of our own before now we 
lease vessels but the local content act said you must own a 
vessel made it you must own vessels, it must be flagged 
Nigerian vessels, that has made Nigerians to be owning and 
running their vessels” RB2 
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Some of the research participants identified the benefit of the 
domestication of activities to the Nigerian economy as the reduction in 
capital flight. As stated by one of the local advisor:  
“I think it has positively contributed in the sense that it has 
tremendously reduced capital flights” RB4 
Furthermore, the CEO of one of the indigenous companies indicated 
that: 
“….and also to prevent capital flight because every time it's 
sent out there we are paying extra fee for it to be sent out 
there, even the clearing agent, but here the local company 
whoever, is going to it is in Nigeria, bound here, the transport, 
he’s employed on that job, the money made remains here, 
that’s one of the ways we have done that even for our 
partners and we are still looking forward to do that for some 
other products” LOC7  
 
In addition, one of the regulatory bodies stated that the domestication of 
activities has created more employment opportunities for Nigerian people: 
 “…the ripple effect is that employment opportunities are 
being made available to citizens of other countries so when 
you domicile those activities in country you reduce capital 
flight, and when capital flight is reduced then it has a positive 
impact on the GDP…….” RB7  
 
However, some of the research participants commented on some of 
the negative impact of the policy: 
 
5.2.2.6 Lack of capacity for enforcement 
One negative aspect of the policy, according to the participants, was the the 
lack of capacity available in the industry to enforce the law. As stated that the 
LC advisor of one of the IOCs: 
“It's not advisable to sign a law that will impact negatively in 
the long term on the actual vibrancy of the Nigerian oil and 
gas industry because if you sign a bill into law and then it 
limits the capacity of the Nigeria oil and gas industry simply 
because we want to encourage the indigenous companies. It 
  
133 
will impact in the long run on the level development of the 
Nigeria oil and gas industry” IOC1 
This was supported by another LC advisor: 
“On the negative side in terms of how successful it’s been, its 
impact, I would say sometimes the law, people are sometimes 
pursuing it irrespective of the capacity that is available” IOC2 
 
Some participants also believed that the policy had no discernible target, as it 
tries to achieve too much at the same time: 
“However, for me this has been my opinion on the 
implementation of the Nigerian content, I tend to think that 
we try to do so many things at the same time, for me our 
starting area would have been to pick a particular area and 
focus our attention build on it, we started it well with 
engineering” RB4 
 
Furthermore, one indigenous company believes national companies lack the 
capacity to operate in the industry:  
“What were these issues, they never had spares as in spare 
parts, I was on board this rig, they had issues on one of the 
equipment, okay get this thing changed and continued the 
job, they do not have spares. So, in that area the company 
actually had challenges because of the law, a Nigerian firm 
was patronised” LOC5 
 
Arguably, LCP implementation had both positive and negative impacts on the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry and the Nigerian economy. However, the data 
gathered suggested that the positive impacts outweigh the negative effects. 
Table 5.2 further summarises the impacts of LCP implementation. 
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Table 5.2. Impact of the Nigerian local content policy 
Interviewee Impact of the Nigerian 
local content policy 
                        Quotations 
RB7 Investment “What I can say to that is that since the policy came to 
play, I would say that it has attracted a lot of foreign direct 
investment”  
IOC1 Advantage to local companies  “With the Nigerian local content policy, most of the land 
locations and swamp locations are being reassigned to 
indigenous companies” 
LOC3 Advantage to local companies  “We have seen number of newly start-up companies and 
growing and they have improved”  
RB3 Advantage to local companies  “Yes like I said we have more Nigerian companies 
participating in the country, it has greatly enhanced the 
subcontracting process” 
RB1 Skills acquisition and capacity 
development 
“There has been a substantial improvement especially in 
training of Nigerians” 
RB2 Skills acquisition and capacity 
development 
“It not only aided employment but skills acquisition, 
through this medium any Nigerians have gone into 
vessels”  
LOC7  Skills acquisition and capacity 
development 
“We have been able to train them, develop them, 
empower them and now they have taken up those roles 
that expatriates once to took”  
IOC2 Enforcing the law irrespective 
of the capacity available  
“people are sometimes pursuing it irrespective of the 
capacity that is available”  
IOC4 Enforcing the law irrespective 
of the capacity available 
“Can we do these things honestly without compromise 
and without cutting corners”  
Source: Author  
5.2.3 Resources available for implementation of policy 
This section reviews the research participants’ views regarding the resources 
available for the implementation of the LCP. Resources provide the necessary 
assistance to enable oil and gas companies to carry out the policy as required 
by law. Therefore, there is a need to explore the resources available for the 
implementation of this policy. Inevitably, employees from various oil and gas 
companies had different of opinion on the assistance available for implementing 
this policy. 
“It is a bit of a struggle, if you read a bit more about the 
development of local content across the globe. For instance, 
in Japan local content has been successful. But in some 
countries, it has taken them much longer to implement, 
however, I think we have had a bit of an aggressive work plan 
for Nigeria” IOC2 
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However, some indigenous companies argued they do have the resources to 
participate in the industry: 
“Yea depending on our operations, we have got the capacity 
to carry out our job, we have got the tools, we have the 
human resources, we have got the material resources, the 
capital is there to execute whatever we do, as I speak with 
you LOC5 as a company is leading inspection and training 
company in Nigeria because we have got the capacity for that” 
LOC5 
 
5.2.3.1 Training 
Much was said on the subject of the resources available for implementing the 
policy. One such aspect mentioned by the participants was training.one of the 
CEO of  an indigenous companies indicated: 
“Well I want to believe that the basic will entail training 
because when you train someone to the extent, he is good at 
it then he becomes a sellable commodity anywhere not 
necessarily within the local environment so training and 
retraining is a major tool in this direction” LOC1 
 
The LC advisor of one of the IOCs believed that training was an important 
aspect, enabling Nigerians to become involved in the industry and indicated 
that:  
“Training, training, more and more training, the plan as I understand it, 
is that with time as we move forward more Nigerians will take over” 
IOC4.  
Moreover, the research participants also stated that training is included in the 
LCP: 
“Two, they also have it as a requirement now if you win a 
contract you must train people in that contract, so those kind 
of training that they are doing are actually making more 
Nigerians more employable in the oil and gas and also that 
requirement by law” RB3 
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As a result, on the whole oil and gas companies train their staff and have 
established training centres. For instance, the CEO of an indigenous company 
stated: 
“So what they now do is to employ Nigerians and put them to 
understudy the experts, so within, we call it (OJT) on the job 
training, so most of them are now growing in the field” LOC5 
“We have trained over a dozen staff this year alone already 
abroad” LOC5 
 
Some indigenous companies have established training centres in Nigeria, where 
companies train their employees and the government sends Nigerians for 
capacity building development: 
“For training, we have got a simulator which is used for well 
intervention and rotatory drilling. Also, look at this, as a 
requirement of the local content law, we had this, when they 
had the amnesty program, disarmament and the integration 
of the ex-militants when the federal government audited our 
company and deem us fit to develop their competency, they  
gave us a hundred of them, that we taught……...” LOC5 
 
In addition, an advisor of one of the regulatory bodies indicated: 
“Now, the way we frame that is to identify skill gaps, and 
come up with a training program post university training 
program, now our model has three phases; we train, we 
attach on projects then you certify” RB5 
 
While a CEO of an indigenous company indicated: 
“And we will certainly be training more; there are a lot of 
retraining as well that goes on…...” LOC3 
 
According to one of the regulatory bodies, in order to implement the law, 
regulatory agencies have opened training centres and devised strategies to 
empower Nigerians; however, he remarked:  
“…., have you heard of any training centre that is owned by NCDMB?” 
RB4 
  
137 
One of the objectives is to empower Nigerians to start up their businesses: as 
indicated by a LC advisor: 
“so the welders we’ve trained we are not just leaving them to 
walk on the streets, we also have other programs like the 
EDTP Entrepreneurship development training program so that 
we can empower them to start up something while we are 
waiting for the industry to pick up” RB7 
 
Some of the research participants also discussed the training institutes and 
scholarship programmes available to Nigerians: 
“Well, we have training institutes that are providing skills, like 
the petroleum training institute they are available, the PTDF 
that are providing scholarship, the ETF that are providing 
scholarship for people to study aboard and acquire those 
required skill”. RB6 
However, an advisor of one of the regulatory bodies specified that these training 
institutions are just theory based and do not teach practical work. 
“PTI if you ask me, is still too much theory, we need hands 
on, we need an engineering company that has training facility, 
like in NEPCO they have executed so many projects in the 
past, all they will do bring the projects, we call it the dummy 
projects, but for these guys you are training them, they look 
at it like this is a brand new project, so they are redesigning 
that project as if its brand new that’s the type of training I 
want” RB4 
 
5.2.3.2 Funding 
The research participants also raised the challenging issue of accessing funds 
when implementing the LCP, especially with regard to the 1% remittance to the 
Nigerian Content Development Fund (NCDF): 
 “There is a Nigerian content fund which local companies can 
access to help them to prequalify and qualify during the joint 
qualification system that will help them to compete favourably 
with their foreign counterparts so that they can win jobs” RB7  
 
Regarding the NCDF, none of the research participants were aware whether the 
funds have been utilised in the industry:  
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 “Okay, I cannot really talk much whether they are able to 
access this fund or not, I cannot say” IOC1 
 
“The bank doesn’t have the necessary fund, that is part of our 
problem, but like I said there is an NCDMB fund which is 
normally deductible from invoice whenever we submit. These 
funds readily available, but those funds can only be release to 
you when you have a true and clear intention of you want to 
set up a manufacturing plant that is when that fund can be 
released. Am not talking for NCDMB, but that is what they 
said, I don't know who have gone and tried and it worked but 
that is what I have heard, and I believe it is working” LOC2 
 
Similarly, a number of the local content advisors from the regulatory agencies 
stated that there is no information about companies that have utilised the NCDF 
funds: 
“So I don’t know how far the money has helped in furthering 
the business of contractors” RB1 
 
“That is being collected, I don’t know if they have started, for 
every company we award a contract we collect the 1% and 
give it to NCDMB and the whole idea is that the money will be 
used to create a more competitive breath that everybody can 
access whether they have started implementing it or not, I 
am not aware”  RB3 
 
When discussing the implementation of the policy, the research participants 
also highlighted the level of existing infrastructure. Some of the participants 
stated that it is the companies themselves that provide most of the resources: 
“When it comes to, infrastructure is there, but then most of 
the things you provide for yourself, if the light is not there, 
you run your generator to run your business, the roads are 
not there, some of the roads where the warehouses are 
located, you still have to maintain them. So, you are paying 
huge taxes, but you are not getting the benefits. That is the 
issue, if most trailers and most trucks are going and they get 
there and fall, they damage the equipment. So, the 
infrastructures are not to the level to which we expect” LOC4 
“If you wait for infrastructure or finance to be there before 
you say you are running a successful policy you will never 
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start especially a situation of a developing country like 
Nigeria” RB1 
“Well maybe why I don’t know so much about the finance we 
use our own equity in terms of infrastructure a lot of people 
complain” LOC7 
 
In summary, most of the research participants argued that resources 
are not readily available to facilitate LCP implementation. In regard to 
the NCDF funds, most of the research participants were unsure that 
the funds are readily accessible to indigenous companies. It is also 
important to note that oil and gas companies provide most of the 
equipment and materials used in the various activities of the Nigerian 
oil and gas industry. 
5.2.4 Barriers to the successful implementation of the Nigerian local 
content policy 
Having considered the resources available for LCP implementation, it is also 
important to obtain the participants’ perception on the barriers to the successful 
implementation of the policy. 
“ It still boils down to getting the requisite microeconomic 
indicators which is infrastructure, access to fund, ready funds 
because a constraint of local contractors is how they can 
readily get the funds at a reasonable rate that they can 
effectively render the service, and make some money, to 
grow, so funding the microeconomic environment can allow 
you to set up a business”  RB3 
 
Research participants are of the view that the effective implementation 
of the LCP has been obstructed by many factors, some of which 
include:  
5.2.4.1 Lack of infrastructure  
One participant stated that the implementation of the LCP in Nigeria is hindered 
by the fact that the country is a developing nation. Furthermore, Nigeria lacks 
the necessary funds and infrastructure required to manage the oil and gas 
industry, as stated by the LC advisor of one the IOCs:  
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“In terms of infrastructure, yes to some extent it is still a far 
cry from what it is supposed to be for example there is meant 
to have regular power supply and good roads so that they can 
move the tools from their location to customer locations” 
IOC1 
 
“As more local companies are coming they need the requisite 
infrastructure to be able to thrive” RB3 
 
The LC advisor in one of the IOCs highlighted the standard of educational 
institutions as a hindrance. They argued that the level of education available is 
not suitable for the activities undertaken in the oil and gas industry due to the 
amount of technology involved in running the industry: 
“so that comes with its challenges because you need to 
prepare the universities, the various levels of institutions or 
ways of preparing the workforce and local resource persons 
to meet those needs cos you are implementing something that 
requires immediate replacement so you don’t want to 
establish a gap which was the primary reason why we ended 
up with of expatriates”  IOC3 
 
Furthermore, sufficient power supply was also stated as one of the barriers to 
LCP implementation. Power generators produce the majority of electricity used 
in manufacturing activities in Nigeria. Thus, the cost of running the generators 
is factored into the sales of equipment and materials, which this is a major 
headache for indigenous companies: 
“The PIB, and local content thing, power genration is one 
major headache” LOC6 
 
5.2.4.2 Lack of capacity  
Some of the participants stated that indigenous oil and gas companies have 
limited resources and capacity compared to other IOCs in the industry:  
“Maybe more of a question would be local company who want 
to now play in our industry who find their resources limited” 
IOC2 
 “Nigerians do not necessarily have the technical capacity and 
know-how and technology to get deeply involved in these 
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issues, and this is the natural resource this is the mainstay of 
the economy” NB1 
 “We have recognised that one of the challenges of a 
developing economy like ours, and you know I told you that 
our mandate is in respect to developing positively” RB5 
 
One of the LC advisors spoke specifically about the lack of capacity in the area 
of welding: 
“That is one of the biggest challenge that the local companies 
are facing because let’s be honest with ourselves for example 
when we talk about welding I am not sure we have the 
number of skilled welders in quantity and quality as we want 
to have” RB4 
 
The same LC advisor also commented on the lack of capacity in the field of 
engineering: 
 “It’s not cheap to train engineers, the challenge is the skilled 
ones are in short supply”  RB4 
 
One of the research participants, also contend that due to the lack of capacity 
most of the projects are reserved for the IOCs: 
“there are some highly technical jobs that are still exclusively 
reserved for foreign companies” RB3 
 
5.2.4.3 Insufficient capital 
As already stated above, necessary funds are not available to indigenous 
companies. Thus, when asked about the barriers to implementing the policy the 
issue of funds was raised: 
“Another thing is that they also need capital, the level of 
capital the local content entrepreneurs they are able to 
generate is barely enough to keep them in the onshore 
location they are not able to go to deep offshore locations” 
IOC1 
 “Funding is also a major challenge because all those things I 
mentioned require money, so when we recognised that” RB5 
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 “It does not change the reality that there is a funding issue 
for the industry, so it does not change all that reality” I0C5 
“The policy is just evolving, and I believe because of the 
constrains, particularly the capital, is a severe constraint, 
because without that, even if you have the expertise to 
provide services, sometimes it becomes difficult for you to be 
able to participate or compete with these multinational 
companies?”  RB6 
 
5.2.4.4 Ambitious policy 
A LC advisor of one of the IOCs pointed out that the LCP is too ambitious and 
the oil and gas companies cannot everything stated in the policy. 
“What we can learn from them is just having a less ambiguous 
act”.  IOC6 
 
“Yea again, in law your A is A, and your B is B, you are not 
supposed to start for this person you will start amending do 
you understand. It defeats the purpose of the act itself. So, 
let have a, not like it should not be ambitious but let it be 
clear, let it be achievable and let it be measurable, but what 
you have now, like the case of that waiver, it is not 
achievable” IOC6 
 
Another LC manager declared the LCP to be ambitious and cannot be measured: 
“Most people say that the Nigerian local content policy is 
ambitious. Also, that local content is a broad subject when 
NNPC said they achieved 35% local content in the industry, 
they should have explained where because local content is 
divided into management, procurement, fabrication even 
catering, you have to specify what exactly you are talking 
about. What are the resources available for these local 
companies to carry out the local content requirement?”  RB4 
 
However, one of the regulatory bodies stated that it is better to have 
an aggressive policy than not have a policy at all. The policy must be 
able to be tweaked to achieve the purpose for which it was created:  
“Will it be better to have an ambitious percentage or not at 
all. It is just pointing to the way you want to do so you know 
  
143 
whether at al also you will be able to know if you are 
performing against your percentage” RB1 
“but the real policy itself is locally grown that is why they have 
issues with that policy because we should have legislation that 
can be tweaked as we go on to tweak to achieve different 
thresholds rather having a big document that is cast in 
stone……..” RB1 
 
Security was also mentioned as an obstacle to the implementation of the policy, 
as companies are looking for an enabling environment in which to operate: 
“Then security sometimes when deployments are made we 
have to provide escorts for tools and personnel's which you 
know is additional cost this   is the challenge” IOC1  
 
On the other hand, the CEO of an indigenous company cited the current fall in 
oil price as a barrier to implementing the policy: 
“It is a phase it will pass; it has happened before. It happened 
in 2007, and they say the oil price has crashed, yea the 
circumstances are different sort of and for us here in Nigeria, 
it’s only more difficult because of the uncertainties about the 
election and everything thing, but it is a cyclical thing it 
happens every now and then in the oil industry” LOC6. 
 
In summary, most of the research participants believed that the barriers to 
implementing the policy lie with the lack of infrastructure and insufficient capital 
which makes it a challenge for companies to abide by the policy. Furthermore, 
the lack of capacity was also regarded as a barrier, as indigenous companies 
lack the necessary manpower to operate in the industry. 
5.2.5 Incentives 
When asked if there are any incentives in place to encourage companies to 
implement the LCP, one of the regulatory bodies stated:  
“Sure, sure, the incentives can be seen from different 
perspectives, the first incentive is for you to have that 
satisfaction that you are complying with the law, so nobody is 
after you. Your shareholders are happy with you; the 
community is happy that at least that the first incentive…..” 
RB5 
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After agreeing that there are incentives for implementing the policy, some of 
the participants then categorised these incentives under the following 
subheadings. 
5.2.5.1 Local sourcing 
Some of the research participants suggested purchasing from local 
manufacturers as the materials should be available and cheap: 
“So while there may be incentive from a cost perspective to 
say let’s use more locals” IOC2 
“Well, when you say incentives, is it incentives coming from 
the regulatory body, from what I can say I will talk about it 
from the economic side, getting anything from outside the 
country is very expensive, if I can source for it locally, why 
not, it will be cheaper” LOC6 
 
One of the indigenous companies believed the implementation of the policy 
alone is an incentive:  
“Well, that is surely a far-reaching thing the way I see it. Are 
you going to give them tax holiday because you want local 
content? No, I think the way I see it if they implement local 
content it will reduce even their cost of operation because if 
you were to ship an expatriate here the attendant cost on one 
expatriate will cover two, three local so that itself is enough 
incentive for them” LOC1 
 
In addition, the CEO of an indigenous company referred to the support given 
by the government as an incentive. For instance, governmental support given 
to indigenous companies attempting to participate in the industry: 
“Yea, there are some initiatives and incentives, but I don't 
really have the full data, but I know there are some incentives 
that if you want to set up a plant and in company plant NCDMB 
will throw their weight on you, they can write to all the IOCs 
to patronise you, there are some kind of grant that can be 
given to you by the NCDMB in conjunction with PETAN……...” 
LOC2 
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Moreover, some of the research participants mentioned the incentive offered to 
operators trying to establish businesses in the country: 
“The third incentive is that once you are implementing the 
law, there is a section in the act, I think section seven that 
allows you to, that allows the honourable minister of 
petroleum resources to provide incentives to operators that 
want to establish facilities, infrastructure to domicile certain 
activities in the country. So, you see the incentive of okay am 
putting this in Nigerian environment, government is 
recognising it, government is supporting my investment, you 
know that is an additional plus” RB5 
 “There is a clear incentive clause, clause 48 talks about 
incentives which say that for companies that invest to build 
capacity in country, the minister and the executive secretary 
should discuss with other government agencies to give them 
tax incentives and other fiscal incentives” IOC5 
5.2.6. Sub-standard product and no incentives 
However, one of the IOCs believed that there is a negative aspect to offering 
incentives for implementing the policy, as it leads to the production of sub-
standard goods: 
“The negative aspect of it is, of course, do they meet the 
standard specs so if they do not meet the standard specs, and 
so what do we do. So, we still depend heavily on imports, we 
even the things we are supposed to be doing by snap of your 
fingers should be given” IOC4  
 
While some of the participants spoke of incentives to encourage the 
implementation of the policy, one of the participants mentioned that 
inducements are not widespread. 
Those that benefit from the incentives are the companies which have a close 
relationship with the Nigerian government: 
“to be honest, I will not say there are incentives at the 
moment because there are companies that have benefitted, 
especially indigenous   companies, but I cannot say its 
widespread, sometimes it looks like the same people in the 
industry, the same people, I do not want to it cabal……...” 
IOC6 
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In addition, an LC advisor of one of the IOCs asserted that there were no 
incentives or encouragement to implement the policy:  
“We have been promised incentives, and they actually even 
told us that if you put in the Nigerian content in a lot of the 
raw materials we are going to l get a bit of waivers into some 
of your input of raw materials, I don’t have a problem with 
that, we don’t even get this incentive that they are talking 
about”  IOC4 
 
The NCDF was again mentioned when the companies were questioned about 
the incentives provided.  They stated that the fund had not been utilised: 
“Incentive, we have not, we know that they keep on deducting 
some percentage from every job we do and remit to NCDMB, 
1% we have applied to NCDMB, to develop all the things you 
are seeing here is self-funding, and insurance and the rates 
are so high when we borrow money from the bank, NCDMB 
have not supported”  LOC4 
“There’s no incentive on that, however, there’s even more or 
less a burden in which when the NCD directive became a law 
your money even become deducted, since the law came into 
force, any whether service or purchase order you do will take 
away 1% NCDF and it’s a lot”  LOC7 
“So I have told you what the incentive is, as far as I know, 
the question is that incentive being given or not. So far, as far 
as I know, no company has benefited from it, but that is the 
incentive the people who made that law, envisaged and put in 
the act and I think it is an incentive that can really help to 
attract investment and help us achieve how objective and 
something that can be measured”  IOC7 
 
Table 5.3 below summarises the incentives for implementing the LCP in the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry. 
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Table 5.3. Incentives for implementing the Nigerian local content policy 
Participants Incentives for 
implementing the 
policy 
                         Quotation 
IOC2 Local Sourcing “There may be incentives from a cost perspective to say 
let’s use more locals” 
LOC6 Local sourcing “I will talk about if from the economic side, getting anything 
from outside the country is very expensive if I can source 
it locally, why not, it will be cheaper” 
LOC7 No benefit “There is no incentive on that. However, there is even more 
or less a burden in which when the NCD directive became 
a law your money even become deducted”  
IOC5 No benefit “So I told you what the incentive is, as far as I know, the 
question is that incentive being given or not. So far, as far 
as I know, no company has benefitted from it” 
Source: Author 
As depicted in Table 5.3, a number of the research participants stated that 
incentives came in the form of government support and local sourcing. 
However, one of the IOC’s commented that incentives were awarded to those 
companies that had a close relationship with the government. Other research 
participants argued that the government did not offer incentives or support. 
Indeed a few of the incentives put forward by the government have resulted in 
the production of sub-standard goods. 
5.2.7 IOC’s role in the Nigerian oil and gas industry 
To understand the impact of the LCP on the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry, it is necessary to understand the role of the IOCs’ in LCP 
implementation in the industry. Following are a selection of comments 
made by the research participants when asked about the IOCs’ role in 
the Nigerian oil and gas industry:  
“We don’t deal directly with them, but we are aware that the 
oil and gas industry for now is dominated by foreign human 
capital, foreigners in terms of investment especially the 
upstream, the upstream part of the industry” NB1 
“ they don’t plan to leave, they have been here since 1956 
and somebody who have been in your country since 1956 till 
2015 and has not told you when he will leave, they are here 
for business, we don’t want them to leave either because we 
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benefit from them, it’s an inflow of investment into our 
country……...”  NB1 
 
5.2.7.1 Role as middlemen 
The research participants also gave their opinion regarding the role of 
indigenous oil and gas companies acting as middlemen for the IOCs, by winning 
contracts and outsourcing to foreign oil and gas firms: 
 “but having said that we have also seen some companies who are on 
paper maybe seem to be implementing this local content but in reality 
they are not, I mean they basically appear to act as commission agents 
collecting the job and sending out to somebody, not having a concrete 
plan on how to domesticate the work “LOC3  
According to one of the indigenous companies, the IOCs employ a Nigerian to 
manage their business: 
 “It actually affected a lot of them going back, so what they now do is 
get somebody, Nigerian who can manage the business, but they 
supervise from where ever they are” LOC4  
Nevertheless, regulatory bodies are aware of this situation: 
  “It is also happening, we are also having companies that don’t have 
anything, but they go into technical partnership with foreign companies 
then bring them in so they come like an agent they have a Nigerian face, 
but the entire structure and body of the company is foreign” RB3  
 “They just bring in people to front for the company and at the end of 
the day the desired results will not be achieved. Because the 
multinationals will just come in and present middlemen, these are the 
Nigerians; you will say ok and deal with them, but everything happens 
behind that does not promote the development of the local content 
policy” RB6 
5.2.7.2 Partnership and collaboration with local companies  
However, partnership/collaboration still exists between the IOCs and 
indigenous oil and gas companies.  Indeed, one of the LC representative of the 
IOC, on the subject of partnership and collaboration, mentioned that: 
 “So we aid in the implementation of this policy by making sure we have 
local content partners when we execute projects” IOC1 
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The research participants also commented that indigenous companies do not 
possess the necessary technical know-how. As a result, they must partner up 
with the IOCs to carry out a project with a view of gaining knowledge: 
 “We have seen in the last few years there is a bigger eagerness, 
international companies the world players are more interested in signing 
up local partners, in truly going into joint ventures that have road map 
to actually transferring, deploying knowledge and technology to the local 
market” IOC3 
“is just simply, for instance, one of the time we have done is if you 
noticed when you came here we have Devon, we have a joint venture 
with a Nigerian company, so it is called wood group/Devon, we currently 
finalising all the necessary work for the joint venture. So, we are 
currently in a joint venture with a Nigerian company. So, that way we 
are able to achieve” IOC6 
“That has been happening, and it will still be happening It boils down to 
the fact we don’t have the technology and technical knowhow we still 
depend on them that’s why we have the JV, the partnership with them 
in such a way that” LOC7 
 
As stated earlier, some of the research participants argued that indigenous 
companies and IOCs engage in a joint venture partnership for the wrong 
reasons: 
“However, someone can go and bid for a project and doesn't have the 
technical know how he now invites someone else who has the technical 
know who is actually ready to do the project   and benefit Nigerians, 
employ more Nigerians, generate revenue then it makes sense in the 
long run but if someone who doesn't have the technical know-how has 
access to funds, diverts the funds for the wrong purposes then at the 
end of the day it doesn't really benefit anybody” IOC1 
 
An auditor of one of the NGO asserted that partnership/collaboration only exists 
in order to secure projects as IOCs are obliged to partner up with indigenous 
companies to gain contracts in the industry: 
 “It is still this IOCs and some interested parties in the industry who 
understand that if this law is passed, they will lose some grounds that 
are now working in collaboration with some Nigerians who also benefit 
from the opaque system not to allow the law to go on” NB1 
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5.2.7.3 Training and human capacity development  
Considering the aim of the Nigerian local content policy, which includes the 
training and human capital development of Nigerians, when asked about the 
IOC’s role in respect to training and human capital development, a member of 
the IOC stated: 
“training is mostly done by multinationals like Baker Hughes, Baker 
Hughes as a company trained the personnel of our local content partners” 
IOC1 
In addition, the majority of the research participants asserted that: 
 “Upstream they have done all these various apprenticeship schemes in 
to train people in welding etc.” IOC2 
“I think they will be in a better position to answer that because from my 
own point of view, apart from one or two we work with, that always 
usually have workshops, so we learn from there” LOC4 
“So for us it’s key, you can build infrastructure and all that but you need 
the manpower, we have started the global Nigerian program so all these 
are aimed at enhancing the human capital in the industry” IOC5 
Furthermore, research participants added that a few IOCs have internship 
programs for training and human capital development: 
“but certainly we do a lot of internship for university students that are 
trained that any point on time we have up to 30-40 people from 
universities, polytechnics, doing their internship with us” IOC2 
“We have implemented as much as our business can carry, we have 
focused so much in it, for us training is key, we are running a lot of 
schemes, we have postgraduates training in the UK, for young Nigerians 
in key technical skill areas, we have Shell PETAN internship where every 
year we take 40 young graduates and place them in PETAN companies 
for one year to gain industry experience, we have the field engineer 
training”  IOC5 
However, a research participant perceived human capacity to be an act 
of mentoring: 
“But there is always what they call handholding, whereby your 
handholding somebody and pull him up and make him to mature, stand 
and grow” LOC3  
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“Well, firstly, in the recruitment of their people and ensuring that there 
is transfer of expertise” RB6 
5.2.8 IOC’s perception of local companies  
With regard to the IOC’s view of indigenous companies’ capabilities, a number 
of the research participants discussed the IOCs’ reluctance to subcontract jobs 
to indigenous companies: 
 “the challenge is to get Nigerian involved, but you could see corporate 
resistance from the companies because a lot of the companies are 
making lots of fortunes, but that same benefit as its done in other 
countries like Norway and places with natural resources are not available 
here” NB1 
One of the indigenous companies commented on the resistance of insurance 
companies to work with indigenous companies, as they believe that indigenous 
companies do not have the capacity to carry out projects in a technology driven 
industry such as the Nigerian oil and gas industry: 
“IOC, I will start by saying that they have tried, to a large extent some 
of them have tried. However, also have a handicap; there are some 
major projects that they could have some confidence to allow some 
Nigerian companies to bid. However, sometimes, the insurance 
companies, because, most of these projects are major projects, 
insurance companies, who are MNC, may not have or may not accept the 
Nigerian companies to take up such projects, they look at, it’s a high risk, 
if there is any failure” LOC4 
An LC advisor of one of the indigenous companies highlighted that the IOCs are 
reluctant to work with indigenous companies as they are used to working with 
well-known names such as Halliburton: 
“That is one thing we are struggling with if you are dealing with a 
company like Total, Chevron or ExxonMobil. For them they are used to 
working with the big names like Schlumberger, Halliburton, Baker, GE 
but when you come as a local company they are reluctant” LOC6 
 “I will like to call that strategic partnership because going back to my 
other illustration when I go into an office and nobody gives me a listening 
ear because I am black person from a different part of the world……”  
LOC6 
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5.2.8.1 Locals ability to withstand pressure  
The research participants spoke of the social pressures faced by Nigerians and 
how it has affected the level of confidence the IOCs have regarding the 
indigenous companies’ ability to operate in the industry: 
“they are not always sure that the locals are able to withstand the 
pressure by that I mean the pressure that I will get as a Nigerian on this 
job, I am sure an expatriate will not get half of them because he doesn’t 
have relatives, brothers, old school mate pressurizing him to give them 
give them a job or a contract”  IOC2 
 
5.2.8.2 Lack of experience  
There were also a number of comments made by the participants on the IOCs’ 
perception regarding Nigerians’ lack of experience: 
 “You see if you do not expose somebody, he would not stay in the house 
and have experience, the day they first employed him what experience 
did he have? He is now an expert, when he started was he an expert, no, 
he has to learn on the job will he stay in the house to become an expert? 
He has to learn on the job there is nothing you do theoretically in the 
university, the research lab when it comes to implementation you have 
to learn on the job” LOC1 
 “there reasons will always be that we haven’t been able to find a fully 
competent person” LOC3 
 “No am not satisfied, because there are lot of other areas, there a lot of 
jobs we could do but they are there to push it, the IOC then to bend their 
hands, like the deep offshore they say the Nigerian companies don't have 
the capacity to work at the deep offshore, but the Nigerian companies 
we have the capacity to work deep offshore.  They say in the FPSO we 
cannot work; there are people who can work in the FPSO” LOC4 
 
5.2.8.3 Opinion of indigenous companies’ performance  
Regarding the performance of indigenous companies, the participants believe 
that the IOCs perceive indigenous companies as not having the necessary 
knowledge and capability to compete in the oil and gas industry: 
“those multinational try to say a bit unlike what the local content law 
says, if we are going to put a Nigerian, that Nigerians had better perform 
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at the same level like an expatriate but it is not always possible that law 
to deliver at the same level as an expatriate would have and secondly 
the preparation that you need to play certain roles is a long term thing”  
IOC2 
 
 “How do you ascertain whether somebody has the technical capability if 
you do not give him the opportunity, we have to give him the chance, 
look this our company, before this company was formed, inspection and 
training were exclusively reserved for this IOCs we are talking about” 
LOC5 
 
5.2.8.4 Lack of Trust 
Considering the competitiveness of the oil and gas industry, some of the 
participants believe that there is a lack of trust between the IOCs and the 
indigenous oil and gas companies: 
 “I go for a business meeting in a client's office, and because I am 
Nigerian, they feel that I lack the competence to address the particular 
subject matter. However, hence I show up with a white guy who doesn’t 
have the kind of education I have or the level of education I have and 
because he opens his mouth and the first two statements they all nod 
their heads and say yes, yes, yes, this is what they are looking for, that 
bias is already there.  Moreover, it is something we are really working 
hard to change.”  LOC4 
 
In addition, in support of this assertion research participant LOC7 stated that:   
“You are trying to learn from them they to want to make money they 
want their annual turnover to increase once they know that learning from 
them will make their revenue dwindle, you cannot take it away” LOC7 
However, the data gathered suggested that the IOCs still train Nigerians, 
however, one of the research participants noted that IOCs find it difficult to 
empower Nigerians once the training is completed. 
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“in terms of training, they are actually doing that, except that 
sometimes, it is difficult for them to relinquish those positions for the 
Nigerian people to take over” RB6 
 
Nevertheless, a few of the IOCs argued that: 
“They were sceptical because they did not want to transfer the 
technology but we do not allow them to transfer the technology we steal 
the technology, like the Japanese and the Chinese, do. So, as an IOC 
how do you sell your product and remain competitive is to destroy the 
other person” IOC4 
“Now does it now mean every CEO or whatever is going to now be 
Nigerian going forward? No, that I do not see that as the case even if it 
is from the perspective of I am a South Korean or American company 
even if I am going to trade in Nigeria why should, must I put a Nigerian 
there when it is my own company. So, it is a bit like somebody from Aba 
coming to set up a company Lagos, and you say he must put somebody 
who is a Lagosian there he may say well he will prefer to have somebody 
he can trust” IOC2 
 
Arguably, the role played by the IOCs is essential to the development and 
implementation of the LCP. However, the collected data suggested that when 
indigenous companies attempt to act as an intermediary, by selling contracts 
to the IOCs, effective implementation of the LCP is hindered. However, few 
indigenous companies still partner with IOCs to gain knowledge and experience 
in order to compete in the industry. Table 5.4 summarises the interviewee's 
responses on the IOC’s role in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. 
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Table 5.4. The IOC’s role in the Nigerian oil and gas industry 
Interviewee IOC’s role Quotations 
RB3 Middlemen “……bring them in so they come like an agent they 
have a Nigerian face, but the entire structure and 
body of the company is foreign”  
RB6 Middlemen “They just bring in people to front for the company 
and at the end of the day the desired results will 
not be achieved…” 
NB1 Partnership/Collaboration “It is still this IOCs and some interested parties in 
the industry who understand that if this law is 
passed, they loose some grounds that are now 
working in collaboration with some Nigerians who 
also benefit from the opaque system not allow the 
law to go on” 
LOC7 Partnership/Collaboration “……we don’t have the technology and technical 
know-how we still depend on them that is why we 
have the JV, the partnership with them in such a 
way that...” 
LOC6 Perception of indigenous oil and gas 
companies 
“That is one thing we are struggling with if you are 
dealing with a company like Total, Chevron or 
ExxonMobil. For them they are used to working 
with big names like Halliburton….but when they 
come as a local company they are reluctant”  
LOC3 Perception of indigenous oil and gas 
companies 
“There reasons will always be that we haven’t been 
able to find a fully competent person” 
IOC1 Training/Human capacity 
development 
“Training is mostly done by multinational 
companies like IOC1, IOC1 as a company train the 
personnel of our local content partners” 
IOC2 Training/Human capacity 
development 
“We have always been focused on developing local 
people”  
Source: Author 
5.2.9 Subcontracting 
Many activities take place in the oil and gas industry, one of which is the 
subcontracting of oil and gas projects to different companies. When asked about 
the procedures of subcontracting in the industry, the participants showed 
adequate knowledge of the sub-contracting process.  
“ Yea, there are some, I don't know what area you mean, but sub-
contracting from my own understanding, you mean is when we have a 
job that we cannot execute, then we get a foreign company to partner 
with us, or when a foreign company has an equipment that it wants to 
send down to Nigeria, because of the laws and act, it cannot fully 
implement or cannot fully send it down without coming to partner with 
a Nigerian company”  LOC2 
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“ Basically it’s mostly based on knowledge of what those 
companies are doing, a number of them that we are aware of 
that have strengths in some of those areas that we don’t have 
strength at all, and because we have been around for a while, 
we have seen the emergence of most of these companies, so 
we have been able to know that company x is very strong in 
this area and company y is strong in that area……...”  LOC3 
 
“Now for instance, when you want to, it is just about standard 
as a company. If we want to do something and we shortlist, 
we have to shortlist up to 10, and we look at different criteria’s 
if they meet all the criteria’s…”  IOC6 
 
Furthermore, one of the IOCs argued and concluded that the process of sub-
contracting has led to different business relationships, such as joint venture 
partnerships. 
“We put out some of our legacy tools for  sale and acquisition  
when we do this we have companies that show interest, and 
they  are usually our local content partners in Nigeria  so  we 
have a working alliance with them such that they acquire the 
tools but we still ensure that we provide assembly and  
maintenance services  throughout the entire life of those tools 
so we maintain the assets and we make sure that  we follow 
procedure to  give them value throughout the lifetime of these 
assets”  IOC1 
 
In support of these excerpts, research participants LOC2 and IOC2 respectively 
argued that IOCs have to partner with indigenous companies in order to operate 
effectively in the Nigerian oil and gas industry: 
“They know there are some law they have to abide by, if they 
have a vessel, they will not say, they will put, may just one 
foreigner to take care of the boat, the rest will be 
Nigerians……….”   
“In our own industry, most of our contractors are locals by 
definition. Also, when we want to transport we use local 
contractors”  
Furthermore, research participants stated that a number of indigenous 
companies partner with IOCs to allow them to buy equipment that is unavailable 
in Nigeria: 
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“Yes, subcontract like a mentioned, the instrumentation, look 
at the back here, we have all this instrumentation, so 
certification, like those with lifting certification we sub-
contract it to some Nigerian companies. In the foreign side, 
we don’t have the technology to build these kind of 
equipment, so we buy them overseas, in the West, in the UK, 
in European” LOC4 
 
Similarly, when indigenous companies lack the capability to operate in the 
industry they form alliances or partnerships with IOCs by outsourcing the 
projects to them. 
“The Nigerian LNG project, when we looked at it, the project 
was managed by the main contractors the TSKJ. Those were 
the main contractors, those people have expatriates, LNG 
itself has expatriates. This TSKJ is a consortium of four 
companies, apart from the consortium that have expatriates. 
All the individual companies have expatriates working, and 
they have sub-contractors; DAEWOO and others” RB6 
“Even before the law was passed we have always felt even for 
complex and highly technical jobs that as at the time of award 
we don’t have Nigeria that can handle completely, we always 
encourage the international contracting companies that get 
such jobs to subcontract packages to Nigerians that can help 
them to build capacity” IOC5 
 “That is what we do basically, everything oil and gas that this 
company does is contracting out, we literally contract out 
everything” RB3 
 
In addition, some of the joint ventures between indigenous companies and IOCs 
are created to facilitate capacity building and technology transfer as argued by 
some of the research participants: 
“That is where the implementation we are talking about comes 
in, the whole idea is if you enter technical partnership with a 
foreign company, it is assumed you are learning, so by the 
time you finish a cycle of contract, if for example your 
experience is 10%, then you are leaning on 90%, its assumed   
the second phase of your contract will be 20%, so it continues 
like that. We have a success story in aviation, in helicopter 
rotary wings we have local companies like Kempton, and they 
are doing wonderfully well” RB3 
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 “So subcontracting is one key tool you can use to enhance 
in-country capacity” IOC5 
 “The way it works is that it helps technology transfer and 
training; so, they become more experienced and able to 
provide it helps” IOC2 
“ I also was coming to that, but the first thing to us as a 
company, we just want somebody who has the same ideals 
as us, you just don’t come here and make money, because 
they may just come here to make money and not pass on that 
knowledge that you require sustain that business, once they 
leave”  LOC6 
 
However, two of the research participants concluded that subcontracting is not 
just a matter of outsourcing services, but also concerns the quality and standard 
of services received: 
“so the incentive could be a matter of cost etc. maybe it is 
easier to source local raw materials, but again the other side 
of the coin are the local raw materials are they of the grade 
you want, quality, etc. They always have gone hand in hand 
if not you will just have a law that is more of cosmetic that 
won’t achieve development of the country” IOC2 
 “Slightly, why I said slightly is that because of where we are 
coming from, and understanding the business, say we are a 
local company but we must get the right kind of service, 
quality service, high safety consciousness, if you don’t get 
that, price is still okay, we can look at price its negotiable, but 
if those two things are not there, we will not. Health and 
safety, it is something that human lives are involved, because 
if there is any fatality, okay all these people here are in a 
vessel on a platform, if there is a fire incident where do you 
think they will run to” LOC4 
 
5.2.10 Employability 
Having considered the impact of the LCP in section 5.2.2, it is also important to 
evaluate how the policy has helped in the employment of Nigerians. The 
relevant issues raised were: 
5.2.10.1 Partnership and collaboration 
Although employment, partnership and collaboration was discussed in sections 
5.2.2.3 and 5.2.6.2, a number of participants still highlighted the need to 
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provide employment through partnership and collaboration. For instance, one 
of the IOCs discussed partnerships in regard to specialised roles: 
“But there are also specialised roles and services like were we 
cannot compromise on the level of expertise that is   needed 
in project execution for example when we have deep water 
wells” IOC1 
 
Likewise, a CEO of an indigenous company stated that the reason for entering 
into a partnership was due to the fact that indigenous companies did not have 
100% capacity to fulfil the task: 
“As you probably will know there are quite a lot of companies 
that really don’t have the 100% of the capacity to do the work 
and they still have to rely on foreign support of some sort” 
LOC3 
 
Similarly, research participant RB3 spoke of partnership and collaboration as a 
means for start-up companies to build their capacity and empower themselves: 
“We still have provision, that is why to empower them we 
don’t insist that you must as a company have track record, if 
you haven’t done this job, we assume that you go and have a 
technical partnership with someone that has done the job, it’s 
not just about you but also your technical partner, that is the 
only supplement you can get for start-up”  
 
However, RB3 highlighted the fact that IOCs invite indigenous companies to 
work for them, as opposed to the opposite being true: 
 “they can decide on their own they have some key areas of 
technical deficiencies they can invite these other technical 
partners to come in, what is happening is the other way 
round, the international companies are inviting Nigerians to 
work for them, it should be the other way round” 
 
5.2.10.2 Succession planning 
The majority of the research participants identified succession planning as a 
means of creating employment for Nigerians. They referred to it as the process 
whereby indigenous companies are in an opportune situation to take control of 
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projects after having worked with IOCs for a specific number of years. During 
this period, the indigenous company would have gathered the knowledge and 
capability to be able to run the project; and compete favourably in the industry: 
 “as a matter of fact, it is becoming a deliberate policy, that 
for each company, that also happens to be one of the local 
content requirement is when you are bidding for a job in your 
technical proposal, you are to demonstrate a succession plan” 
RB4 
 
An LC advisor of one of the regulatory bodies cited an example in support of 
this assertion: 
 “So that means a Nigerian that will be working with 
expatriate, so he is learning for the first two years and another 
two years. Our expectation is that after four years of 
understudy they will be able to come to speed……”  RB5 
 
Furthermore, research participants argued and concluded that succession 
planning also involves training Nigerians to take over jobs undertaken by 
expatriates: 
 “Yes it will reduce the number for instance a major 
equipment company, its one of the biggest companies in the 
world the last three times we did it  we had to bring in  foreign 
guys to work on this equipment the last time we did it we 
brought one person from abroad and asked our engineer to 
join them so it has reduced the number of foreigner coming  
whereby  this person will be trained on the job after which he 
will be sent out of the country to be trained so over time  our 
long-term goal is to domicile that service here”  LOC7 
 “So, before you can sign capital projects or any projects 
whatsoever, any entity that wants to do any project under the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry. You must show your 
employment plan, training plan, succession plan, the E and T 
plan contains all these parameters, so the NCDMB has to 
approve your E and T plan before the contract is awarded 
project is approved, so that one way they can monitor the 
implementation, that is one tool I know that they can use to 
monitor the implementation” RB7 
 “So what we actually do like in one of our project which we 
actually concluded with the Nigerian LNG, we had 90% 
Nigerians for the project, so what we try to do is to ensure 
that we have succession planning. The roles where a foreign 
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is working, you see Nigerians that understudy them and 
eventually take over from them. So, these are the things that 
we try to do” IOC6 
 
5.2.10.3 Reduction in foreign workforce  
Research participants argued that the process of creating employment for 
Nigerians has had a negative impact on the employability of the foreign 
workforce i.e. expatriates. Hence, indirect revenue is generated for Nigerians 
through the oil and gas industry in the form of retained income. This assertion 
is supported by the following quotes: 
“Before the Nigerian local content policy was passed into law, 
there were a lot of expatriate in the industry, however, since 
the inception of the policy, there has been a decline in the 
number of expatriates in the industry” RB6 
 “It has affected the foreign workforce because I can tell you 
that in 2005 when we conducted the industry-wide skills audit, 
I don’t know if I should put this on record but I have to be 
plain to you, there has been loads and loads of foreigners 
coming into this country to do welding activities because it’s 
on tape I’m not going to call the name of company”  RB7 
“In the early days when I joined the oilfield industry, I could 
count how many Nigerians that were in my department, but 
now in Oando, we have like 96% or 98% of our workforce 
totally indigenous” LOC6   
 
“I will say that cannot be qualitatively measured but if you 
look at it just back of the envelope you may say yes there has 
been reduction” RB1 
 “All these people have expatriate, so if you look at it, almost 
about 5000 people working for the Nigerian LNG project are 
expatriates, this was about 12 years ago. However, the 
Nigerian local content policy, am sure that most of these 
things have improved” RB6 
  “If you read the paper I think you will understand there has 
been a significant reduction in the number of experts in the 
sector, if I take the three Exxon Mobil companies in Nigeria 
for instance, the trend has been downward, if you spoke to 
the upstream people I am sure that they will be confirming 
that with the NCDMB there have been a reduction in the 
experts that are actually coming in”  IOC3 
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However, one of the participants stated that, although there has been a 
reduction in the number of expatriates in the oil and gas industry, the industry 
still favours expatriates especially in deep-water exploration:  
 “It is still skilled in favour of the international company 
especially in the area of offshore” NB1 
 
Nevertheless, some of the participants concluded that prior to LCP 
implementation IOCs where used to taking menial jobs in the industry. 
However, since the introduction of the LCP, the situation has changed in favour 
of Nigerians: 
“Because of the law certainly the incidence of expatriates 
coming to do core jobs lower down the ladder may have 
reduced because of the law” IOC2 
 “……more Local contractors are coming in resulting in 
expatriate competing for simple jobs as catering jobs” RB3 
“No not the downstream sector, even the upstream sector 
that includes exploration and production, you have people 
that do catering, you have a lot of services that are provided 
there. All these things are not done by the local workforce; all 
these are outsourced to expatriates, and you know because 
you have a lot of expatriates coming in to do the job, so 
somebody is coming to cook food, you have a lot of Chinese, 
Indonesians, so you will have to bring in a Chinese or 
Indonesian cook” RB6 
 
Furthermore, some of the research participants remarked on the reduction of 
expatriates employed within the oil and gas companies. They argued that as a 
result of the policy stating that IOCs must transfer knowledge to Nigerians, 
there have been increasing numbers of indigenous companies taking part in oil 
and gas activities, thereby reducing the number of IOCs in the industry: 
“Now companies do not come into Nigeria with foreign 
workers, they come and take like two foreign people and train 
like 100 Nigerian people” LOC2 
“So PTDF took that up, and we trained thousands of welders 
in that area, so the welders we have trained and certified have 
reduced the level of foreign influx of foreigners especially in 
the area of fabrication” RB7 
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5.2.10.4 Expatriate quota system 
The expatriate quota system indicates the percentage of expatriates allowed 
into the country. When asked about their view of the expatriate quota system, 
the participants stated: 
 “Now we have an expatriate quota management system that 
allows us to recognise area where they are skilled gaps, I have 
mentioned to you that we have JQS where we have all the 
individual competencies uploaded, so anytime an expatriate 
is needed in the industry, there is always a justification, oh 
we checked your search engine we did not find any qualified 
Nigerian”  RB5 
 “I can only talk for my company, there is a stringent expert 
quota approval process by the board and by the ministry of 
interior, and I know that applications are scrutinised heavily” 
IOC5 
However, one of the regulatory bodies spoke about there not being a database 
in Nigeria to allow companies to check whether the skills required are available 
in the country: 
 “The minister of information that said you should issue 
expatriate quota, you don’t issue any expatriate quota to an 
incoming company when you don’t have a database to check 
if you have those competencies available in country so it’s 
going to be a contradiction when you have those 
competencies in country and somebody bringing them in you 
only promoting capital flights”  RB7 
 
In addition, there have been clashes between regulatory bodies 
responsible for issuing the expatriate quota as stated by the LC advisor 
of an IOC: 
 “In the case of expatriate quota, they have been effective. 
however, what you also have again in this immigration are 
people who are already used to immigration staff who do side 
runs……...”  IOC6 
5.2.10.5 Preference to Nigerian manpower 
One of the impacts of the LCP in regard to employability is the preference for 
Nigerians in the workforce, as IOCs are required to collaborate with indigenous 
companies to conduct business in the oil and gas industry: 
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“yes of course to a lot of extents after all am I, not a Nigerian, 
a greater number of staffing within the company is Nigerian 
based” LOC1 
“In the sense making them relevant because the Nigerian 
content policy will assist indigenous companies to get jobs and 
get first-hand …… they know that without the Nigerian 
company they would not be able to execute any project in 
Nigeria”  LOC2 
 
There have also been significant changes in the number of Nigerians taking up 
managerial positions as stated by LC advisors of some of the IOCs: 
“for example, until 2004, the position I occupy has always 
being occupied by expatriate since the inception of this 
company, but in 2004 for the first time a Nigerian became the 
chairman and managing director, I succeeded the person in 
2008” IOC2 
“ we got to a point where we got local people to get on the 
affiliates like my CEO who is a local person he is a Nigerian, 
in the 108th year of existence in Nigeria, he is the second 
Nigerian, local person employed, who has been appointed 
chairman and MD of the company, the first person was 
appointed in 2004”  IOC3 
 
Preference for local manpower has also boosted the activities of indigenous 
companies in the industry:  
“Nigerian local content laws, so this actually has boosted our 
activities because larger percentages of this industry activities 
are now given to Nigerians. Not just Nigerians anyway, but 
Nigerians who are fully qualified, just like as JC International 
is, JC International travels personally, I had my training in the 
U.S. We had that capacity, went to the western world got this 
training and we had the capacity to deliver same services that 
the western world was delivering in Nigeria”  LOC5 
 
In summary, the policy has facilitated skills development and employability of 
Nigerians. It has also reduced the number of expatriates entering the country, 
thereby presenting more opportunities to Nigerians. This is because the policy 
requires IOCs to partner with indigenous companies to conduct business in the 
country. 
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5.2.11 Strategies to improve the implementation of the Nigerian LCP 
When the participants were asked how the policy could be improved, a number 
of participants stated that it was too early to discuss what could be done to 
improve the policy: 
 “It is not a one size fit all, it won’t be a copy and paste thing, 
you have to apply delivery approach that aligns with your own 
reality, I think that is very important, you can just say Norway 
did this, and you copy it, it won’t work” IOC5 
 “Like I said earlier before I answer that question, I do not 
want to answer it directly; I know that the Nigeria content 
policy is not a sprint if it is a sprint I will just tell you how 
much we have been able to cover” RB7 
 
However, most of the participants spoke about a range of strategies that could 
be implemented to improve the LCP. 
5.2.11.1 Enforcement 
Some of the participants believed that there was a lack of enforcement of the 
policy in the industry: 
 “When you have a law, and there’s no enforcement, people 
won’t follow it, it is for them to be up and active, the NCDMB 
is so empowered that they can enforce, monitor and do that 
if the system can just work things will shape up” LOC7 
 
 “yes they submit report, but it is another thing to know if the 
reports are true or fake, but they are being done, but you 
know another thing is who verifies these reports”  RB6 
 
One of the regulatory bodies stated that the absence of clear and appropriate 
law has hindered enforcement. 
 “in Nigeria there is one thing that is interesting about us we 
have all the laws, our problem is enforcement, and I tell you 
the enforcement is every easy” RB4 
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However, two of the research participants argued that the law is clear and 
appropriate but lacks a regulatory framework for enforcement.   
 “First of all there is always a starting point if the law is signed 
then we see how the implementation will go but if there is no 
regulatory framework it is difficult to predict how the forces in 
the industry will influence things favourably to make it happen 
for the Nigerian oil and gas industry” IOC1 
 “Just, more enforcement, I think a lot of the foreign OEMs 
are getting away with a lot of things, what most of them do, 
is come here and form one small company and register it and 
call it a Nigerian PLC. Moreover, still, it operate like the OEMs 
outside the country. What changes are needed in the 
regulatory framework, we need to know first of all who the 
real drivers for this are, and who is going to enforce the 
consequences for going outside the law” LOC6 
 
Furthermore, the participants also emphasised the need to strengthen the 
monitoring processes by in order to enhance enforcement.  
 “I have not gone through the law, all through, the area where 
I still have concern, I need to go and read and know what 
exactly what, is the monitoring, if the monitoring, the 
monitoring is where the problem is, because if you monitor it, 
you should be able to track the progress and not people 
feeding you with information you will believe”  LOC4  
 “I think NCDMB the monitoring board should be the one to 
appoint GM for oil and gas companies that is one, it will help 
to eliminate, a company will say after all I am the one that 
employed you. If NCDMB is given the sole responsibility to 
appoint the staff to monitor companies’ activities, it will help” 
LOC2 
 “Maybe on the monitoring and assessment aspect maybe 
there should be a bit more and for government to stand back” 
IOC3 
 
Likewise, some of the research participants supported the need for flexibility in 
the law: 
 “So flexibility and more of compliance, a lot of things to 
happen in this country and you put the rules there, and people 
do not comply, and that leaves room for a lot of shady 
practices………...”  IOC4 
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 “You see there is no law that is not adequate, it is the 
implementation that matters, you have the best laws 
everywhere but all you have to do when you make laws and 
people begin to contradict them, you have to look at, people 
look for loopholes to sabotage them………”  LOC5 
 
An LC advisor in one of the regulatory bodies highlighted how the monitoring 
department must be reinforced and organised: 
 “But I think mostly what we need to do; we need to 
strengthen our monitoring department. Largely because I still 
feel that there is a disconnect, because I feel for you to be 
able to enforce this law, you must be able to have an agency 
that will be able to coordinate these things. You understand, 
like when you have the civil service commission that is able 
to employ people into the civil service, you must be able to 
have an agency that is able to correlate all these skills that 
we have and is able to ensure that they communicate with all 
the MNC and the local companies that are” RB6 
 
RB6 concluded that sanction(s) should be imposed for non-compliance. 
 “I do not think so because I have not heard of anybody 
persecuted or penalised for not implementing the policy. 
However, that does not mean that the law is not being 
implemented.  However, if the law is fully implemented the 
impact would be fully felt, you will not have to be told, you 
will feel the impact. There should be sanctions should be 
imposed as and when due for defaulters, then there must be 
incentive for those that are doing well” 
 
5.2.11.2 Infrastructural Development  
The research participants argued and concluded that Nigeria as a country 
suffers from poor infrastructural development that has hindered the effective 
implementation of the LCP in the oil and gas industry. Hence, research 
participants emphasised the need for infrastructure development: 
“But as time goes on we discovered that capacity building is 
not only about education you have to draw a line between 
education and training. For capacity building to be complete 
there has to be education, training; there has to be 
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infrastructural development and institutional development, so 
this is what makes capacity building to be complete” RB7 
“but if you ask me a question is it better now before 2010, I 
will say yes because now there are conscious effort to reward 
Nigeria content participation and secondly people know that if 
they put the infrastructure there, they will be patronised” RB1 
 
However, one of the research participants asserted that the recent fall in oil 
price has negatively impacted infrastructural development: 
“in this era of falling crude oil price, you need to have a sector 
that will support the economy with the least possible cost so 
that you can competitive and that can only be achieved if 
issues like flexibility in terms of access to the industry is 
allowed with no restriction, then the development of 
infrastructures which is power, roads, water, we have to have 
them and all of these will add to the cost bottom line and most 
importantly environmental stability, if you have it people will 
have more confidence to invest, they are a lot of people with 
money that cannot enter into this market, so if they have a 
stable economy, they are willing to invest into the local 
capacity and the environment is favourable for investors. So, 
this are the things I think they need to do increase the local 
content and make it a success” RB3 
5.2.11.3 Transparency  
Having discussed the impact of the LCP in the Nigerian oil and gas industry, 
many of the research participants asserted that the lack of transparency and 
accountability in the oil and gas industry has hindered the successful 
implementation of the policy. For instance, an LC advisor from one of the IOCs 
stated: 
“Transparency, they need to be transparent, then corruption 
we need to reduce the level of corruption in Nigeria because 
if there is transparency and there is fairness in the distribution 
of resources they will reduce the level of insecurity I believe 
that companies will want to come and invest that is they bring 
in money to come and support the indigenous firm in Nigeria”  
IOC1 
 
Moreover, a CEO of one of the indigenous companies stressed that there should 
be sincerity of purpose in the implementation of the policy: 
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“Sincerity of purpose, the purpose of local content is to 
develop our technology; there should be no way to change 
that okay. One thing that is peculiar in this country, for 
instance, you will see someone will apply for some quota for 
expatriate, he will not use them, he will go and sell them to 
other organisations by getting visas and all this one’s for them 
okay, there are certain laws in this country that we need to 
strengthen”  LOC5 
“It has to be sincerity of the people that implement it, 
transparent, carrying along all stakeholders, so that people 
nobody will be confused, that is at the agency level” RB3  
 
5.2.11.4 Domiciliation of oil and gas activities in country  
Domiciliation of oil and gas activities in the country was also one of the 
strategies suggested by the research participants. They asserted that it reduces 
capital flight from the country and helps in the capacity building of indigenous 
companies: 
“Well, because the overall objective is yet to be met it's still a 
long way to what I think is the total objective of the policy is 
such that we will be able to take full ownership of the industry 
either part of the industry or the complete set up because now 
we do a lot of importation”  IOC1 
“the ripple effect is that employment opportunities are being 
made available to citizens of other countries so when you 
domicile those activities in country you reduce capital flight 
and when capital flight is reduced then it has a positive impact 
on the GDP” RB7 
“Then we also recognise that the Nigerian oil and gas industry 
is not as big as we want it, in terms of being able to absorb 
the capacity that we developing, what do I mean by that, if 
you have a fabrication yard that is doing structural steel 
fabrication that yard can also build masts so if you are doing 
structural for production platform and all that. You can 
actually focus on those areas, so there has to be a holistic 
approach to local content for Nigeria, beyond oil and gas 
industry, we need a more expanded approach to local content 
implementation in the oil and gas industry” RB5 
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5.2.11.5 Petroleum Industry Bill 
The passing of the Petroleum Industry Bill was one of the strategies outlined by 
the research participants, since it will allocate more responsibilities to 
indigenous oil and gas companies in Nigeria: 
 “Well one thing is to suggest government is government, 
those people that are running the government think 
otherwise, politics should be removed from business, that is 
what the PIB intends to capture and now you see how difficult 
it is to pass the PIB, because the PIB intends to capture a lot 
of things, local content, the way we do things, you know the 
way we acquire acreages, the way we govern these things, 
this is all captured in the PIB, the Petroleum Industry Bill. 
Now, until this bill is passed, it’s very vast, it contains a lot. 
Until these bill is passed, we will just be, we will just be 
touching the top of it” LOC3 
 
RB4 argued that the passage of the PIB would negatively impact the IOCs 
because they would have less control: 
“This is what the PIB bill is taking about and if it is passed a 
lot of things will change. However, the question is, are we 
ready for the change? Because most IOC don’t want the bill 
to be passed, we are not ready for that and that was why they 
rejected, you know one of the recommendations in the bill 
was for incorporated joint venture (IJV)………...”  RB4 
 
However, an LC advisor from one of the regulatory bodies argued that the 
passage of the PIB bill would foster collaboration between all stakeholders in 
the industry: 
“to some extent I think that is what you are trying to do with 
the PIB, where they talked about the community having, 10% 
of the funds going to the community, I think they must have 
gotten that model from Malaysia, so I think if we work it out 
very well, it is a way of integrating the community right from 
even the early stages of the field development”  RB5 
 
Likewise, the majority of the research participants concluded that the Bill would 
enhance transparency and accountability in the industry: 
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 “If the PIB is passed into law all the fears and concern that 
we have found out in the industry that can improve 
transparency and enhance accountability are all proposed in 
the bill, are proposed in our own position on the bill because 
the way the bill was proposed by the ministry of petroleum 
resources is such that if the bill is passed that a way the 
problem will still persist……...”  NB1 
“ So what we can do to improve this regulation, I think is to 
streamline the PIB and pass it, once that is done that will be 
taken care of, I don’t want to pre-empts the effect or what 
the result of the PIB will be when the PIB is passed but PIB on 
its own, the original concept of PIB is good enough, and if that 
would be implemented I believe we will have a lot of success 
in that area. However, it is a marathon; it is a long haul. So I 
will still go back to the PIB, the PIB is a legal instrument of 
which the federal government intends to restructure the 
entire petroleum industry in order for the entire petroleum 
industry to make a more significant contribution to the 
development of the industry, and the Nigerian content needs 
to be passed, that bill needs to be passed” RB7 
 
5.2.11.6 Enabling environment 
The participants argued that creating an enabling environment would 
enhance successful LCP implementation. The participants suggested 
the need for government support to create a conducive environment 
in which indigenous companies could participate:  
“support the indigenous firm in Nigeria because what the 
indigenous firms really needs is capital. They need that 
investor confidence; they need to create that enabling 
environment for investors to come from outside Nigeria and 
have the confidence that the money they put in here will be 
of course yield returns” IOC1 
 
Furthermore, according to the research participants, the creation of an enabling 
environment will attract foreign investment. They consider this necessary 
because foreign investors are sceptical about investing in the Nigerian oil and 
gas industry due to the uncertainties associated with it: 
“taking in co-ordinance the environment they operate, they 
should not be too rigid because foreign staff, we operate in an 
environment where security is paramount, and it’s not all 
companies that can, so they must recognise all those failings 
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and make law that will compensate and make sure that we 
operate in environment that is profitable”  LOC5 
“Secondly, the laws that govern foreign investment must be 
favourable to you so that you be able to repatriate your profit. 
You should be able to have linnet laws that allow you to move 
freely. People are very concerned about religion; there must 
be free practice of your religion, a lot more that people put 
into consideration when they go to other places to invest” 
LOC5 
 “They need to come here and investment and of course, they 
have to be encouraged by the government to do that. The 
environment has to be conducive for the investors too. So, 
you won't blame them because there are a lot of uncertainties 
that makes them sceptical in coming here to plan their 
investment” LOC6 
 
5.2.11.7 Stakeholder’s involvement  
According to a number of the research participants, successful LCP 
implementation relies on all stakeholders being involved: 
“I will always tell you that one area that all hands have to be 
in deck, there has to be involvement, there has to be 
stakeholder’s involvement, because if all the stakeholders are 
not properly represented, it is still not going to be very 
effective” RB7 
“Important in the sense that they should be more open and 
more willing to accepts inputs. Because government makes 
policies, sets the goal, but the stakeholders ultimately enable 
government to achieve the goals, so it is important that input 
from stakeholders be part of that process…….” IOC3 
“So the fact that there is a law in place and there is an attempt 
to implement it has earned them that five that is why this. It’s 
is half of the job having the law so you now need to think 
through, you know the African approach is sometimes that of 
cane, forcing things down people rather than working with 
stakeholders to say look what we want to achieve is to get 
more Nigerians to be knowledgeable about this, to provide 
more of the services and whatever and then they can work 
with those stakeholders to have a road map and plan to 
achieve that objective but it looks to me that it is more like 
this is the law you have to comply whether it makes sense, 
whether the capacity is there or not, so I think more emphasis 
should be made on how do we help the people who need to 
comply with this”  IOC2 
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5.2.11.8 Manpower 
The research participants argued that the lack of local workforce has been a 
barrier to successful LCP implementation. When discussing potential strategies 
for improving the policy, the research participants spoke about training and 
increasing the number of Nigerians required in the industry: 
“If your manpower is not adequately trained you cannot have 
a good Nigeria content, you also need to ask yourself should 
local content be an up-comer affair” RB1 
 
Likewise, one of the regulatory bodies commented on the limited workforce of 
the regulatory bodies enforcing the LCP: 
“the NCDMB by the number of manpower they have there is 
a limitation for effective monitoring, because if you are talking 
about an industry that is billions of dollars and you have less 
than 50 people to monitor the implementation of the policy 
than there is a limitation” RB6 
 
5.2.11.9 Access to funds  
A lack of funds has always been a hindrance to indigenous companies’ ability 
to actively participate in the oil and gas industry. Thus, the research participants 
emphasised the need for the availability of funds as a strategy for improving 
LCP implementation: 
 “Support the indigenous firm in Nigeria because what the 
indigenous firms really needs is capital. They need that 
investor confidence; they need to create that enabling 
environment for investors to come from outside Nigeria and 
have the confidence that the money they put in here will of 
course yield returns” IOC1 
“We also need to ensure that local companies are given access 
to funds and capital to be able to compete favourably in the 
industry” RB6 
 
“I think it’s the right policy in the right direction and also to 
help Nigerian contractors I think it’s the right policy in the 
right direction to ensure that the problem of funding is 
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confronted and treated accordingly so I believe that one way 
or the other it has made a dent in the way we do things”  RB1 
 
In addition to the availability of sufficient capital to help indigenous companies 
participate, a few of the research participants highlighted the need for 
transparency in the management of the capital provided to the indigenous 
companies: 
“so you want to give them the money to aid them to do 
something maybe they divert the money into something else 
but if you give the money to real investors people who are 
ready to develop the oil and gas industry they can pull 
resources together attract, investors to come in and to do 
more business in Nigeria” IOC1 
“implication of the fund should be more effective, people need 
to see where the fund is going to in terms of support for in-
country capacity building, it is very essential for the credibility 
of the implementation that management of that fund is above 
board and everyone is satisfied that it is really helping” IOC5 
 
5.2.11.10 Capacity building  
A lack of capacity has been a barrier for indigenous companies to take an active 
part in the activities of the Nigerian oil and gas industry. Therefore, the research 
participants suggested ways to improve the level of capacity building which 
would allow indigenous companies to participate more in the industry: 
“The improvement in the regulatory framework should be that 
a lot of emphases should be placed on capacity building for 
the companies” IOC2 
 “If you don’t develop this capacity now, how will you export 
technology tomorrow outside, take for example we are doing 
well in welding, we have one of the best welders that is why 
today we export welders to Angola and Ghana.  Construction, 
are we there yet? No, but we are moving forward. In rig, for 
instance, do we have the experts to build the rig, do you have 
the steel, and our steel industry needs to be developed, if we 
have the steel, electricity and every other thing that will aid” 
RB2 
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In addition, one of the research participants suggested that the IOCs should be 
motivated to work with indigenous companies to improve the level of capacity 
in the industry: 
 “first of all, you need to look for companies that are willing to 
work with Nigerian companies, not because they want to come 
here and do business, but they want to also develop how own 
Nigerian oil field that is the main thing. You not just coming 
here to make money, but you are coming here to support and 
grow our own indigenous company, our own indigenous 
oilfield market as well” LOC6  
 
5.2.11.11 Incentives 
As stated earlier, there were little or no incentives for LCP implementation, thus, 
the research participants identified the provision of incentives to indigenous 
companies as a strategy for facilitating the successful implementation of the 
LCP: 
“Due for defaulters, then there must be incentive for those 
that are doing well” RB6 
 “We believe that there should be specialised free zones for 
oil and gas practises so that, the law recognises that items 
produced within the free zone that is oil and gas are not 
consumed within the free zone, not that tax free regime 
should be throughout the cycle, throughout the value chain, 
you understand that is another area” RB5 
5.2.11.12 Training and empowerment 
The research participants emphasised the need for training and empowerment. 
They perceived this as avenue means of creating employment and empowering 
Nigerians to take part in the oil and gas industry: 
“…… that is the area I think we are not doing well because you 
have trained a lot of people with the right skills, but 
unfortunately access to the job is not available” RB6 
Again, an LC advisor from one of the regulatory bodies’ state: 
 “for me, Nigeria content what they would have done, which 
I had suggested when I was in NETCO and I said to the MD  
why don’t you make a case whereby NEPCO, apart from doing 
our normal engineering, we could become  a big training 
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centre, so what government can do is find a way to raise 
money and it is easy to do that, then use that money to build 
NETCO not only as an engineering outfit but also as a training 
centre which I feel is not difficult, and use it and build people, 
NETCO should  also  become  a training centre, for a lot of 
people to be trained and for NEPCO to retain them,  and a lot 
of people can be trained, they can go out there and wherever 
they find themselves it's fine”  RB4 
 
In addition, an LC advisor fromform one of the IOCs indicated: 
 “So these are some of the issues, that I think, if you have 
data of who or how do we know who to train, for instance you 
may just be an engineering graduate, but you don’t have 
industry experience you don’t have that skill, how are we able 
to build your capacity, how can we project with the money we 
have, okay in Delta state, they are 5000 people, okay for this 
year we will be trying to empower, even if it's 500, do you get 
what I mean. You don’t have that, so when we start gathering 
data being show” IOC6 
 
Also, a CEO of an indigenous company argued the need for regulatory bodies 
to support and help start-up companies: 
“To add to that in the oil and gas it’s even difficult for gas 
start-up company to come in typical even to come in NCDMB 
should do something to support start-up company to be able 
to get a good partner who can support you, you don’t even 
give the person the chance if you want to register with total, 
they want to see references of companies you have worked 
for if you are coming as a fresh company so it’s difficult 
sometimes” LOC7 
 
In summary, most of the research participants believe that for 
successful LCP implementation, Nigerians must not only be trained but 
must also be employed in the industry. The government must provide 
an enabling environment as well as incentives to attract investors to 
the country. Additionally, the government must provide adequate 
funds to allow indigenous companies to participate in the industry and 
these resources must be managed in a transparent manner. 
Furthermore, all activities must be domiciled in the country to reduce 
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capital flight with a view of retaining the revenue generated in the 
country. 
5.3 Level of transparency in the implementation of the Nigerian local 
content policy 
There has been much discussion on the level of transparency in the Nigerian oil 
and gas industry and when the question was put to the research participants, 
most of them agreed that more must be done to improve the level of 
transparency in the industry. 
5.3.1 More can be done 
“The law in place to enforce compliance to me is adequate, 
but I think more should be done. I think more should be done 
in the areas of making sure that these companies because 
there some companies, some IOC that are still very adamant 
in patronising companies. I don't think there is any reason 
why we manufacture coverall in the company, and another 
company will come here” LOC2 
 
According to one of the IOCs, the law should be a living document, whereby it 
is enforced in every activity of the oil and gas industry: 
 “Well I don’t know, I wouldn’t say that I am an expert of the 
law, but for me the law has to be a living document it shouldn’t 
be just a sterile document, saying you shall, you shall, you 
shall, you will, you will, thou shall, it should recognize where 
the constrains are, what areas need to be focused on and so 
on” IOC2 
 
However, an LC advisors from one of the IOCs argued that the NCDMB, who is 
responsible for LCP enforcement, does not visit oil company sites as frequently 
as expected: 
 “Like you said, there is always room for improvement, the 
fact that I am not aware of any visit by the NCDMB team may 
be an indication of that, maybe the upstream guys will have 
a different perspective, but from Mobil Oil Nigeria perspective, 
I will say there should be room for improvement” IOC2 
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In the same way, some of the regulatory bodies stated that there was little or 
no information available on NCDMB’s monitoring activities in the industry: 
 “Yeah, like I said this is a journey not a destination, they are 
doing well, but they need to try and create more transparency 
so that people will understand the mode of operation that is 
one. Two, when you ask about monitoring and 
implementation, I have no idea, so that is another area they 
need also to make as public as possible so that people can 
see. Maybe they can have an annual audit of companies’ 
compliance for the stakeholders to know” RB3 
 “As far as I am concerned they are doing their best, but they 
are not there yet” RB2 
 
Furthermore, when the research participants were asked about the level of 
transparency in the bidding of oil and gas projects in the industry, they 
indicated that: 
 “It can be better, it is not as transparent as it is should be, I 
tell you why many politics come into play. Secondly we seem 
to be stuck with the principle of lowest bidder, not saying it is 
bad other countries do not do it the way we do it” RB4 
 “Transparency has not been there because the bidders they 
know that if you go to the lowest bidder and some of them 
they will underquote, so they can get the job and later they 
begin to ask for variations, that is the biggest problem we 
have so until we are able to deal with this issue of lowest 
bidder to make it more transparent and realistic that’s why I 
said it could be better”  RB4 
 “Yea, but NCDMB, but again this whole thing about, caucus 
in the industry, there is still a caucus of people who, at least 
from some people who came give let me call it testimony 
about how what NCDMB have done for them. In terms of 
acquiring money and loan through the bank……”  IOC6 
 
Similarly, according to one if the indigenous companies, providing adequate 
information in regards to bidding will help to enhance transparency in the 
industry: 
 “I will say the transparency is on the low side, most times 
you bid, put out your proposal you don’t get anything. I expect 
there should be a feedback may be invite the first ten people 
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to say they selected this one based on this, detail out 
something across board” LOC7 
 
Some of the participants argued and concluded that there cannot be 100% 
compliance as companies will always adopt sharp practices to undermine the 
system: 
 “the implementation is NCDMB, because the level of 
transparency, you know, you cannot actually get it, you 
cannot get a 100% compliance to the Nigerian content 
because there are some companies that will want to maintain 
some sharp practices to boycott the system. there are some 
companies that will still want to do that, but the level to me, 
I will rate them like 80% because the NCDMB they are doing 
well, they are trying their best to make sure that Nigerian 
companies are actively involved in services relating to the oil 
and gas industry” LOC2 
“Are they enforcing it fully, to be honest with you, I don’t 
know the level of competence” RB4 
 
5.3.2 Relative 
When asked about the level of transparency, some of the research participants 
said the transparency level was relative. For example: 
“Well, the level of transparency is relative. Why I said, that is 
that is a two-way thing because the operators will tell you 
something different and they will paint a picture that wow that 
we are doing this. Meanwhile, the Nigerian companies saying 
well we are not seeing it, so it's relative to whomever you are 
talking with” LOC4 
 
Similarly, a number of the research participants perceived that transparency is 
relative in the sense that the governments' intentions might be genuine. 
However, it depends on how transparent the oil and gas companies are in 
implementing the policy: 
“Transparency is a relative word, the intention of government 
is very genuine, but you know that in Nigerian some people 
might change, but relatively I think the transparency is 
acceptable” LOC5 
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“Okay, there are two sides to it, there is the individual, and 
then there is the organisation, how much and how well those 
the organisation push transparency and you the individual, 
how willing are you to work with the organisation in achieving 
that” LOC6 
“To the best of my knowledge I can say that transparency is 
higher with the law and even with the implementation of the 
law before now people were not meant to put Nigeria content 
clauses in their contracts there is no a single contract you 
want to do that you want to do thresholds in the industry that 
Nigeria content will not form part of the bid you need to 
employ Nigerian company use Nigeria labour, materials  and 
the law has even gone ahead to specify percentages to be 
used although there are arguments on whether we should 
have gone to that extent all of these things are put in there 
to  ahead to be able to ensure transparency and 
implementation process”  RB1 
 
However, a CEO of an indigenous company concluded that transparency is the 
responsibility of the organisation: 
“I may not be able to say that, but across the IOC they have 
different colouration to it, Chevron, for instance, is liberal they 
want the local contractors to boom, the likes of Total no they 
still bring in the foreign company to do the job even the jobs 
that locals can do. They have different strategies of looking at 
this policy despite that there is a policy on ground” LOC7 
5.3.3 Sceptical 
Nevertheless, some of the research participants were sceptical when answering 
questions asked about transparency in the oil and gas industry: 
 “the extent I know adequacy but to think it is a good step in 
the right direction it is the Nigeria local content that will know 
the adequacy or not” LOC1 
 “Maybe this question should have been directed to NB1, 
because if you ask me as the person in charge of policy and 
development, I might not see any leakages but I can tell you 
that we have a very robust process” RB5 
 
The question was then directed to NB1, who replied: 
 “It’s only the local content policy people that are able to 
answer that question, to tell you their challenges” NB1 
  
181 
 “I have answered the question to the extent it concerns our 
work, but I will not answer how transparent their local content 
participation is because it’s them that should have that fact. 
This question requires some empirical evidence, how many 
people were employed within this period in the key sectors, 
not as drivers in shell” NB1 
 
However, some of the research participants stated that implementation of the 
policy has been transparent:  
 “In as much as I am not in the procurement section of those 
companies, but the little we have done, it’s been transparent 
to a large extent, some of them there are still issues because 
Nigeria, there a lot of things we do behind the scenes, but 
there are some that we have been involved in, it was 
transparent” LOC4 
 “But there was one that we were also involved in that we 
noticed that there was something and we raised an alarm, and 
they quickly, they did not know how they will defend it, in fact, 
we brought in NAPIMS, and they quickly shut it down and 
awarded it to an MNC” LOC4 
 
From the analysis in Table 5.5 below, it is evident that the research participants 
believe that there is still more to be done regarding transparency in the 
implementation of the LCP. Furthermore, a number of the research participants 
stated that transparency is relative, as the government might have a genuine 
intention; however, it is at the discretion of the oil and gas companies to be 
transparent in their activities in the industry. Some of the companies were also 
sceptical when it came to issues of transparency in the oil and gas industry. 
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Table 5.5. Level of transparency in LCP implementation 
Participants  Quotations 
IOC2 “Like you said, there is always room for 
improvement, the fact that I am not aware of 
any visit by the NCDMB team may be an 
indication of that, maybe the upstream guys 
will have a different perspective, but from 
Mobil Oil Nigeria perspective, I will say there 
should be room for improvement” 
LOC1 “the extent I know adequacy but to think it is 
a good step in the right direction it is the 
Nigeria local content that will know the 
adequacy or not” 
LOC4 “Well, the level of transparency is relative. 
Why I said, that is that is a two-way thing 
because the operators will tell you something 
different and they will paint a picture that wow 
that we are doing this. Meanwhile, the 
Nigerian companies saying well we are not 
seeing it, so it's relative to whomever you are 
talking with” 
LOC5 “Transparency is a relative word, the intention 
of government is very genuine, but you know 
that in Nigerian some people might change, 
but relatively I think the transparency is 
acceptable” 
NB1 “I have answered the question to the extent it 
concerns our work, but I will not answer how 
transparent their local content participation is 
because it’s them that should have that fact. 
This question requires some empirical 
evidence, how many people were employed 
within this period in the key sectors, not as 
drivers in shell” 
RB3 “Yeah, like I said this is a journey not a 
destination, they are doing well, but they need 
to try and create more transparency so that 
people will understand the mode of operation 
that is one. Two, when you ask about 
monitoring and implementation, I have no 
idea, so that is another area they need also to 
make as public as possible so that people can 
see. Maybe they can have an annual audit of 
companies’ compliance for the stakeholders to 
know” 
RB5 “Maybe this question should have been 
directed to NB1, because if you ask me as the 
person in charge of policy and development, I 
might not see any leakages but I can tell you 
that we have a very robust process” 
Source: Author  
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5.4 Procedures for ensuring transparency  
When asked about the process for ensuring transparency in the implementation 
of the LCP, the research participants expressed a number of views and opinions 
ranging from monitoring to compliance. 
5.4.1 Monitoring 
When asked about the regulatory body responsible for the implementation of 
the LCP, one of the IOC stated the wrong regulatory body: 
“The body like NAPIMS know who the players in the industry 
are in the industry are actually they have all the indigenous 
players in Nigeria are registered with NAPIMS, they ensure 
that they are active participants in the oil and gas industry” 
IOC1 
 
This suggests that a number of oil and gas companies are not aware which body 
is in charge of LCP enforcement. In addition, some of the research participants 
outlined the different procedures for monitoring in the industry: 
“a lot of and you bring expatriate down tripping are going on 
you may have an engineering and you bring the expatriate to  
Nigeria end up in the industry  there is no way that can be 
measured for those working in DPR  offshore they can tell you 
that they are  qualitatively tell you that we are monitoring 
expatriate influx  and at least it’s being reduced we have 
something we call oil safety passport OSP DPR issue to every 
offshore worker  you don’t go  offshore until you have gotten 
that before you board the helicopter or given the offshore 
passport you will need to prove you have gotten the 
expatriate in the country with the  knowledge of the relevant 
authorities in the oil and gas industry”  RB1  
“I believe every company experience is different, when I had 
to face the NCDMB in Bayelsa, it was clear what they shared 
with us was a method through which they ensure that 
companies that are certified because they basically approve 
and certify that these companies meet these requirements for 
you to actually go and deliver service in the sector and they 
had a way of checking for ongoing compliance……”  IOC3 
 
In addition, one the indigenous companies stated that the level of monitoring 
had to be improved: 
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“The strategies, what we are already doing, if they actually, 
is in monitoring, if the regulators monitor, what is already in 
place, it will yield, but the monitoring is not there” LOC4 
 
Similarly, some research participants argued that the monitoring process is 
flawed, as there are no visits from regulatory agencies: 
“Sometimes you finish and they say okay send eh, your 
Nigerian content, they send a template you should fill, and 
you just fill numbers and sign and send to them, they keep 
and file it; that is it. However, nobody wants to check if 
actually want we have sent is right” LOC4 
“I do not think, nobody comes to talk to you, do they even 
know you are working. First they ask are you registered, they 
are hundreds of companies they are registered in their 
database. They say okay do another, and they keep creating, 
that not, go and do field verification, have they done that” 
LOC4 
 “That is not the aim of the local content it defeats the aim of 
local content, act, that is where the monitoring team needs to 
play their role, there’s nothing wrong with partnering with 
someone to do the job, what’s the level of the person’s 
participation to my level of participation, not that I am 
subletting the job entirely, if we are doing the job together,  I 
am bringing in my own expertise also to do the job, what’s 
my role, I will play a role, not subletting to him to do 
everything, if I  leave everything to him, which means  I don’t 
have to join him to do it”  RB2 
 
Furthermore, some of the research participants stated that the level of 
monitoring in the industry has been adequate: 
 “So, before you can sign capital projects or any projects 
whatsoever, any entity that wants to do any project under the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry. You must show your 
employment plan, training plan, succession plan, the E and T 
plan contains all these parameters, so the NCDMB has to 
approve your E and T plan before the contract is awarded 
project is approved, so that one way they can monitor the 
implementation, that is one tool I know that they can use to 
monitor the implementation”  RB7 
 
 “Well NCDMB is really pushing it because most of the JV 
tenders, contracts that come out. They would request for the 
local content quota that is coming from your company for that 
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particular project, so that is their own way of monitoring and 
enforcing and making sure that inspected” LOC6 
 
They added that the regulatory body has been helpful in measuring the 
companies’ performance:  
 “They measure performance by audit, when they come to 
audit you, they ask relevant questions that have to do with 
local content laws, if you are in compliance, with those laws 
they do it from time to time” LOC5 
 
 “What they do, again the best people to answer this question 
is NCDMB, I know what they now are they have what they call 
the NCDMB compliance certificate before you start any 
contract they give you some forms to fill, and these are the 
undertakings of what you will do. So if they want to audit your 
performance they will audit you based on what those pre-set 
parameters” RB3 
 
However, most research participants argued and concluded that a monitoring 
database should be made available: 
 “It is very clear they have a system called NCJQS that is 
Nigeria Content Joint Qualification Service every contract that 
is awarded that wants to participate in Nigeria content is 
registered there and whatever contract that is issued and the 
local content performance is also registered there so it’s it is 
easier that way to be able to measure performance 
qualitatively”  RB1 
 “So accountability is assured, but we did not stop at that, we 
now change of Parton from NCCC to performance monitoring, 
where we have a very robust monitoring evaluation system 
that visits your facilities, request for reports on how you are 
implementing the commitments that you have made for the 
contract……...”  RB5 
 “Well, I think they have a database of what they do, and 
gradually these figures are or will be released. For what I hear 
there is a good sign of improvement from where we are 
coming from the NCDMB” RB6 
 “Thereby saying that the government is encouraging local 
content and from time to time they audit, if you apply to 
NIPEX for registration they want to see the percentage for 
Nigerians in your organisation in terms of ownership, in your 
employment, how many Nigerians are in there, how many 
  
186 
experts are in there. The experts what position do they hold; 
they want to know all those things” LOC5 
 
5.4.2 Measurement 
When the research participants were asked about the process used to measure 
LCP implementation, some the participants stated that there was no structure 
in place through which to measure the policy: 
 “So, I mean, there is no structure in place to measure that, so if I put 
that I have 99% local staff how do you know” IOC5 
 “I don’t know how they get their figures, because whatever I say now, 
government will refute it because I don't have, I can only say what I 
know about, but they are the one who provides those figures and tell you 
how we are 80% this, we are 90% this how do they get this figures. They 
show you that in marine we are already have this and this, how did they 
get the information” LOC4 
 
However, the LC advisor from a regulatory body argued that the policy has had 
little impact on the ability to measure its performance: 
“I believe the impact might not be that big for you to be able to measure 
it in a large scale instance” RB6 
An LC advisor from an IOC (IOC2) argued and concluded that oil and gas 
companies are making an effort to find ways of avoiding the monitoring 
process: 
 “There are some companies that are just owned by few Indians who 
came from wherever that don’t have all that structure and things like 
that, and therefore if you put some of these smaller institutions under 
pressure and you are waving the law, and they have not complied; they 
will look for ways of circumventing it. So, I will say that the bigger well 
defined MNC are doing a better job at complying than maybe some the 
smaller companies, so I would not say that implementation has been 
perfect than some of the smaller institutions because I think they 
sometimes they find shortcuts to respond”  
5.4.3 Disclosure  
As regards transparency and accountability, the disclosure of information is an 
important aspect of oil and gas companies’ activities. When the research 
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participants were asked about the process of ensuring transparency in their 
various organisations, they stated the following: 
“First and foremost by being open and we welcome NOTAB, 
we are an open book when they come to inspect we provide 
all the information they require like us going to appear before 
the board in Yenegoa, it was basically to show that we are not 
hiding anything and this is our operation runs” IOC2 
 “My experience as a downstream player the periodic reviews 
we have with the board is one sure way, because in doing that 
we provide a whole deck of information to the board which 
they go through and during those sessions we take questions 
from them……”.  IOC3 
 “Well there are certain declaration that must be made, but I 
cannot be working in a company like Oando and have a 
business that is vendor to Oando without me declaring that 
affiliation, because I might be putting myself at an undue 
advantage over other people who are not sort of affiliated with 
the company on the inside and I might have insider 
information that those people don’t have……”  LOC6 
 
Research participants associated with regulatory bodies in the industry argued 
that the flow of information in the industry is restricted:  
“The management of the industry regarding publications is 
opaque, and there is a lot of corruption going on in the 
industry that even our intervention has helped to draw 
national and international attention to it but it has not solved 
the problem” NB1 
 “The Nigerian oil and gas industry is opaque, and that is the 
challenge we all face there is little openness, and the award 
of licenses is still done by discretion” NB1 
“Now in terms of the transparency, there are people who, it is 
still a caucus where you could easily just, with a, with just a 
phone call you can get the thing you want. Where there are 
organisations, by nature of how they operate they have 
integrity, they want to go through the right process. So by the 
end of the day, you still have people who are still close, but in 
fairness to NCDMB, they are quite open when you want to 
assess them, they are quite open……”  IOC6 
 
However, an auditor from an NGO asserted that the lack of openness is the 
result of Nigeria being a rentier state: 
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 “I do agree with you, that’s the status quo, but the way it 
should be that’s why NEITI was set up, we are currently in a 
rentier state where the citizens don’t ask questions, because 
they don’t pay any utility, they don’t pay heavily for the loose 
of this revenue,  assuming it’s in the developed country where 
every kobo you earn you pay tax and because you pay tax 
you feel the impact that’s the status quo, but  where we want 
to be is a situation where the revenue streams that flows into 
the government coffers from the oil and gas is open and 
transparent”  NB1  
 
Arguably, revenue from the oil and gas industry has been mismanaged due to 
the lack of information disclosure in the industry:  
 “Then secondly not many Nigerians can tell you how much 
exactly the quantity of crude we produce in a day it is still 
shredded in debate and mystery.  Only the international oil 
companies that have the expertise to go deep sea and explore 
the oil have that information, and as business people we do 
not think it is fair for only them to have that information and 
for that kind of information not available, Nigeria is losing a 
lot of revenue…….”  NB1 
 
5.4.4 Embedded in company contract and policy 
The research participants also discussed the ways in which 
transparency could be ensured in LCP implementation during their day-
to-day activities within the oil and gas industry. The majority of the 
research participants asserted that LC is included in their companies’ 
policy and contracts for projects in the oil and gas industry:  
 
“What I know is that we have our legal departments that 
actually sees to it that most of our contracts are prepared and 
worded in accordance with what the federal government 
expects and requires of us in driving the local content policy” 
IOC1 
“For instance, in our own case, in our own contracts that we 
sign whether, with suppliers, there are some part of the local 
content law that are borrowed so there is an expectation that 
if you want to work for us that the company has complied the 
local content policy, it is embedded in our contract that is one 
of the ways we ensure accountability” IOC2 
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“well for us, first of all, my organisation is based in different 
countries and prior to the Nigerian content act; we always aim 
at almost 100% nationalisation in the various places we 
work……...”  IOC6 
 “We are overruled and over controlled we have something 
that we called the OMS Operations Integrity Management 
System which spells out how we should do things, how we 
should respect the rules and laws of the Federation. As a 
matter of fact, by the time we begin to fall short of the law, 
you can take it from me, our fear is not with Nigerian content 
board or the Nigerian government coming to catch us, our 
fear is that Exxon Mobil will frown at us and that is withdraw 
our license to continue to operate”  IOC4 
“I know Oando as a company is very strong in pushing that 
transparency, it’s part of our core values, it’s is embedded in 
some of our core values” LOC6 
 “It's part of our contracting and procurement process its 
embedded in it, we’ve done a lot of awareness internally, 
externally, we have updated our contracting and procurement 
template and document to incorporate those requirement’s, 
we have appointed focal points within the company to help 
drive Nigeria content in the various parts of the business, 
production, major wells and all that”  IOC5 
 
However, an LC advisor from one of the IOCs argued that there is a local content 
division in their organisation and an internal monitoring team that visited 
various project sites owned by the company: 
“We have a solid structure; we have an NCD organisation, 
well-resourced. Like I said we have focal points, we report to 
our management frequently; there is a decision review board 
that looks at what we do every quarter that has people at the 
highest level involved. We have an internal monitoring team, 
not just the one for the board, we have our monitoring team, 
we also pick sample of projects we visit on our own…”  IOC5 
 
5.4.5 Compliance  
Some of the research participants spoke stated that strict compliance with the 
Nigerian LCP was a means of ensuring transparency in the implementation of 
the policy: 
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 “It has also focused companies whether local or multinational 
companies on the need to because in complying with the law 
they have to take deliberate steps to make sure they are in 
compliance. It may be it in some cases where goods are 
manufactured they need to make deliberate efforts to ensure 
that a certain amount of their inputs are sourced locally, the 
people involved in the manufacturing cannot be entirely 
expatriates anymore” IOC2 
 
The majority of the research participants stated that an internal audit is carried 
out based on the terms and condition of a prevailing contract; 
 “For us whatever we have done in the contracting phase we 
continue through the process even in the implementation, we 
don’t do anything like, just do this so you will win the contract, 
if you said, for instance, you are not going to use expatriates 
in the job. We monitor to ensure you don’t do it, so you don’t 
do anything that I would say is just for expediency, so that 
we can say that we have complied with the law. We tend to 
follow through simply because our system will audit us based 
on the terms and agreement we have made in the contract, 
so if we say no expatriate, so if we say something and when 
the auditors come and say your contract stipulate there 
shouldn’t be any expatriate but we are seeing one or two 
expatriate, so I would say through our auditing process we 
ensure transparency”  IOC2 
 “Yes, that again takes us back to compliance, because the 
act is very clear on what the expectations are, so as a 
company it’s our responsibility because its law for us to find a 
way to achieve those, and it takes us back to want I said at 
the beginning, that one of the things that the act has 
encouraged or has enabled is for local companies in Nigeria to 
source the expertise they need to operate in those areas that 
they never use to operate and”  IOC3 
 
Even though, one of the indigenous company asserted that the icompanies’ way 
of complying with the Nigerian LCP is by ensuring they employ more Nigerians 
in their workforce: 
“Because we know these laws as they affect us, we take 
appropriate action to make sure that we comply with the laws. 
That is why if you look at our organisation, more than 98% of 
the employees are Nigerian, there is no expatriate director, 
there is no expatriate manager in this organisation, it all 
Nigeria, we have just one or two supervisors that are experts, 
the rest are all Nigerians” LOC5 
  
191 
In summary, there are different procedures for ensuring transparency in the 
implementation of the LCP. Some oil and gas companies ensure transparency 
by creating an internal monitoring division within their organisation. While other 
companies ensure transparency by including   LC in their policies and contracts 
executed in the oil and gas industry. However, a number of the research 
participants believe that the LCP lacks structure; therefore, neither the 
implementation nor the level of transparency can be adequately evaluated. In 
the same way, the research participants believed that transparency is limited, 
as in the oil and gas industry disclosure of information is restricted because 
most companies do not each other. Finally, the participants concluded that 
monitoring in the industry was inadequate and that the agencies responsible 
for the monitoring and enforcement process lack necessary qualifications to 
carry out their duties. 
5.5 Agencies responsible for the implementation of the Nigerian local 
content policy 
Monitoring has been established as the process required to ensure 
transparency in the implementation of the LCP.  Therefore, it is 
important to also consider the agencies responsible for the 
implementation of the LCP. When questioned, the research participants 
felt that the organisation in charge of the implementation of the LCP 
functioned as follows:   
 
“When it comes to infrastructures and finance, I would not 
say, yea the local content law and act is there, and there are 
some bodies that have been created by the federal 
government, NCDMB stationed in Bayelsa, it was created, to 
create an enabling environment for this law to thrive because 
you cannot create a law without keeping somebody to monitor 
it. If there is nobody monitoring it, people might” RB2 
“DPR practically plays no role, because the policy is so specific 
that is why the special agency of the Nigeria content 
development and monitoring board was created to oversee 
and manage to ensure that the policy is implemented on a 
day-to-day basis” RB1 
“I think from that standpoint, because what has underlined a 
lot of those transactions is the NCDMB, therefore from that 
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standpoint, you can say there has definitely been a lot of value 
adding in terms of actually developing people” IOC3 
“The implementation is driven by the Nigeria content board I 
think it is for them to answer” IOC5 
 
The above quotes suggest that two research participants acknowledged the 
Nigerian Content Development Monitoring Board (NCDMB) as the organisation 
responsible for LCP implementation. However, a number of the research 
participants spoke of other agencies’ involved in LCP implementation:  
“We have DPR, DPR does so, and indirectly NAIPMS does so 
too, I mean am talking about the oil industry, DPR does so, 
before they give you licence to operate; you have to provide 
all this information, and from time to time they come for 
audit” LOC5 
“In the oil and gas industry one of the regulatory bodies is 
DPR, but the DPR are almost like a department under NNPC” 
NB1 
“NAPIMS enforces the policy, for instance, we were trying to 
supply Ago to Addax but we were told that we have to go 
through NAIPMS, so we have to do all the registration, all the 
requirements as an arm of NNPC. We were not given any 
special treatment, we were told to go and bid like any other 
company, we must have all the requirements required. That 
was how we went and bided through NAIPEX” RB6 
“Well, the NAPIMS and NIPEX are arms of NNPC that are 
charge to do that, and even the local content board is mostly 
manned by NNPC staffs, we have NNPC staffs that are there. 
So NNPC is actively involved in ensuring that the law is 
implemented” RB6 
 
In addition to what has been stated above, one of the research participants 
concluded that there are too many regulatory bodies involved in the 
implementation of the LCP: 
“NIPEX is eh, they all work hand in hand, but if you ask me, I 
think we have too many regulatory bodies now that their 
functions are starting to question who and who does what. 
However, the local content driver, the regulatory body that is 
the driver is the NCDMB” LOC6 
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5.5.1 Lack of coordination 
A number of the research participants stated that the agencies responsible for 
the implementation of the LCP lack coordination when carrying out their 
responsibilities: 
“those entities need to get their act together, I don’t think 
they are coordinated in monitoring that, NCDMB is doing one 
thing, the other is doing the other, as far as am concern, I 
don’t see any coordination” LOC6 
“will tell us we the JV take for example  our JV that is Chevron 
and NAPIMS are tendering for a job, and Nigeria content is 
coming to tell us to look we have this bidder you have to 
include him, it’s not their business, it is not proper, I have 
heard about it, we have had a lot of encounter with them 
where they tell look this job this is how it should be 
contracted,  and we say this is none of your business, yours 
is to ensure that we comply fully with the requirement of the 
local content policy………”  RB4 
 
Likewise, the lack of coordination was compared to the existence of too many 
regulatory agencies performing the same functions: 
“Honestly speaking we all report to the same minister but we 
don’t have any forum or system or platform to sit down and 
monitor these things, but what we do we make sure that if a 
tender is concluded and contract is awarded, before you can 
get any contract to that stage, it means that the company 
must have fulfilled the local content requirement……”  RB3 
“for two reasons why you cannot actually say you can measure 
qualitatively for now it is not only NCDMB that controls the expatriates, 
the ministry of internal affairs is there most of these things go through 
NCDMB if they don’t approve and the ministry issues the expatriate quota 
there’s nothing anyone can do about it quota” RB1 
 
5.5.2 Manpower 
In addition to the absence of coordination, some of the research participants 
asserted that the regulatory bodies responsible for the implementation lack 
adequate manpower to monitor activities in the industry. They indicated that: 
“They have no staff, more staff, the laws are there, but they 
do not have enough people to implement them, its human 
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beings that does them, regulations means what’s the level of 
compliance, but if the people are not there how will you get 
the job done if they don t have staff, they are short staffed”.  
RB2 
“The siting of the HQ is not something I would want to 
comment on, let’s leave it the way it is, but you have made a 
point, the challenge with the Nigerian content, I don’t work 
with them but I have a fair idea is they don’t have sufficient 
staff strength to go around the industry, even the few they 
have they don’t have the prerequisite skill that are required 
because most of the people that constitute the bulk of the 
staff today came from NNPC”  RB4 
“One of the problems, you have again, is not like they cannot 
go offshore, is the first, let me tell you, one of the problems 
we have is the location of the Headquarters, and also the 
network of the organisation. Because you cannot tell me that 
they are not, before NCDMB, don't DPR people go offshore?  
DPR people go offshore, what is wrong with NCDMB people 
working with those people who go offshore in identifying some 
of these things? If you say you do not have the manpower, 
then employ” IOC6 
 
Moreover, one of the research participants added that the regulatory bodies 
lack the necessary qualifications to carry out their responsibilities: 
“There are people that are kept, in the helm of affairs, to audit 
and manage certain technical areas, there are not competent 
on, the experience I had when I was asked to teach some big 
shots in DPR. They do go to rigs to inspect rigs, but they do 
not have a nice checklist of inspecting rigs because they don't 
have the capacity, the technical know-how, their background 
has nothing to do with that field and this are the people that 
are kept to audit this jobs……”  LOC5  
 
In summary, the research participants stated that there were too many 
regulatory bodies and as a result, they lacked coordination in enforcing 
the LCP. The research participants also spoke about the regulatory 
bodies' lack of manpower to monitor the implementation of the policy 
and that employees lack the necessary qualification to implement the 
law. 
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5.6 Lessons learnt from countries with effective local content policy 
While explaining how effective LCP implementation has been in the Nigerian oil 
and industry; it is important to explore and understand best LCP practices from 
other countries. When asked, which countries they consider to have effectively 
implemented the LCP, the participants stated: 
“Not really but I know of course in the UK you have so many 
players both local companies and international companies as 
much as I know of course it is a level playing field out there if 
you are able to meet the requirement to establish oil and gas 
company. Fine, but in Nigeria, it’s not so easy as it is in other 
areas because there are some hurdles some barriers that 
need to dismantle” IOC1 
“if you go to Saudi Arabia or if you go to Venezuela, their rules 
are strict, okay don’t do this not do that, but you won’t be 
able to compare us with them in terms being able to move 
that forward, like ExxonMobil was in some of those places and 
ExxonMobil say look if that is what you want to do, please 
provide this for us and let’s see and these countries went 
ahead and did that, so I don’t know which one, whether it’s 
the tail that is wagging the head or the other way round”  RB4 
“you can't compare to the ones that have been there like 
Norway, but I believe the way we are going if we maintain 
high standard we should be achieve 90 or there about in the 
next couple of years” LOC4 
 
“I think Malaysia and Angola” RB3 
 
“Norway has done quite well, Brazil has done better than us, 
although they are not as good as Norway, in the UK they have 
done well particularly in the North Sea, Malaysia has done well 
relatively though their approach was different” IOC5 
 “The Dubai, Anglo policy if we have more of that, we will 
benefit more and learn more of their technology some 
companies are incorporated here if you check their board 
member there will be no Nigeria. There should be a stipulated 
number of Nigerians that should be on board……”  LOC7 
 
However, some of the research participants had no idea which countries had an 
effective LCP: 
“I really don’t have an idea” RB6 
  
196 
“I have not come across other countries; I have only studied 
that of Nigeria” LOC2 
“ I am not really aware. Honestly I have worked in Cameroon, 
Ethiopia, Belgium, US and UK, I can’t remember any one that 
had any specific laws for local content, they may have been, 
maybe the job I went to do in those countries particularly in 
Cameroon and Ethiopia, did not afford me to be aware of such 
laws so it would one I would not be competent to talk about 
per se”  IOC2 
 
Furthermore, when asked about lessons learnt from countries with effective 
local content policy, the research participants discussed a range of issues. 
5.6.1 Community involvement 
Malaysia, according to one of the participants, is a success story when it comes 
to community involvement: 
 “In terms of community involvement, Malaysia has a very 
beautiful success story in terms of how they have been able 
to integrate their community into the oil and gas value chain, 
so you hardly hear of community unrest because of the way 
they are structured, so if somebody tells you that you are a 
stakeholder, you must have a stake in any field development 
activity, then you are an owner you have already been bought 
into it, so you make sure that, that thing from the beginning 
to the end”  RB5 
 
In addition, Norway was suggested to have successfully implemented the LCP 
in terms of the relationship with their oil and gas producing communities: 
“As far as the oil and gas industry is concerned, Norway is a 
model for most resource-rich countries, Norway is a model in 
terms of legal framework, Norway is a model in terms of 
relationship with the communities, in terms of management 
of revenue fund” NB1 
 
5.6.2 Local capacity development 
 In regard to capacity building, a number of the research participants referred 
to Norway’s experience and the various methods of capacity building employed 
by the country: 
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“ I will say that had, Norway used to cos local content is not 
a policy that should run in perpetuity the essence is that you 
want to develop your people and bring them at par with 
international standards then you can compete for that position 
then throw your door open after that like Norway did cos they 
didn’t know anything about oil and gas in 1969…...”  RB1 
 “Countries, I don’t think I have had the time to study, but 
Norway has done well. I remember some of my colleagues 
then when I was working in the UK, one it is very difficult to 
work I Norway because they want to utilise their local capacity 
and they are well paid” LOC4 
 “even if oil rises to like $120, Norway does not touch, the 
whole of that money is poured into investment and Norway 
has invested massively around the world and Norway has also 
been developing indigenous capacity” NB1 
 
In addition, when referring to local capacity development, Angola was also 
included in the category: 
 “Angola have does laws, the only thing that is rigid there, is 
this bringing foreign experts, but it does one advantage to 
them, it encourages the IOCs their train the locals to be able 
to survive, so they send the locals to give them the best of 
training, they come back, and they work for them. The 
salaries are cheaper there is no cost for logistics etc. They 
don't need to accommodate them in a very big house and all 
those things. The advantage is there for very one to see” 
LOC5 
 
5.6.3 Professionalism  
The research participants referred to the attitude towards LCP implementation 
and discussed how Nigeria could learn from other countries that have an 
effective LCP: 
“The professionalism that the job is done, we can borrow from 
them the professionalism in how they do their job, we can also 
borrow from them the transparency, we can also borrow from 
them the independence that those other organisations have, 
I’m not sure the Nigeria content board is very independent, in 
the sense that, thank God that it has evolved, before now, it 
was embedded in NNPC before now which was wrong, because 
you cannot be a referee and a player at the same time…….”  
RB4 
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One of the research participants mentioned Malaysia and the level of 
professionalism in the Malaysian oil and gas industry: 
 “We have discussed with somebody, and he gave me an 
example of either the PETRONAS in Malaysia or the 
PETROBRAS I can’t remember, and their own what they do is 
yes they still give consideration to the lowest bidder…….”  RB4 
 “We need to learn patriotism, they are patriotic, in Malaysia, 
I think their laws are more focused on economic development 
than politics for instance if any entity Malaysia is involved in 
mismanagement the first thing they are thinking of is not how 
to be punitive but how to convert it to economic 
development…….”  RB7 
 “Yes there are quite a lot of them, Malaysia for instance have 
an effective local content policy in that anything you are 
bringing into Malaysia they have a proper database to check 
whether that thing is not, no matter how small the equipment 
is, as long as it is going to be used in the oil and gas industry 
to check if it’s not manufactured locally…….” RB7  
 
5.6.4 Domiciliation  
The use of local manpower and local resources in the activities of the oil and 
gas industry was one of the lessons the Nigerian oil and gas industry can learn 
from countries with effective LCP, as stated by the research participants: 
“so that is it, we have indigenous companies who are in 
construction, who are doing both onshore, swamp and 
offshore, they have the capacity, so let all of them, because 
most of the engineering is done overseas, in fact that is where 
the problem starts, the FEED and whatever is done 
overseas……” LOC4 
 “In Saudi Arabia when they bring you as a drilling, your name 
bears a driller, and if they have a driller, you are not going to 
bring a driller to Saudi Arabia. If they know that they have 
local people that can do that, they don't bring them in” LOC5 
 
The research participants also discussed domiciliation activities in other oil 
producing countries: 
 “In Saudi Arabia the company I worked with is called ADC 
was 51% Saudi owned in order to fulfil all righteousness, 
Schlumberger owned 49% for that reason they were not 
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answering Schlumberger in Saudi Arabia, they were 
answering ADC because of the local content  
law and it is the same in this country, it is the same in Russia”  
LOC5 
 “Trinidad and Tobago is a case study of where, we know what 
most people say is that if you produce in Nigeria cost is high 
and all that, so what they did is that they now had an 
arrangement with BP as part of their local content drive. They 
insisted that certain platforms must be fabricated in T&T and 
these guys came back to them and said that the price is too 
much, and they now said okay what should we do to address 
this premium price” RB5 
 
In addition, the interviewees talked about the Angolanisation policy in Angola: 
 “Angola is doing their local content thing, indigenisation; 
Angolanisation, which is very aggressive, but the way they are 
pursuing it, it will not help them in the long term from what 
am seeing” LOC4 
 “Yea they want to make sure that they domicile the industry, 
so when you spend the money there, the economy will be 
robust, people can do business. However, then the fear is 
that, if you are not a developed country, developed country 
will not want to. As a developing country you need people to 
invest, and if they cannot get their returns back they cannot 
come and do business” LOC4 
 
Compared to the LCP in Nigeria, the LCP rules in Angola are strict:  
 “In Angola, I think their law are even a bit stringent, they are 
stricter in Angola, but in Nigeria, it is still open to discussion. 
For me because things are open for discussion in Nigeria, it 
means we are not even follow the law the way we see it, and 
it gives room for misinterpretation, so they need some 
amendments to the act” IOC6 
 “Angola is too rigid; it is easier pregnant Camel to run in 
through the eye of a needle than for you to go to Angola and 
get a contract if you are not an Angolan company. Also, their 
visa process for an expatriate is very hard to get, even though 
you get it, for three years you will not be able to renew it. 
However, it has its advantages and disadvantages. However, 
investors are going there, what they are looking at is to be 
able to repatriate their profits………”  LOC5 
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 “I think one of the things we can learn from Angola is 
aggressive attempt to Nigerianise whatever portion of 
whatever aspect can be Nigerianised” RB3 
 
Norway was also acknowledged as being a country with aggressive domiciliation 
practices: 
 “In fact, they are more paid than the guys that work in the 
UK and you see them they have that confidence, there is a 
way you build the confidence of your workforce, wherever 
they go they just feel happy working for their country. 
However, here because of the way, if not for now before, if 
your overseas and your and you are working in Nigeria, even 
with the business we bring, everybody see you as if you are 
up to what he or she expect” LOC4 
The research participants also spoke about the different way in which oil and 
gas countries used their LCP to stimulate investment: 
 “I know Trinidad and Tobago are not doing badly because we 
have heard success stories of how they have used local 
content to stimulate investment and they have demonstrated 
that if you are consistent in local content policy, you can 
actually achieve competitiveness” RB5 
“Of course as far back as 1978, Norway have put up its own 
sovereign wealth fund, and since that time all earnings from 
oil had gone to investment funds, the proceeds from the 
investment is what Norway use to fund its annual budget, it 
is doesn’t touch its capital over these years. So now that you 
have the crisis in oil price you do not see a country like Norway 
complaining, imagine what savings would have been since 
1978 till today” NB1 
 
In summary, it is evident that the Nigerian oil and gas industry can learn from 
other oil and gas producing countries by implementing a policy that fosters 
community engagement. A policy is required that encourages professionalism 
and improves capacity development by creating more employment and training 
of its citizens, thereby leading to domiciliation of oil and gas revenues in the 
country. 
5.7 Chapter Conclusion 
The chapter began by investigating the views/perceptions of the Nigerian LCP 
held by stakeholders in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. The study discovered 
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that research participants viewed the LCP as a tool that encourages the 
participation of Nigerians in the oil and gas industry. Similarly, the LCP was 
seen as a tool for technology transfer from IOCs to indigenous companies.  In 
the same way, the LCP was perceived as the utilisation of local resources and 
personnel in industry operations. These views of the LCP held by stakeholders 
in the industry have influenced the ways in which they implement it in their 
activities which has an effect on the Nigerian oil and gas industry.  One of the 
consequences of the LCP is the advantage it gives to indigenous companies in 
the award of oil and gas contracts. Furthermore, the research participants 
stated that the LCP brought about the training and employment of more 
Nigerians in the industry. As a consequence, this has resulted in the 
domestication of oil and gas operations in Nigeria, which in turn has reduced 
capital flight out of the country and led to the LCP being regarded as a value 
retention tool. 
Equally, the findings showed the research participants’ views on the resources 
available for LCP implementation in the industry. They asserted that training 
was the key resource required by indigenous companies in the industry. 
However, most of the training is undertaken by oil and gas companies.  In the 
same way, the NCDF, which was created to help indigenous companies 
participate in the industry, has not been properly managed as indigenous 
companies are yet to benefit. 
Furthermore, results from the research revealed the barriers to the successful 
implementation of the LCP. Research participants commented on the country’s 
inadequate infrastructure and the need to supply electricity for major 
operations such as manufacturing and fabrication. Likewise, the lack of capital 
was identified as a barrier to indigenous companies partaking in the industry. 
Banks and insurance companies believe that indigenous companies lack the 
necessary collateral to obtain loans. Therefore, indigenous companies struggle 
to obtain the required funds to operate in the industry. In the same way, 
research participants believed that a lack of capacity had been a hindrance to 
LCP implementation as most of the jobs are reserved for the IOCs. IOCs are of 
the opinion that indigenous companies lack the knowledge to operate in a 
technology-intensive industry such as the oil and gas industry. To partake in 
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the industry, indigenous companies form corrupt joint venture partnership with 
IOCs, where they bid for contracts and outsource it to IOCs for marginal profits. 
Furthermore, the findings also indicate that the LCP was being enforced by the 
NCDMB irrespective of the resources available in the industry, which means 
that the infrastructure and capacity available in Nigeria does not support 
effective LCP implementation.   
In fact, these barriers have affected the level of transparency in the 
implementation of the LCP in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. The research 
revealed that more must be done to improve the level of transparency in the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry. Notwithstanding, some of the research 
participants believed that transparency is relative, as the governments’ 
intention for the LCP is genuine. However, discretion lies with indigenous 
companies and IOCs to be transparent in their LCP implementation activities. 
For instance, oil and gas companies have created local content division within 
their organisation. Some have included the LCP in their companies’ policies and 
contracts. Nevertheless, there are limited LCP monitoring procedures. The 
NCDMB lacks the capability and qualified personnel to enforce LCP compliance 
in the industry. In the same way, research participants indicated that there was 
no regulatory framework to enforce LCP implementation in the Nigerian oil and 
gas industry. They complained that there were too many regulatory bodies 
enforcing the LCP, which has led to a lack of coordination between the agencies 
involved in LCP implementation and enforcement. 
This section has summarised the main findings of the research. It has shown 
the fundamental issues and barriers to LCP implementation. The next chapter 
discusses key findings in relation to the relevant literature on the LCP. 
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Chapter 6 
Discussion and LCP Model 
6.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to critically discuss the research findings in 
relation to the key themes identified in Chapter 5 with two frameworks 
formulated for effective LCP implementation. 
6.2 Perception of the LCP by stakeholders in the oil and gas industry 
The Nigerian LCP is a deliberate policy established by the Nigerian government 
to increase the participation of Nigerians and indigenous companies in the oil 
and gas industry, with the aim of regaining control of the sector that has been 
predominately controlled by IOCs. The policy compelled oil and gas companies 
to implement the LCP in their activities in the industry. Therefore, this study 
investigated the various perceptions of the LCP held by stakeholders in the 
industry. 
As previously mentioned, Table 5.1 outlines the stakeholders’ perceptions of 
the LCP, while Figure 6.1 below presents a new LCP perception model; this 
being one of the key contributions to knowledge arising from this study. The 
LCP perception model was developed by incorporating the research findings into 
the adequate metric parameter of the accountability framework in Figure 3.2. 
This model illustrates the interrelationship between the various stakeholders’ 
perceptions of the LCP. For instance, the LCP as a tool for value retention 
instigates the active employment and participation of the local workforce. This 
is in line with the findings of Lahiri and Ono (2003), and Ihua et al. (2009) who 
stated that the LCP ensures that value is added to the industry through the 
utilisation of indigenous companies and local resources. Likewise, active 
participation often results in knowledge and technology transfer from the IOCs 
to indigenous companies, which gives rise to the utilisation of local resources 
as more indigenous companies have the skills to partake in the industry. 
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Figure 6.1 The LCP stakeholders’ perception model (Author generated) 
Hence, the value generated from oil and gas activities is retained in Nigeria. In 
addition, the LCP is perceived as a tool for knowledge and technology transfer 
through the active participation of Nigerians in the industry. As a result, the 
Nigerian government deliberately established the LCP as a medium allowing 
Nigerians to have greater control of their domestic oil and gas industry and 
creating employment opportunities and wider societal benefits in the process. 
However, some of the research participants (see for example: IOC6 and LOC6) 
in section 5.2.2.2 concluded that this view has changed the way IOCs operate 
in the industry since the inception of the Nigerian LCP. 
6.3. Capabilities of indigenous companies – Positive View 
The NOGICD 2010 ACT, in Section 10 (1) a, b, 3(1), (2), stated that the sole 
aim of the LCP is to promote Nigerian involvement in the oil and gas industry 
(NCDMB 2016). Hence, exclusive consideration must be given to indigenous 
companies that have the capacity to execute jobs. This is consistent with 
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Echendu (2015) who found that, since the implementation of the LCP, the 
NCDMB had created more than 5000 employment opportunities and is 
responsible for over 85% of engineering man-hours in the oil and gas industry.  
There is evidence to suggest that significant levels of activity have been 
domiciled in Nigeria due to the LCP. For example, IOC1 in Section 5.2.2.2 
stated that as a result of the LCP, the majority of the rigs in land and swamp 
locations have been assigned to indigenous companies. This has resulted in 
more indigenous companies emerging in the industry. Hence, there is a 
consensus among the research participants that the LCP has presented 
Nigerians with more employment opportunities. According to IOC4, Nigerians 
are now employed in managerial positions.  This is consistent with Kalyuzhnova 
(2012), which stated that LCP transfers managerial skills from an external 
source (IOC) to indigenes and the wider community. In addition, IOC4 further 
stated that his organisation is now structured with 60% IOCs and 40% 
Nigerians as a result of the policy. Likewise, LOC2 and RB6 claimed that the 
LCP has affected the employment rate in Nigeria and that more Nigerians are 
now employed. This is supported by Ovadia (2014) who determined that the 
use of local resources (i.e. personnel and materials) has increased from 
approximately 5% to 40%, with an average annual investment of $15 billion. 
Hence, local content retains approximately $5billion in the Nigerian economy 
annually. According to the findings, the LCP mandate stipulates that all Front-
end Engineering and Detailed Design (FEED) work must be carried out in Nigeria 
and this has further boosted employment opportunities.   
In addition, more equipment used in the industry has been transferred from 
IOCs to indigenous companies as a result of the LCP, according to IOC1 in 
Section 5.2.2.5. Therefore, indigenous companies are now more involved in the 
industry’s operations. This is consistent with the NCDMB (2016) policy 
stipulation that ownership of moveable assets, including rigs and marine 
vessels, should be staffed by employees of indigenous companies. Hence, new 
opportunities have been created allowing more Nigerians to work in the oil and 
gas industry. In addition, some of the regulatory bodies and IOCs in Section 
5.2.3.1 argued that the LCP has helped develop the capabilities of Nigerians 
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through training. As a result, IOCs have trained Nigerians in the industry and, 
on a few occasions, have employed Nigerians and encouraged them to shadow 
key experts. This is consistent with Udoh et al. (2015) who found that the 
NCDMB and PETROFAC have collaborated with the Oil and Gas Training 
Association of Nigeria (OGTAN) in order to improve training and development, 
create attachment and opportunities for the employment for Nigerians, create 
training programmes and identify institutions to be upgraded to training 
centres. According to RB5, one of the objectives of training Nigerians in the 
industry is to empower them to start up their own businesses. This aligns with 
the claims of LOC5 that they have established training centres in Nigeria, where 
the government have sent Nigerians to be trained with the view of empowering 
them to start their own businesses.  
6.3.1 Capabilities of indigenous companies –Hindrances 
In Section 5.2.2.6, a number of the research participants, IOC2, RB4, and 
LOC5 argued that despite the indigenous companies’ lack of capabilities to 
participate in the oil and gas industry, the NCDMB still enforces the 
implementation of the LCP. According to Abdulkabir et al. (2015), and Ado 
(2016), the NCDMB places more emphasis on the enforcement of the LCP rather 
than the development of local content. For instance, rather than focusing on 
long-term training and development of Nigerians, they are concentrating on the 
revenue generated in the industry.  
In addition, research participants LOC5, LOC7, and NB1 emphasised that the 
oil and gas industry is knowledge intensive and technology-driven in nature, 
with the involvement of indigenous companies having been constrained due to 
the lack of knowledge and/or access to necessary technologies.  Further, LOC4 
stated that indigenous companies lack the financial capacity to enter the 
industry. This finding corroborates with the point made by Heum et al. (2003) 
that indigenous companies are no match for the IOCs who are much better 
equipped, both financially and technologically. Also, Heum et al. (2010) added 
that indigenous companies operating within the oil and gas industry cannot 
compete with the manpower competence residing with the IOCs.  
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Furthermore, IOC3 in Section 5.2.4.1 highlighted that the standard of 
educational institutions in Nigeria is a further barrier to LCP implementation. He 
argued that the level of education being provided, particularly in technical and 
engineering fields and in other areas such as quality assurance and project 
management, is inadequate. This is consistent with the findings outlined by 
Bakare (2011) and Vaaland et al. (2012). 
In addition, the quality of materials and services offered by indigenous 
companies is another challenge. According to IOC4 in Section 5.2.6, the 
products manufactured by indigenous companies are sub-standard and not fit 
for purpose. Hence, the industry depends heavily on imported products, as the 
goods manufactured in Nigeria do not meet international standard 
specifications. According to Vaaland et al. (2012), the compliance of indigenous 
companies to international quality standards is limited, which can result in the 
poor maintenance of oil facilities. This aligns with Ihua et al. (2011) and Eruhn’s 
(2015) research findings that the lack of training facilities in Nigeria remains 
challenging. However, this issue has also been associated with the lack of 
funding from the Nigerian government, which has compromised both research 
initiatives and technical education. Arguably, this undermines the country’s and 
the Nigerian oil and gas industry’s capacity building as it is difficult for the nation 
to produce indigenous technicians and engineers to fulfil LCP implementation. 
Similarly, poor infrastructure has been identified (see for example: IOC1 and 
RB3 in Section 5.2.4.1) as a barrier to LCP implementation. For instance, 
inadequate power supply has adversely affected the manufacturing and 
fabrication division within the oil and gas industry. This is consistent with 
Erhun’s (2015) statement that the country lacks a stable electricity supply, 
which has negatively impacted fabrication and manufacturing in the industry. 
Also, IOC3, LOC7, and RB3 associated poor infrastructure with the inadequate 
road networks.  
In addition, the oil and gas industry is known to be capital intensive and requires 
significant investment in its operations and activities. Hence, the findings from 
this study revealed that the indigenous oil and gas companies face the issue of 
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raising capital for developing and implementing projects. This could be 
attributed to the high collateral requested by Nigerian banks and the inability 
of indigenous companies to provide such collateral. This is consistent with 
Bakare (2011) and Balouga (2012) who found that indigenous oil and gas 
companies are denied funds by Nigerian banks for the aforementioned reasons. 
Ihua et al. (2011) and Anyadike (2014) added that limited access to foreign 
currency and/or the high cost of borrowing in the local economy is a further 
barrier to the implementation of the LCP.  
Besides the indigenous companies’ lack of capabilities, finance and the poor 
infrastructure, evidence further revealed that favouritism and nepotism in the 
award of projects also hinder the successful participation of indigenous 
companies in the industry. For instance, IOC6 in Section 5.2.6 argued that 
consideration and incentives are only available to those companies that have 
close relationships with the Nigerian government. This is consistent with 
Abdulkabir (2014), Martini (2014) and Nwapi (2015) research findings that LCP 
implementation has been significantly influenced by the personal interests of 
well-connected indigenous companies and public officials. This has encouraged 
favouritism and nepotism in the industry. It can be concluded that first 
consideration in the award of contracts is given to indigenous companies with 
political influence. This is consistent with Ado’s (2016) argument that the first 
consideration rule has been discriminatory towards some indigenous 
companies, because certain companies are awarded contracts as a result of 
political patronage. This is contrary to the findings of Ramdoo (2016) that first 
consideration must be given to indigenous companies, regardless of the 
nationality of management or investment. It also differs from the findings of 
Tordo et al. (2013), which states that incentives are provided for local 
contractors to foster the development of the local supply chain.   
6.4 IOCs’ motivation to partner with Indigenous companies  
The Nigerian LCP is an effort by the Nigerian government to give Nigerian 
citizens more presence in the Nigerian oil and gas industry (Okafor and Aniche 
2014; Erhun 2015). It stipulates that IOCs working in Nigeria must award 
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contracts to indigenous oil and gas companies and these contracts must be 
carried out in Nigeria with a high percentage of local workforce, or in 
partnership with an indigenous company. Throughout this study, research 
participants such as IOC1, LOC7, and NB1 have commented on the partnerships 
between IOCs and indigenous companies as mandated by the NOGICD 2010 ACT. 
Notwithstanding, it came to light that there are various reasons why IOCs and 
indigenous companies enter into partnership in the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry. For instance, LOC3 and RB3 revealed that indigenous companies 
have partnered with IOCs with aim of gaining knowledge. These partnerships 
include: on the job training (OJT), understudying and project-driven training 
opportunities.  This is in line with Heum et al. (2003) who found that indigenous 
companies collaborate with IOCs as they lack the technical capabilities to 
participate in the industry, especially in technologically intensive areas. 
According to Otombosoba and Dosunmu (2016), the partnerships between IOCs 
and indigenous companies will promote capacity building and technology 
transfer.  
In addition, IOC2, IOC5 and LOC4, in Section 5.2.7.3, revealed that IOCs have 
established internship programmes for the training of Nigerians. This is in line 
with Erhun’s (2015) research findings that state that operators are compelled 
by the NCDMB to make an effort, within a reasonable amount of time, to train 
Nigerians within the industry. Some of these internships include partnership 
with Nigerian universities and training institutions. For instance, some IOCs 
collaborate with the Petroleum Technology Association of Nigeria (PETAN), the 
Petroleum Training Institute (PTI) and the Petroleum Technology Development 
Fund (PTDF) to train Nigerians. Other training programmes include scholarships 
for Nigerians to study abroad. This is consistent with Oyejide and Adewuyi’s 
(2011) findings that IOCs invest in the industry through training programmes 
and scholarship grants. Through these programmes and training, Nigerians will 
develop the capacity necessary for the industry. For instance, Shell grants 850 
scholarships annually and trains Nigerians to acquire different skills such as 
carpentry, welding and pipefitting (Oyejide and Adewuyi 2011). 
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However, IOC2 and LOC2 in Section 5.2.9 argued that the IOCs form a joint 
venture with indigenous companies in order to qualify for contracts. 
Nevertheless, LOC3 and LOC4 complained that certain joint venture 
partnerships were entered into for the wrong reasons, especially when 
indigenous companies act as intermediaries for contract purposes and/or 
financial gain. These views are consistent with other studies (such as Nwanolue 
and Iwuoha 2012; Okafor and Aniche 2014; Otombosoba and Dosunmu 2016) 
who found that there are some situations where IOCs partner with indigenous 
companies to front for a foreign company as an indigenous firm, with the guise 
of fulfilling the LC guidelines. In addition, Awe and Olusuyi (2014) argued that 
the lack of infrastructural development and deficiency in the manufacturing 
sector is one of the reasons indigenous companies become intermediaries for 
the IOCs, thus, corroborating the earlier point concerning the lack of 
infrastructure in Section 6.3.1 
Furthermore, LOC4, LOC6, and NB1 discussed the resistance of IOCs to 
collaborate with indigenous companies because of the perception that they lack 
the capabilities to operate in the industry. LOC4, LOC6 and IOC2, in Section 
5.2.8, argued and concluded that the IOCs have more confidence in expatriates 
than indigenes operating in the industry, because they are used to dealing with 
international companies like Halliburton, and General Electric. This argument is 
in line with that of Amanze-Nwachukwu (2007) and Okafor and Aniche (2014) 
who found that one of the reasons IOCs are resistant to the LCP is because they 
are sceptical of the indigenous companies’ abilities and technical know-how to 
carry out oil and gas projects. They believe that imposing indigenous hiring 
conditions is unfair, especially when the domestic labour lacks the necessary 
skills to undertake the job (Nwaokoro 2011). However, IOC6 and RB4 argued 
that the fault does not lie with either the IOCs or the indigenous companies and 
stated that the LCP is, in fact, too ambiguous for oil and gas companies to 
comply with.  This aligns with the argument of Okafor and Ancihe (2014) and 
Erhun (2015) regarding the inability of the NCDMB to develop the required 
capability to close the capacity gap created by the shortfalls between available 
indigenous capacity and the opportunities created by the LCP. This existing gap 
makes it difficult for IOCs to comply with the LCP in the oil and gas industry. 
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This also shows that the stakeholders in the industry (Government, IOCs and 
indigenous companies) do not agree on the policy objectives.  
Also, in terms of competitiveness, LOC7 stated that the IOCs believed that if 
they train Nigerians, business opportunities in the industry will be limited. 
Although the IOCs still train Nigerians, RB6 stated that they find it hard to 
relinquish positions to a Nigerian workforce as they do not wish to lose their 
competitive advantage in the industry. Hence, they find ways to evade LCP 
rules by forming corrupt joint venture partnership with indigenous companies. 
Hence, this contradicts Ramdoo (2016) research finding that there should be a 
balance and agreement between stakeholders, which will determine the success 
of the LCP. 
6.5 Enforcement, monitoring and accountability of LCP implementation 
Institutional enablers are government institutions that directly or indirectly 
influence how stakeholders in the oil and gas industry operate. These include 
ministries and parastatals that are responsible for policy development, 
implementation and monitoring industry activities (Owusu and Vaaland 2016). 
Findings from this study revealed that enforcement of the Nigerian LCP lies with 
the NCDMB. This is consistent with the NOGCID 2010 ACT Section 60 and 70, 
which states that the implementation and enforcement of the Nigerian LCP lies 
with the NCDMB. In addition, under the provision of Section 70(i), 63 and 4, 
the NCDMB is responsible for formulating procedures and guidelines, which 
assists oil and gas companies with their obligations under the Act.  
However, the Nigerian LCP lacks appropriate enforcement. For instance, IOC5, 
LOC2, and RB4, stated that the enforcement processes have been inadequate. 
In addition, research participants IOC6, LOC6, RB2 and RB4 argued that the 
lack of enforcement is because the NCDMB does not have the qualified staff 
necessary to enforce the policy. In line with this argument, a number of 
participants, such as RB2, IOC6, and LOC5, stated that the absence of 
appropriate enforcement and monitoring processes for the implementation of 
the Nigerian LCP resulted from a lack of field verification, especially in sending 
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field officers to monitor compliance at the implementation phase of oil and gas 
projects.  This is consistent with Okafor and Anichie’s (2014) argument that the 
NCDMB lacks the capacity to build the necessary manpower, qualification and 
assistance to enforce the LCP in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. As a result 
of the inefficiency of the NCDMB, oil and gas companies are resistant to the 
implementation of the LCP. Likewise, Amanze-Nwachukwu (2007) stated that 
poor enforcement has resulted in the unwillingness of the multinational 
companies to adhere to the Nigerian local content initiatives. However, findings 
in Sections 5.3, 5.4.1 and 5.4.4 indicate that the monitoring processes have 
been adequate. For instance, IOC6 stated that they have provision for internal 
monitoring teams within their organisations to enforce the LCP in their 
operations. This conforms to the NNPC directives of 2007-2008 that all IOCs 
must form a Nigerian Content Division (NCD) in their organisation to enforce 
LCP implementation (Ovadia 2014). Moreover, it is also consistent with Ovadia’s 
(2016) argument that the NCDMB has performed relatively well in the 
enforcement of the LCP. On the contrary, Ovadia (2014) observed that some 
IOCs have refused to form an NCD in their companies. 
Regarding, the measurement of LCP performance, findings indicate that there 
are no structures in place in the oil and gas industry to measure the 
performance of the LCP. This aligns with Ovaida’s (2013, 2014) argument that 
there is no way of measuring the LCP’s performance because there are no clear 
definitions and targets, thus, compliance with the policy cannot be properly 
evaluated. He went further to state that creating a target and means of 
measuring the LCP has been an area which the NCDMB has been reluctant to 
develop. This is supported by Awe (2014) who stated that the NCDMB has no 
clear requirements for evaluating project delivery. Hence, supporting the 
findings of this study that the NCDMB in an ineffective regulatory body. 
Furthermore, research participants IOC6 and RB4 argued that the policy is too 
ambitious with no definite target and thus, cannot be measured. This has resulted 
in IOCs dictating the terms and conditions of the LCP. This is supported by Bakare’s 
(2011) statement that the majority of companies try to lobby for relaxation of 
the policy in the industry. This differs from the findings of Ramdoo (2016), that 
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the LCP utilises different regulatory instruments such as setting minimum 
targets for the employment and training of indigenes.  
Furthermore, the findings from Chapter 5 revealed that poor accountability 
measures in the implementation of LCP have had an adverse effect on the level 
of transparency in the oil and gas industry. According to Lederman et al.’s 
(2005) argument, transparency can only be achieved by properly defining roles, 
responsibilities and delegation which would help to avoid information 
dissemination problems and complicated monitoring. Furthermore, 
accountability is concerned with holding agencies and individuals responsible 
for their performance (Paul 1991). Arguably, an appropriate definition of who 
should be accountable for the correct implementation of the LCP would promote 
full compliance and transparency. Research participants IOC4, LOC2, RB4 and 
RB6 complained about the inability of the NCDMB to sanction companies that 
default in the implementation of the LCP. For instance, RB6 stated that he was 
yet to hear of any company that has been sanctioned for not implementing the 
LCP in their organisation. This has given IOCs another opportunity to evade the 
LCP and to distort the instrument of the policy for their own self-interest. This 
is consistent with the arguments presented by Nwaokoro (2011), Martini 
(2014), and Nwapi (2015) that the lack of enforcement and sanctions by the 
NCDMB is due to the corrupt vulnerability of the LCP. Indeed, the NCDMB has 
been accused of accepting gifts from oil and gas companies that it has been 
charged to monitor.  This highlights the inadequate monitoring and control by 
the body charged to oversee the implementation of LCP. On the contrary, WTI 
(2013) argued that LCP has been instrumental in sanctioning IOCs that impede 
capacity development in the implementation of the policy.  
6.6 NCDF Management and Transparency  
The Nigerian Content Development Fund (NCDF) was set up by the NCDMB to 
establish capacity building initiatives directed at increasing Nigerian content in 
the oil and gas industry. It was also meant to promote human capital 
development, create credit facilities, execute infrastructural development and 
provide incentives to indigenous companies (Anyadike 2014; Ovadia 2014 and 
Erhun 2015). The Nigerian LCP mandates that a deduction and remittance of 
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1% of all contracts awarded to oil and gas companies is paid into the NCDF. 
The NCDF was to work alongside the Nigerian Content Employment Initiative 
(NCEI), which requires operators to identify Nigerians for training and to use 
the fund for training purposes. Even though all the research participants stated 
they remitted 1% of every contract they execute to the fund, information from 
the NCDMB’s website specified otherwise. The NCDMB (2016) stated that 
certain oil and gas companies default in the deduction and remittance of 1% of 
the value of the contracts they executed to the NCDF. 
Furthermore, some of the research participants (for instance, IOC7, LOC4 and 
LOC7 in section 5.2.6) specified that they do not have access to these funds 
and that this resource has not be utilised in the industry. This is consistent with 
Okafor and Aniche’s (2014) argument that no information is available on 
companies that have been granted funds from the NCDF. Furthermore, RB1 
added that there is a need to publish the names of oil and gas companies who 
have benefitted from the fund. According to the International Petroleum 
Industry Environmental Conservation Association IPIECA (2011), information 
regarding the NCDF fund should be published as no information is available on 
how the fund has been utilised in the industry. Fawibe (2014) argued further 
that the implementation of the NCDF is yet to be established, as there are no 
procedures for disbursing the fund to qualified indigenous companies. Likewise, 
Ovaida (2014) observed that there are transparency issues in the management 
of the NCDF as there is no standard regulatory framework for monitoring the 
effectiveness and implementation of the LCP. Arguably, the creation of the 
NCDF clearly indicates an ideal situation that could facilitate the successful 
implementation of the Nigerian LCP. The disclosure of information to 
stakeholders and the public is a means of improving accountability (Chisholm 
1995). However, there is no appropriate mechanism in place for the distribution 
of funds to qualified indigenous companies (Ovaida 2013; Fawibe 2014). Hence, 
there is a lack of transparency in the management of the NCDF. 
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6.7 Downturn in oil price and its impact on local content 
implementation 
This section is important due to the unfolding events in relation to global oil 
price fluctuation as the study has shown in section 5.2.11.2 that the fall in the 
price has impacted the effectiveness of LCP implementation in the industry. 
The fall in the price of oil has affected all oil producing countries. However, the 
direct consequences are more severe in countries like Nigeria, which rely 
heavily on oil and gas revenues (Agarwal et al. 2015). The Nigerian economy 
is overly dependent on the oil and gas industry, with over 90% of its total 
revenue generated from oil and gas production (Offiong et al. 2016). Hence, 
the fall in oil price has adversely affected the Nigerian economy, creating 
several repercussions for Nigeria’s finances, both at a national and sub-national 
level (Offiong et al. 2016). This is because Nigeria’s revenue base is determined 
by two key factors - production quotas and world oil prices - with the latter 
being beyond the control of any one country. Therefore, low oil prices represent 
a major threat to the economic stability of Nigeria. This is consistent with the 
statement by Agarwal et al. (2015) that the fall in the price of oil has forced 
the Nigerian government to adjust its budget twice to accommodate an 
estimate of $65 per barrel in 2015, while reducing spending to less than 10% 
of the 2015 budget.  
The research participants (for example LOC6, NB1, and RB3) stated that the 
fall in oil price has had a negative impact on LCP implementation. For instance, 
LOC6 argued that indigenous companies are having difficulty participating in 
the industry because of the drop in oil price. According to the Guardian 
newspaper (2016), the fall in oil price has significantly reduced the level of 
participation of indigenous companies, leaving many without contracts. 
Likewise, the naira has fallen less than one-third against the dollar, highlighting 
the Nigerian governments’ inability to balance its budget. As a result, NB1 
stated that the level of infrastructure development has been affected due to the 
inability of the government to balance the budget. This has also affected the 
finance sector, where an estimated 20% of loans are granted to indigenous oil 
and gas companies. This is in line with Agarwal et al. (2015) who noted that 
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the naira has been devalued by the central bank to balance the fall in the oil 
price, hence, indigenous companies that rely on foreign loans have paid more 
in naira. Further, evidence from this study revealed that the Nigerian 
government has had to sell its foreign exchange and raise its interest rate to 
control the devaluation of the Nigerian currency. Hence, many cost parameters 
have been affected, resulting in an increased burden on indigenous companies. 
For instance, IOCs had to suspend many projects which have led to reduced 
activity in the industry (Guardian 2016) and others to ask for a discount on 
existing contracts undertaken with indigenous companies in order to buffer the 
fall in oil price. However, any discount will adversely affect indigenous 
companies because they will not be financially viable. On the other hand, 
indigenous companies are unwilling to take legal action for fear of gaining a bad 
reputation and losing future contracts. The only alternative is to renegotiate the 
terms of the discount (Agarwal et al. 2015). Ovadia (2016) concluded that these 
the way in which IOCs attempt to evade the implementation of the LCP. When 
the price of oil drops, IOCs renew their effort to sacrifice the LC in the name of 
the bottom line. 
Nevertheless, LOC6 argued that this was not the first time the world has 
experienced a fall in oil price. He states that the fall in oil price is a cycle that 
will soon be over. This is consistent with Offiong et al.’s (2016) statement that 
Nigeria has already had to deal with the vagaries of unpredictable oil prices 
such as in 1986 and 2006. However, Ovadia (2016) concluded that the recent 
fall in oil price illustrates the folly of depending solely on revenue derived from 
the oil industry to bring social and economic development. Hence, there is a 
need for appropriate LCP implementation and for approaches to promote 
economic diversification and plans for the future without hydrocarbon. 
6.8 Knowledge transfer and spin-off effect of the LCP 
One of the objectives of the Nigerian LCP includes promoting the participation 
of indigenous companies in the industry and fostering the technological transfer 
from IOCs to indigenous companies. From the statements made by the research 
participants including IOC4 and LOC4, it is clear that the LCP is regarded as a 
process of transferring technology from the IOCs to indigenous companies. RB7 
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stated that the implementation of the policy goes beyond human capacity 
development to include technology transfer into other industrial sectors. This is 
consistent with the statement of Ayonmike and Okeke (2015) that the LCP can 
be used to harness skills and technical competence that can be applicable to 
other sectors of the Nigerian economy. For instance, Section 53 of the NOGCID 
2010 Act mandates that all fabrication and welding must be undertaken in 
Nigeria. This transverses different sectors including: construction, shipping, 
telecommunications, aviation, and automobile.  
Hence, the positive impact on local and foreign investments in capacity building, 
in areas such as fabrication and welding, will not only increase the number of 
Nigerians working in industry, but will also enhance technical specialisation. 
Furthermore, Vaaland et al. (2012), Monday and Agorzie (2014) and Monday 
(2015) argued that creating links between the oil and gas industry and other 
sectors of the Nigerian economy has been acknowledged as a solution to 
combat poor business performance and low technology capacity. Hence, based 
on the various arguments made by the research participants, the study reveals 
ways of creating broader economic linkages.  As stated in Section 6.6, the 
NCDMB should create a framework for the disbursement of the NCDF fund to 
indigenous companies.  Furthermore, the IOCs’ domiciliation of a minimum 
percentage of their profit in a Nigerian bank should significantly create the 
availability of long term funding for capacity development and inject more funds 
into the local economy (Ayonmike and Okeke 2015).   
The second objective is to encourage partnership between IOCs and indigenous 
companies in order to foster technology transfer. Although IOCs claim to have 
made an impressive effort to partner with indigenous companies, evidence from 
this study reveals that indigenous participation is still relatively low as a result 
of corrupt joint venture partnerships. However, if there is genuine collaboration 
between IOCs and indigenous companies to execute contracts, it will result in 
the transfer of technology and knowledge. This will stimulate vocational and 
technical capabilities and economic activities in various ways including: the 
emergence of new indigenous companies; strengthening the capabilities of 
existing indigenous companies (Ayonmike and Okeke 2015); value retention 
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(foreign exchange, availability of funding); and finally will have a positive effect 
on the non-oil producing sectors of the Nigerian economy. Furthermore, 
because of the mandate set out in Section 25 of the Act, IOCs are required to 
establish offices in areas where oil and gas activities are carried out. This has 
compelled IOCs to employ indigenes and, in doing so, has enhanced indigenous 
capacity in the area and stimulated rural development (Ayonmike and Okeke 
2015).  
Another set of barriers to LCP implementation identified in this research is the 
relationship between key actors and the level of technical and technological 
provision provided by educational institutions in Nigeria. Research by Monday 
(2015) indicated that the linkage between universities, research institutes, and 
indigenous companies is relatively low. This is also similar to the findings in 
Section 5.2.1, and the argument put forward by Vaaland et al. (2012) and 
Owusu and Vaaland (2016) that there are weak relationships between 
universities, IOCs and indigenous companies. This has led to disappointing 
knowledge transfer outcomes. Furthermore, RB4 in Section 5.2.3.1 argued that 
training in Nigeria is more theoretical than practical and is the reason why 
Nigerian companies often send their employees abroad for training. In addition, 
Ihua (2010) argued that Nigerian educational institutions are underfunded and 
ill equipped to produce graduates that can compete in a technology intensive 
sector like the oil and gas industry. Hence, there is the need for Nigerian 
universities and research institutions to be equipped capacity wise and 
financially able to receive and distribute the technology transferred from IOCs 
to indigenous companies. 
6.9 Lessons learnt from countries with local content policy 
This section presents the best practices in LCP implementation from other oil 
producing countries. Evidence from this study shows that the research 
participants referred to Malaysia, Norway Angola and Brazil as examples of 
countries with effective local content policies. Although these countries were at 
different stages of development when hydrocarbon resources were discovered, 
countries like Malaysia and Norway have been very successful in the utilisation 
of their hydrocarbon resources (Heum et al. 2003). For instance, Nigeria and 
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Angola’s local content initiatives were inspired by Norway (Ovadia 2014). With 
regard to best practices, respondents spoke of a variety of measures used in 
these countries.  
6.9.1 Local capacity development  
As a result of the technological complexity of the oil and gas industry, the issue 
of knowledge and technological spill-over is vital for the successful development 
of adding value to the local economy, which is one of the reasons why most oil 
producing countries have adopted policies that foster technology and 
knowledge transfer (Warner et al. 2013). Research participants IOC1, IOC2, 
LOC7, and RB3 indicated that Nigeria has much to learn from Norway, the UK, 
Brazil and Angola with regards to local capacity development. For instance, 
regulators in Brazil require operators to invest 1% of their revenue in research 
and development (Heum et al. 2003; Warner et al. 2013; Playfoot et al. 2015). 
While in Angola, $0.15 of every barrel of oil produced goes towards training 
Angolans (Asiago 2016). In Norway, IOCs are required to locate their research 
and development activities and partner with research institutes and universities 
in Norway (Heum et al. 2003). Local participation in the Norwegian oil and gas 
industry ranges from favouring its national oil company Statoil during licensing 
rounds, to encouraging the utilisation of locally produced goods and services 
(Warner et al. 2013) with the aim that it will create avenues for developing 
suppliers.  
6.9.2 Domiciliation and Monitoring 
The research participants LOC4, LOC5 and RB3 spoke of the Angolanisation 
policy in Angola, where the Angolan government ensures that all activities are 
undertaken in the country. This is consistent with Ovadia’s (2013) statement 
that the Ministry of Petroleum in Angola mandates that all foreign oil and gas 
companies plan to increase the number of indigenous workforce and monitor 
the companies to ensure they comply (Ovadia 2013). As a result of the 
Angolanisation policy, the Angolan government created tax incentives for 
Angolan oil and gas companies and mandated the use of local currency and 
Angolan banks, unlike the Nigerian oil and gas industry, where research 
participants IOC4, 10C6, 10C7 and LOC6 complained the Nigerian 
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government offered no incentives. In addition, LOC4, LOC5 and RB3 believe 
that the policy encourages investments in manufacturing and efforts in building 
human capacity in the Angolan oil and gas industry. Notwithstanding, Ovadia 
(2014) pointed out that despite these new initiatives, it is still difficult to 
measure the success of the Angolan LC in retaining revenue generated, creating 
jobs and value addition because of the lack of openness and the absence of 
monitoring and evaluation. 
In addition, NB1 spoke of the relationship between the Norwegian oil and gas 
industry and the local institutions in the communities in which they operate. 
This aligns with the statements of Neff (2005) and Ramdoo (2015) that 
companies are required to conduct 50% of their research and development in 
collaboration with a local institution. Hence, Norway ensures quick technology 
transfer to Norwegian companies and this has helped local companies attain 
and furthermore, set new international standards in offshore developments. 
Undeniably, in Norway, the LCP is driven by research and development and 
technology transfer (Warner et al. 2013). As stated in Section 6.8, the IOC’s 
decision regarding technology transfer lies with the host country’s technology 
inferiority, the cost of technology transfer and the scale of technology diffusion 
(Chul-Woo and Bong 2009). 
6.9.3 Professionalism  
Evidence from this study revealed that oil and gas companies were concerned 
about the governments’ attitude towards LCP implementation. They indicated 
that the NCDMB should learn from countries like Norway, Brazil and Malaysia 
about how their independent regulatory bodies work and how they can improve 
transparency in their oil and gas industry. This is consistent with the assertion 
made by Thuber et al. (2010) that Norway has an administrative system which 
assigns oil sector functions to three state controlled institutions, each having a 
distinctive role. In contrast, Brazil has two institutions, the State Oil 
Corporation, Petrobras and the National Petroleum Agency (ANP), which is the 
sector’s regulatory agency (Prochnik 2011; Playfoot et al. 2015). However, the 
findings from this study revealed that in Nigeria a number of the regulatory 
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agencies perform similar functions and lack coordination and collaboration to 
work together to enforce LCP rules.  
 6.10 The LCP implementation model 
The study developed an accountability framework in Figure 3.2, which is 
modified in Figure 6.2 below, after taking into consideration the research 
findings which informed the final model. This model is detailed and 
comprehensive because it includes the opinions of the various research 
participants interviewed for this study. 
Participation
Infrastructure
Enforcement 
 Training 
Partnership and Collaboration
 Perception
 Trust 
Disclosure and Information sharing 
 Resources
Finance 
Power
Educational institution 
 Monitoring 
NCDMB
 Compliance 
 Targets 
Adequate Metric
Efficiency 
Consideration
Information 
Dissemination
Acknowledgement of 
Spin-off Benefit 
 
Figure 6.2 The LCP implementation model (Author generated) 
6.10.1 Participation 
As stated earlier, the participation of Nigerians and indigenous companies in 
the industry is one of the Nigerian government’s main goals in creating the LCP. 
The government had a clear objective of what it wanted to achieve by 
implementing the LCP and is linked to the “Adequate Metric” parameter of the 
LCP model. This clearly states what constitutes local content, with one set of 
metrics being indigenous participation (Klueh et al. 2007; Ado 2016). 
Furthermore, Nigerians can participate in the industry if they have the 
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necessary capabilities to partake in the activities in the oil and gas industry. 
This is the reason why the LCP mandates that IOCs partner with indigenous 
companies with the view of transferring knowledge and technology to 
indigenous companies. This, again, links to the adequate metric component and 
the acknowledgement of the spin-off benefit parameters of the LCP model. The 
training of Nigerians is a mandatory requirement for IOCs that want to partake 
in the industry. When trained, Nigerians acquire the necessary capabilities to 
participate in the industry, which can be useful in other sectors of the economy, 
as previously stated in Section 6.8. Moreover, the stakeholders’ perception of 
the LCP, which is also linked to the adequate metric component of the LCP 
model, influences how they implement the LCP in their operations. For instance, 
IOC4 and LOC4 stated that the LCP was about the transfer of knowledge and 
technology from IOCs to indigenous companies. LOC4, in Section 5.2.7.3, 
claimed that they have been trained by IOCs in the industry, thus promoting 
their view of the LCP as representing the transfer of technological skills. 
Furthermore, IOC4 has trained Nigerians through different programmes, hence 
influencing their view that the LCP facilitates the transfer of technology, which 
aligns with the strategic feature of rational choice institutionalism. Where the 
behaviour of actors is driven by a strategic calculus rather than impersonal 
historical forces (Hall and Taylor 1996) 
Also, considering the competitiveness of the oil and gas industry, LOC7 stated 
that the IOCs believed that by training Nigerians, business opportunities in the 
industry will be limited. Hence, they are reluctant to share information with 
indigenous companies. This is supported by Tordo et al.’s (2013) findings that 
foreign companies might be reluctant to share information with indigenous 
companies due to competition in the oil and gas industry. Therefore, there is 
an association to the information dissemination parameter of the model, as it 
deals with partnership and information sharing between stakeholders in the 
industry. It also concerns trust. The empirical findings of this study revealed 
that IOCs distrust the indigenous companies’ capabilities in the industry, which 
is one of the reasons why IOCs are reluctant to share information and partner 
with indigenous companies. 
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6.10.2 Infrastructure  
As stated in Section 2.5.2, one of the necessary conditions to support the 
implementation of LCP is the countries’ capacity and capabilities to deliver the 
LCP. This includes the level of infrastructure available. Evidence from this study 
revealed that inadequate infrastructure has been a barrier to effective LCP 
implementation in the Nigerian oil and gas industry.  For instance, an 
inadequate power supply has affected the degree of manufacturing and 
fabrication in the industry, leading to the production of inferior quality goods 
and services that do not comply with international standard. In addition, the 
findings in Section 5.2.3 stated that as a result of inadequate infrastructure, oil 
and gas companies have to provide the necessary resources themselves in 
order to operate in the industry. This requires high levels of investment and 
specialised input due to the technological complexity of the oil and gas industry. 
Hence, new entrants find it difficult to participate. This links to the “Efficiency 
Consideration” component of the model as it deals with the resources available 
to implement the LCP. It is also concerned with performance accountability as 
it considers technological considerations and capacity constraints that affect the 
level of economic benefits that can be captured at a point in time (Ado 2016).  
There are very few indigenous companies that can execute or provide services 
that require sophisticated expertise or technology, therefore, creating a class 
of middlemen with indigenous companies gaining contracts and outsourcing to 
IOCs to implement while retaining some margin as profit (Balouga 2012). 
In addition, infrastructure is linked to education as can be seen in fig. 6.2, as 
without universities and training institutions training would not be possible. 
However, as stated in Section 6.3.1, the quality of education has been a barrier 
to the participation of Nigerians in the industry.  According to IOC3, the 
standard of education, particularly in engineering and technical services, may 
not meet the demand in the industry. Hence, IOCs are constantly looking for 
ways of evading implementation of the policy. This has a direct link to the 
compliance parameter of the model, as the findings revealed that a lack of 
infrastructure leads to non-compliance of the policy. 
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6.10.3 Enforcement  
Proper enforcement of the LCP will result in the effective implementation of the 
policy in the oil and gas industry. The enforcement of the LCP lies solely with 
the NCDMB. It is the responsibility of the NCDMB to ensure compliance of the 
policy and build the capacity of indigenous companies in the industry (Ovadia 
2013).  Its function includes administering, coordinating, monitoring, 
supervising, appraising and managing LCP implementation (Ado 2010). This 
also aligns with institutional theory where organisations in a field are pressured 
to seek legitimacy through socially and culturally sanctioned administrative 
routines intended to render accountability (Scott 1995; Ezzamel et al. 2007). 
The NCDMB is also responsible for the development of indigenous companies’ 
capabilities and producing guidelines for LCP implementation (Ihua 2010; Ado 
2016). This is directly related to the “Adequate Metric”, “Efficiency 
Consideration”, “Information Dissemination” and the “Acknowledgement of 
Spin-off Benefit” of the LCP model 
. As stated by Ado (2016), “Adequate Metric” establishes what constitutes the 
LCP, which includes setting LCP targets. In establishing these targets, 
regulators have to ensure the technological capacity available in the industry 
will be able to carry out the opportunities created by the policy (Hansen et al. 
2015). 
“Efficiency Consideration”, is concerned with fulfilling LC targets, where oil and 
gas companies have to use the resources available to implement the policy. 
These targets should be realistic and within the capability of the indigenous 
companies in the industry (Klueh et al. 2010; Tordo et al. 2013; and Ado 2016). 
However, the findings from this study revealed that the Nigerian LCP is too 
ambitious and the target is unrealistic as it tries to achieve too many things at 
the same time. This is supported by Okafor and Ancihe (2014) and Erhun 
(2015) who found that the NCDMB lacks the ability to develop the required 
capability to close the capacity gap created, due to the shortfalls between 
available indigenous capacity and the opportunities created by the LCP. 
Therefore, IOCs find it difficult to comply with the demands placed on them by 
the LCP. Furthermore, the NCDMB lacks the qualified staff necessary to enforce 
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the policy, which has resulted in the absence of field verification skills and 
subsequently the non-compliance of LCP requirements.  
In addition, “Information Dissemination” is integral to the success of the LCP. 
It relies on the extent to which indigenous companies, IOCs and regulatory 
bodies are transparent in their activities in the industry (Ado 2016). However, 
this study revealed that there was a lack of trust and information sharing 
between the stakeholders in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. For instance, 
IOCs are reluctant to share information with indigenous companies because 
they do not want to lose their position in the industry. In addition, there was a 
consensus among the research participants that there is no available 
information regarding the management of the NCDF. Hence, as stated in 
Section 5.3.1, more needs to be done to improve the level of transparency in 
LCP implementation. 
The “Acknowledgement of Spin-off Benefits” which deals with the economic 
linkage between a country’s oil and gas industry and other sectors of the 
economy is facilitated by the three other parameters. For example, the NCDMB 
creates and enforces LC targets (metrics) which are communicated to the 
various stakeholders in the industry (information dissemination) who then use 
the available resources (efficiency consideration) to operate and develop 
economic linkage (benefit).  
6.11 Strategies in implementing the LCP model  
6.11.1 Participation and Infrastructure Development  
The findings revealed that infrastructure (efficiency consideration) is key to the 
success of LCP implementation. For instance, research participant RB7 argued 
that for capacity building to be complete, infrastructure in Nigeria must be 
developed. In addition, the provision of education by institutions and institutes 
must be improved. As pointed out by Fawibe (2014), funding should be 
provided by the NCDF fund for research and development and for upgrading 
the standard of educational and research institutions. Furthermore, RB1 argued 
if the necessary infrastructures are put in place, it would be easier for 
indigenous companies to participate in the industry. As stated by LOC4, LOC7 
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and RB1, most indigenous companies provide critical resources and 
infrastructures in order to participate in the industry, whereas most IOCs only 
invest in local infrastructure when it is of benefit to them. Furthermore, the 
government should invest in educational institutions to facilitate capacity 
building. With regards to capacity building, Well and Hawkins (2008) pointed 
out that promoting local content is not the same as capacity building, although 
there is a link. For instance, patronising a local supplier is one means of building 
their capacity. However, building the capacity of a local supplier by training 
them, will improve their ability and chances to tender and win a contract in the 
oil and gas industry (Well and Hawkins 2008). As stated by IOC6, IOCs should 
be motivated to partner with indigenous companies to improve the level of 
indigenous capacity in the industry. One way of creating capacity is by entering 
into joint ventures with foreign companies, where local companies can benefit 
from capacity development (information dissemination) by working as partners 
with the foreign companies. 
Access to funds was also identified in Section 6.3.1 as a barrier to indigenous 
company participation in the industry. Without the necessary funds, indigenous 
companies are limited in their ability to invest and meet the financial 
requirements for participation. This is because banks and financial institutions 
believe that lending to indigenous companies is risky and unattractive due to 
the high cost of transactions and limited funds. Banks require significant 
collateral and high-interest rates, which is a challenge for indigenous companies 
(IPIECA 2011). Research participants IOC1, RB1 and RB2 stated that 
indigenous companies should be given access to the capital required to partake 
in the industry. In addition, financial institutions can partner with MNCs and 
IOCs to help indigenous companies access more sustainable funding sources 
(IPIECA 2011). Moreover, IOC1 and IOC5 argued in favour of transparency, 
(information dissemination) in the management of the Nigerian Content 
Development Fund (NCDF). Therefore, all transactions arising from the NCDF 
should be made available to the public to ensure transparent utilisation of the 
resource. Furthermore, the NCDMB must ensure that the NCDF is used to 
encourage local participation, create employment and develop infrastructure. 
In addition, as stated by Fawibe (2014), reputable financial institutions should 
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also be employed to review the business plans of proposed indigenous 
companies, advise and manage the NCDF in collaboration with the NCDMB.  
6.11.2 Adequate enforcement of the LCP 
The findings revealed that there has been inadequate enforcement of the LCP 
in the industry. LOC7 and RB4 argued that the NOGCID Act is adequate. 
However, there is inadequate enforcement as the NCDMB lacks the regulatory 
framework to enforce the policy. Likewise, RB6 also confirmed the inability of 
the NCDMB by stating that there was no field verification by the NCDMB to 
substantiate the reports presented by oil and gas companies with regard to 
their LCP implementation. Thus, Ovadia (2013) stated that the enforcement of 
the LCP in Nigeria has been informal, as the NCDMB has yet to cancel projects 
or issue fines. Rather, when they discover any violation they chose to negotiate 
with the companies and this creates a level of discretion in the enforcement 
process that can be abused. This confirms the complaints of research 
participants, IOC4, LOC2, RB4 and RB6 regarding the inability of the NCDMB 
to sanction companies that default in the implementation of the LCP. For 
instance, RB6 stated that he was yet to hear of any company that has been 
sanctioned for not implementing the LCP in their organisation. 
Okafor and Aniche (2014) pointed out that strict enforcement of the LCP in the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry will create jobs and reduce the level of restlessness 
in youths living in the Niger Delta. To achieve strict compliance, LOC2 stated 
that the NCDMB should oversee the appointment of LC managers for oil and 
gas companies in Nigeria. This would eliminate politics interference and give 
the NCDMB the sole responsibility of monitoring staff activities in the company. 
IOC3 also stated that the Nigerian government should step back and leave the 
monitoring process to the NCDMB. Although the Act gives sole responsibility to 
the NCDMB, the Ministry of Petroleum may, nonetheless, issue directives to the 
NCDMB in respect to the implementation of the LCP (Nwaokoro 2014). The 
LCP’s definition of operators includes the NNPC, its joint venture partners and 
subsidiaries operating in the Nigerian oil and gas industry, which include the 
NCDMB. 
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Nwaokoro (2014) questioned the possibility of the NCDMB enforcing the policy 
on the NNPC. Although its goal is to compel foreign companies to utilise local 
resources, it also imposes the obligation on the NNPC and this raises 
enforcement issues, especially if enforcement is transferred from the NNPC to 
the NCDMB.  It also raises the question of how the NCDMB will compel the NNPC 
to comply (Nwaokoro 2014). To strengthen the monitoring process, the 
government must step back and give sole responsibility of enforcing Nigerian 
LCP to the NCDMB.  
6.12 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter presented a critical discussion of LCP implementation in the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry. It also identified the various perceptions of LCP 
stakeholders. These include the opinion that the LCP should be regarded as a 
tool for indigenous participation and the utilisation of local resource and 
personnel in the activities of the Nigerian oil and gas industry. Other perceptions 
are that the LCP facilitates technology transfer from IOCs to indigenous 
companies, encourages value retention and it is a deliberate policy created by 
the Nigerian government. Furthermore, a closer look at the various perceptions 
of the LCP by stakeholders’ in the industry indicate that these views are closely 
linked and these perceptions are aligned with the adequate metric parameter 
of the accountability framework in Figure 3.2. For instance, the LCP as a tool 
for value retention instigates the active participation of Nigerians through the 
employment of the local workforce and the utilisation of local resources in the 
industry’s activities. Hence, a model for LCP perception was developed based 
on the opinions held by the research participants and the adequate metric 
parameter of the accountability framework. Regarding the capabilities of 
indigenous companies in the oil and gas industry, the study revealed that 
preference is given to indigenous companies with the capability to execute jobs 
in the industry. As a result, new companies have emerged. However, the study 
also identified several hindrances to indigenous participation. The research 
found that indigenous companies lack the necessary funds to partake in the 
industry. Indigenous companies complained that they have no access to the 
NCDF, which was created to assist indigenous companies to participate in the 
industry. It also found that the NCDMB enforces the LCP, irrespective of the 
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capabilities available in the industry. The study further revealed that the 
principal motive behind the partnerships formed between IOCs and indigenous 
companies is that the policy mandates that IOCs must collaborate with 
indigenous companies in order to be able to operate in the industry. However, 
it was also revealed that the IOCs believe indigenous companies lack the ability 
to participate in the industry and can only be utilised as a means of bidding for 
contracts. The study showed that this is due to the inability of the NCDMB to 
effectively enforce LCP implementation in the industry. 
The study further developed an LCP model by modifying Figure 3.2 after taking 
into consideration the research findings. The model illustrates the elements and 
accountability parameters required for effective LCP implementation. 
Furthermore, it presents strategies for implementing the LCP model. 
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Chapter 7 
Contribution to Knowledge, Conclusion and Recommendation 
7.1 Introduction 
This study presents a substantiated analysis of the LCP, awareness of the 
subject, its effect and its implementation by oil and gas companies in Nigeria. 
It follows the outline created for this study, including the research aim and 
objectives as stated in Chapter 1. The research comprises of an analysis of LCP 
practices and an evaluation of its effectiveness, with reference to accountability 
practices in the implementation of LCP and strategies that can be employed to 
improve implementation in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. There was a 
further objective of creating a model for LCP implementation, with this being 
one of the notable new contributions to knowledge arising from this work. The 
methodological approaches utilised to achieve the aforementioned objectives 
include: 
1. An extensive review of the literature and other relevant 
information regarding the LCP in both the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry and from a global context was presented in Chapter 2. 
2. Chapter 3 outlined an extensive review of the theoretical literature 
and established a new framework based on institutional theory. 
3. The methodology and an extensive justification for the use of 
qualitative methods were presented in Chapter 4. 
4. The expansive data collected was presented and analysed in 
Chapter five. 
5. In Chapter 6 a critical discussion was offered to explore the 
findings in relation to relevant literature on the LCP and thereafter 
a model for this study was created. 
This chapter now goes on to present the overall conclusions of the study. 
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7.2 Summary of key findings and implications 
Chapters 5 and 6 revealed the various stakeholders’ views of the LCP. These 
views include the perception that the LCP is a tool for enhancing the 
participation of Nigerian citizens.  It was also perceived as a tool encouraging 
the utilisation of local resources in industry activities. Moreover, the LCP is also 
considered to be a tool facilitating knowledge and technology transfer from IOCs 
to indigenous companies. Hence, the LCP is regarded as a deliberate policy 
established by the Nigerian government to give the people of Nigeria control 
over their oil and gas industry.  However, it was also found that oil and gas 
companies have devised ways to evade the implementation of the LCP in the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry. Evidence indicates that IOCs form corrupt joint 
venture partnerships with indigenous companies, whereby indigenous 
companies act as middlemen by outsourcing oil and gas contracts to IOCs for 
marginal profit. Hence, some IOCs are resistant to LCP implementation as they 
do not want to lose their dominant position in the industry.  
The study has also illustrated the relationship between the IOCs and indigenous 
companies in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. It revealed that IOCs partner 
with indigenous companies in order to win contracts, while indigenous 
companies partner with IOCs with a view of gaining knowledge to help them 
partake in activities in the industry. Moreover, the research also revealed the 
IOCs’ perceptions of indigenous companies operating in the industry. These 
included the IOCs’ opinion that indigenous companies lack the knowledge and 
experience to operate in a technology-intensive industry like the oil and gas 
industry. It also identified the lack of trust between IOCs and indigenous 
companies. The IOCs believe that indigenous companies’ participation will 
reduce the IOCs’ business opportunities – as the LCP intended. However, it was 
found that in order to partake in the Nigerian oil and gas industry, IOCs have 
trained Nigerians by partnering with indigenous companies and training 
Nigerians through different apprenticeship and internship programs. This 
implies that although the IOCs are reluctant to partner with indigenous 
companies, they are compelled to do so by the LCP.  
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The study has shown that there is a lack of resources available to assist oil and 
gas companies implement the LCP. It was also found that inadequate 
infrastructure, capital and the quality of educational institutions was a 
hindrance to the implementation of the LCP. The findings revealed that, in most 
cases, oil and gas companies provide critical infrastructure in order to take part 
in the industry, while other companies only consider investing in local 
infrastructure when it is of benefit to them. It also found that IOCs have better 
credit facilities and access to necessary technology, unlike indigenous 
companies that struggle to obtain the necessary capital and resources. 
Furthermore the NCDF, that is meant for capacity building, credit facilities and 
providing incentives for indigenous companies, has not fulfilled these 
objectives. This is due to the lack of transparency in the management of the 
fund and the fact that no procedures have been established for disbursing funds 
to indigenous companies. This implies that the IOCs continue to have 
competitive advantage. Although the LCP offers some benefits to indigenous 
companies, they are being hindered by inadequate infrastructure and the lack 
of management of the NCDF. 
However, it was overwhelmingly acknowledged that there have been some 
positive effects arising from the implementation of the LCP. It was revealed that 
the LCP compelled IOCs to utilise local resources in their operations, thereby, 
resulting in the domestication of oil and gas activities in Nigeria. The LCP has 
given preference to indigenous companies and has resulted in local employment 
and a reduction of capital flight out of Nigeria. As a result of partnerships 
between IOCs and indigenous companies, Nigerians have acquired the 
necessary skills to partake in the industry, thus the number of start-up 
companies in the industry has risen. This implies that since the creation of the 
LCP, the number of indigenous companies in the industry has increased. As 
such, the upsurge in the utilisation of local resources has increased value 
retention in Nigeria and the Nigerian oil and gas industry. 
Despite the positive impacts, there were a number of concerns regarding the 
policy including the lack transparency in the implementation of the LCP. 
Transparency is of course a relative concept. It also relies on oil and gas 
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companies to push for the transparent implementation of the LCP in their 
operations. The lack of transparency in LCP implementation arises from various 
factors including: the lack of trust between IOCs and indigenous companies; 
inadequacies of the NCDMB in enforcing LCP; and, the IOCs’ negative 
perception of indigenous companies. However, the research findings indicate 
that oil and gas companies actually believed that improvements need to be 
made to monitoring levels. The lack of monitoring arises from the poor 
institutional and inadequate monitoring mechanisms used by the NCDMB. 
Monitoring expires after the pre-qualification stage and when the contract has 
been awarded. Thereby, companies evade the essential task of monitoring LCP 
violations, which usually occur at the implementation phase of a project. This 
implies that the monitoring process at the pre-qualification stage is adequate; 
however, the monitoring process at the implementation phase needs to be 
improved. Furthermore, the NCDMB must improve its regulatory framework in 
order to facilitate enforcement of the LCP. 
7.3 Addressing the research objectives 
The research had the broad aim of obtaining an understanding and exploring 
the LCP, as well as evaluating its effectiveness and the transparency practices 
associated with its implementation. This was achieved by using relevant 
literature to develop a theoretical framework that facilitated the data collection 
process. The study revealed the shareholders’ different perceptions of the LCP. 
It also revealed that the LCP has had a positive effect on the Nigerian oil and 
gas industry since its implementation, but there has been a lack of transparency 
in the implementation of the LCP in the industry. 
The first objective of the study was: 
 ‘To critically evaluate the effectiveness of the Nigerian LCP and its impact 
on the Nigerian oil and gas industry.' 
This objective aligns with the accountability framework of the LCP, specifically 
the adequate metric component and the acknowledgement of spin-off benefits 
which have been the effect of the LCP on the Nigerian economy. This objective 
was achieved as the findings from the data analysis revealed that the LCP has 
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presented advantages to indigenous companies in the award of contracts which 
has also helped in the employment and training of Nigerians in the oil and gas 
industry. Also, as a result of the LCP, local resources are now utilised in the 
industry’s operations.  This has led to the domestication of activities and has 
facilitated value retention, which has improved the Nigerian economy. However, 
it also revealed the barriers to the implementation of the LCP, which include 
the lack of necessary resources to allow indigenous companies to operate in the 
oil and gas industry. Hence, infrastructure development is vital for the success 
of the LCP in Nigeria. Moreover, it illustrated that the LCP was enforced 
irrespective of the capacity available to implement the policy. 
The second objective of the study was: 
‘To critically examine the transparency practices in the implementation 
of the LCP in the Nigerian oil and gas industry.' 
This objective fall under information dissemination and adequate metric aspects 
of the LCP’s accountability framework, which deal with transparency practices. 
This objective was achieved by analysing data collected on the degree of 
transparency in the implementation of the LCP in the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry. The research findings have shown that there is a requirement to 
improve the transparency practices in the implementation of LCP in the 
industry.  
The third objective of the study was: 
‘To critically evaluate how transparency has been integrated into LCP 
implementation in the Nigerian oil and gas industry.' 
This objective also falls under the information dissemination and adequate 
metric aspects of the accountability framework of the LCP. This objective was 
achieved as the data analysis revealed that companies embed the LCP in project 
contracts and company policies to ensure transparency in LCP implementation. 
It also revealed that some oil and gas companies have internal monitoring 
teams that conduct site verification to ensure the LCP is implemented. However, 
although the study indicated that monitoring, measurement, disclosure and 
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compliance are ways in which transparency could be further integrated with 
LCP implementation, it also discovered that the NCDMB lacks the monitoring 
capabilities to enforce the LCP as well as structures or frameworks to measure 
the effect of the LCP in the industry.  
Finally, the fourth objective of the study was:  
‘To design a model for the LCP implementation for the Nigerian oil and 
gas industry.'  
This study developed two models for the implementation of the LCP. The first 
model is the LCP stakeholders’ perception model and this was developed from 
the data analysis which showed the different stakeholders’ perceptions of the 
LCP. It explores the various pillars of the LCP and its interconnectedness, which 
can help oil and gas companies learn about the LCP and its implementation.  
The second model, the LCP implementation model and was created by 
comprehensively modifying the accountability framework for the LCP in Figure 
3.2 to include the opinions of the various research participants interviewed. The 
model suggests a transparent process for implementing the LCP in the industry; 
it highlights the need for adequate enforcement from the NCDMB and support 
from the Nigerian government to create a secure environment in which oil and 
gas companies can operate. Furthermore, it underlined the need for the 
government to develop the infrastructure in Nigeria to enhance LCP 
implementation. Access to funds was highlighted as a key obstacle to the 
successful implementation of the LCP. When funds are available, the findings 
show that there is a lack of transparency in their management. Hence, the 
model indicates that access to funds and the management of funds should be 
considered as a process of improving transparency in the implementation of the 
LCP. The model also stressed the need for effective participation between IOCs 
and indigenous companies to facilitate capacity building and increase the level 
of participation of Nigerians in the industry. 
From a theoretical perspective, this study highlights the existing gap in LCP 
research and the issues of LCP development and shows that implementation 
and enforcement have been a challenge for IOCs, indigenous companies and 
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regulatory bodies in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. From the proposed 
models, an LCP approach is directly associated with the companies’ knowledge 
of the LCP, which informs not only how companies can implement the LCP in 
their operations, but also their approach in complying with LCP rules. Although 
the LCP plays a key role in the Nigerian oil and gas industry, findings reveal 
resistance to its implementation, thereby leading to a lack of transparency in 
implementing the LCP in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. Furthermore, due to 
the poor regulatory framework, oil and gas companies are not held accountable 
for their actions when violating LCP rules in the industry. Again, this specific 
issue has not been investigated by other studies. Hence, the proposed models 
developed for this study can play a key role in embracing LCP implementation 
and enforcing the compliance of oil and gas companies in the Nigerian oil and 
gas industry. 
7.4 Contribution to knowledge 
This study set out to critically evaluate the effectiveness of the LCP and the 
transparency practices associated with its implementation. It tried to provide 
evidence of the effectiveness of the LCP and the transparency of practices in 
the implementation of the LCP in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. It has made 
significant contributions to the body of knowledge in three main areas:  
1.  Theoretical Contribution. This study has attempted to contribute to the 
theoretical debate on institutional theory in relation to accountability in 
evaluating the effectiveness and transparent practices of LCP implementation 
in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. It developed a conceptual framework that 
incorporates Klueh et al.’s (2007) principles of the LCP in relation to various 
forms of accountability, to create the interview schedule used to generate data 
for this research. The interview questions and research objectives were 
structured around the LCP’s accountability framework.  The adequate metric 
aspect of the model helped reveal the different stakeholders’ views of the LCP 
in the industry and how it influenced their activities in the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry. The efficiency consideration helped to highlight the effect of LCP 
implementation in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. It also assisted to identify 
the barriers to LCP implementation. Furthermore, in evaluating the 
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transparency practices in the implementation of the LCP, the information 
dissemination aspect of the framework disclosed the degree of transparency 
and how transparency has been integrated into LCP implementation. The study 
discovered that the current level of transparency needs to be improved and that 
the NCDMB lacks the monitoring capability to enforce the LCP in the industry.  
Another theoretical contribution arose from after the modification of the 
accountability framework to include the research findings from this research 
which will be discussed further in the practical contribution section. 
2.  Methodological contributions. The discussion in Chapter 6 presents 
several key findings: stakeholders’ perception of the LCP; the IOCs’ motivation 
to partner with indigenous companies; the capabilities of indigenous companies 
in the oil and gas industry; the enforcement, monitoring and accountability for 
LCP implementation; NCDF management; and the knowledge and spin-off 
effect of the LCP. The study employs an inductive method, using thematic 
analysis to inform this research. The originality of this study is seen in the work 
undertaken and its interpretation using themes generated from the data 
collection. The findings reveal that utilising this method provides a detailed and 
comprehensive understanding of the LCP and its implementation in the Nigerian 
oil and gas industry.  This is in contrast with existing research on the LCP which 
has analysed data deductively, using quantitative research methodology (see 
for example: Takechi and Kiyono 2003; Veloso 2006; Vaaland et al. 2012).  
3.   Practical contributions. The practical contribution of this study lies in its 
aim of evaluating the effectiveness of the LCP and the transparency practices 
associated with its implementation. The research highlighted the barriers to LCP 
implementation and the resulting difficulties faced by indigenous companies in 
implementing the LCP. It went further to recommend strategies to improve the 
implementation of the LCP and enhance indigenous company participation in 
the industry. A number of the strategies proposed include strengthening the 
LCP’s monitoring and enforcement processes in the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry. An LCP implementation model was created to enhance 
implementation. This model will help the NCDMB facilitate enforcement of the 
policy and also improve the participation of Nigerian citizens and indigenous 
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companies in the oil and gas industry. Furthermore, the LCP implementation 
model developed can be used to carry out a comparative analysis of LCP 
implementation of oil and gas producing countries. In addition, further studies 
can utilise a different methodological approach to test the LCP implementation 
model in the Nigerian oil and gas industry and in other oil producing countries.  
7.5 Recommendations 
Following the various findings of this study and in line with the research aims 
and objectives, several recommendations that will be useful to all stakeholders 
in the Nigerian oil and gas industry are highlighted below.  
7.5.1 Government 
The government should provide a conducive environment for business to attract 
foreign investors. This includes the provision of the necessary infrastructures 
such as security measures, good roads and power supply in the country for 
indigenous businesses to thrive. Insecurity, the lack of adequate policies and 
legislation, unsophisticated technologies, human capabilities and a shortage of 
infrastructure have all created an unconducive environment for potential 
investors in Nigeria. The findings revealed that the government must invest in 
infrastructure development and create adequate policies that will attract foreign 
investment into the country. As emphasised by Adedeji et al. (2015), indicators 
for measuring indigenous companies’ participation include business 
opportunities, a favourable environment, financial accessibility, technical skills, 
and incentives. Therefore, the government must recognise the fact that these 
key indicators create a favourable environment for conducting business in 
Nigeria. 
In addition, considering the standard of education in Nigeria, there is an urgent 
need for the government to invest in the educational sector. These should 
include up to date practical and theoretical materials and equipment to absorb 
the knowledge and technology transfer coming from the oil and gas industry. 
The government should also assist the Nigerian financial sector in making 
available the necessary funds required by indigenous companies to participate 
in the oil and gas industry. This will help give indigenous companies competitive 
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advantage in the industry. Findings from this research showed lack of 
enforcement has hindered LCP implementation in the industry. The government 
should assume its responsibility and ensure adequate compliance and 
enforcement of the Nigerian LCP. The government should ensure that 
enforcement is strictly the responsibility of the NCDMB and there should be no 
interference from the Nigerian government. Furthermore, there should be 
realistic consideration in regards to the LCP targets in the industry. 
There is a need to review the section of the NOGICD Act that creates loopholes 
for corrupt practices, namely, where the NCDMB can accept gifts in the form of 
land, money from any individual or organisation. 
7.5.2 Other Stakeholders 
In order to ensure capacity building and technology transfer, IOCs should 
partner with indigenous companies in technical operations to develop the 
necessary core skills. Efforts should also be made to promote partnership and 
collaboration between indigenous companies and IOCs and to encourage 
investment in world-class infrastructure that can compete with international 
standards. 
IOCs and indigenous companies should partner with educational institutions for 
programmes such as research and development, and knowledge and 
technological transfer. IOCs should avoid negative practices such as using 
indigenous companies as a front to secure contracts in the industry. Rather they 
should invest in capacity building initiatives, job creation and genuine 
collaboration with indigenous companies.  
7.6 Limitations and future research 
As with other research, this study is not without its limitations. First, the sample 
size was limited to 24 participants and it can be argued that this small sample 
can affect the validity of the research. However, given the data saturation effect 
and the depth of the information gathered from the analysis, this study provides 
a profound advancement of LCP knowledge, implementation and enforcement 
in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. Qualitative methodology was adopted for 
this research as discussed in the methodology chapter. Moreover, this research 
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can be verified through a further study utilising a different methodological 
approach. For instance, additional research can be carried out to ascertain the 
results of this study using a quantitative methodology approach, for example, 
surveying the different stakeholders in the industry using a questionnaire 
instrument. The data generated can be utilized to conduct a comparative 
analysis of LCP implementation in other oil and gas producing countries such 
as; Norway, Canada, Ghana, Brazil and Angola. 
This research originally sought to conduct a comparative analysis of LCP 
implementation in Norway, Brazil and Angola with data collected from Nigeria. 
However, due to the time and financial constraints, the study focused on 
Nigeria, providing only a brief review of the literature on LCP from a global 
perspective. Nevertheless, questions were put to the participants regarding 
countries with adequate LCP and what Nigeria could learn from them. The 
outcome of this can be seen in section 5.6.  By reviewing the LCP from a global 
perspective, this research provides a platform for a comparative study on LCP 
implementation in different oil and gas producing countries.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Code sheet  
    
Code Sheet 
1.0 Knowledge of the Nigerian local content policy 
1.1 Adequate participation 
1.2 Utilisation of local resources/personnel  
1.3 Role of company 
1.4 Personnel and materials  
1.5 Deliberate policy 
1.6 Value retention  
1.7 Beyond human capital development  
1.8 Technological transfer 
1.9 Collaboration 
1.10 Others 
 
2.0 IOC’s role 
2.1 Role as middle men 
2.2 Partnership/Collaboration with local companies 
2.3 Perception about local companies  
2.3.1 locals ability to withstand pressure  
2.3.2 lack of experience  
2.3.3 opinion on local companies’ performance  
2.4 Training/ Human capital development  
2.4.1 Internship 
2.4.2 Transfer of expertise  
2.4.3 Employment and Training plan 
 
3.0 Impact of policy 
3.1 Positive Impact 
3.1.1 Investment  
3.1.2 Gives local companies advantage  
3.1.4      Employment  
3.1.5      Skills acquisition/ capacity building 
3.1.6      Domestication  
3.1.7       Reduction in capital flight   
3.1.8       Collaboration with other sectors  
3.2  Negative impact 
 3.2.1 Inefficiency in the industry  
3.2.2 Increase in cost  
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3.2.3 Enforcing the law irrespective of the capacity  
4.0 Strategies to improve the policy 
3.3 Enforcement 
3.4 Enabling environment 
4.2.1 Security  
3.5 Sanction  
3.6 Stakeholders involvement  
3.7 Manpower  
3.8 Access to funds  
4.6.1 Management of funds  
3.9 Capacity building  
3.10 Incentives 
3.11 Empowerment (Exxon) 
3.12 Short of staff  
3.13 Infrastructural improvement 
3.14 Transparency  
3.15 Domiciliation  
3.16 Nigerians in Diaspora 
3.17 Petroleum Industry Bill  
 
4 Resources available for implementing the policy 
4.2 Training  
4.3 Access to funds 
4.4 Lack of infrastructures 
4.4.3 insufficient power supply 
4.4.4 acceptability of local products 
4.5 Government support (security) 
 
5 Employability 
5.2 Partnership/collaboration 
6.1.1 Succession Plan 
5.3 Skill development  
5.4 Reduction in foreign workforce 
6.3.1 Reduction in expatriates doing menial jobs  
5.5 Expatriate quota system 
5.6 Preference to Nigerian manpower 
5.7 Trust  
 
6 Procedures for ensuring transparency 
6.2 Monitoring 
6.2.3 Monitoring and evaluation system  
6.2.4 Measurement  
6.2.5 Shortcut to implement policy 
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 Disclosure 
6.3 Stakeholder involvement 
6.4 Enforcement  
6.4.3 submitting reports  
6.4.4 reports are not time bound  
6.4.5 local content plan 
6.5 Embedded in contracts/ company policy 
6.6 Compliance  
 
7 Level of transparency 
7.2 lots of work to be done  
7.3 MNC do better jobs  
7.4 Relative  
7.5 Implementation phase 
7.6 100% transparent 
7.7 Skeptical   
 
8 Agencies responsible for  the policy 
8.2 Too many regulatory bodies 
8.3 Lack coordination 
8.4 Manpower 
8.5 No qualification  
 
9 Level of the Nigeria  local content policy 
9.2 50% 
9.3 4-5 but not 6 
9.4 10 
9.5 4 
9.6 4  
9.7 5 
9.8 3 
 
10 Incentives 
10.2 local sourcing  
10.3 substandard products  
10.4 no benefit 
10.5 government support  
10.6 Clause 48  
10.7 Others  
 
11 Subcontracting  
11.2 Joint venture/partnership  
13.1.1 Knowledge transfer  
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11.3 Outsourcing  
11.4 Standard  
 
12 lessons learnt from countries with effective policy 
12.2 Community involvement  
12.2.3 Malaysia  
12.2.4 Norway   
12.3 Local capacity development/Logistics  
12.3.3 Brazil 
12.3.4 Norway 
12.3.5 United Kingdom 
12.3.6 United States 
12.3.7 Angola  
12.4 Professionalism  
12.4.3 Malaysia  
12.4.4 Trinidad and Tobago 
12.5 Domiciliation  
12.5.3 Dubai 
12.5.4 Trinidad and Tobago 
12.5.5 Angola 
12.5.6 Norway 
12.6 Stimulate Investment  
12.6.3 Trinidad and Tobago  
12.6.4 Norway 
12.7 Frame Agreement  
12.7.3 Trinidad and Tobago  
12.7.4 Angola 
12.8 Monitoring 
13.7.1 Malaysia   
13 Barriers to successful implementation  
13.2.3 Lack of infrastructure  
13.2.4 Lack of power 
13.2.5 Insufficient capital 
13.2.6 Lack of capacity  
13.2.7 Low oil price  
13.2.8 Ambitious policy 
13.2.9 Others 
Random Codes 
Biometric capture system 
Entrepreneurship  
Linkage  
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Appendix 2: Consent letter 
                                                                                       
   Consent Form for Participants 
                                                          
The evaluation of accountability practices in the implementation of the 
Nigerian local content policy in the Nigerian oil and gas industry 
Consent Form for Participants 
I have read the Participant Information Sheet for this study and have had the details 
of the study explained to me. My questions about the study have been answered to my 
satisfaction, and I understand that I may ask further questions at any time.  
 
I also understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time, or to decline 
to answer any particular questions in the study. I understand I can withdraw any 
information I have provided up until the researcher has commenced analysis on my 
data. I agree to provide information to the researchers under the conditions of 
confidentiality set out on the Participant Information Sheet.  
 
I agree to participate in this study under the conditions set out in the Participant 
Information Sheet. 
Signed: _____________________________________________ 
Name:  _____________________________________________ 
Date:  ____________________________________________ 
 
Researcher: Oguagha Udechukwu Offordile 
u.o.oguagha@rgu.ac.uk  
Supervisor: Dr Abhishek Agarwal 
a.agarwal@rgu.ac.uk  
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Appendix 3: Interview questions 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
To critically evaluate the extent of local content policy implementation 
in the Nigerian oil and gas industry 
1. What is your knowledge of the Nigerian local content policy? 
2. In your own view what are the drivers promoting the implementation of 
the Nigerian local content policy? 
3. In what way is your organisation involved in the implementation of the 
Nigerian local content policy? 
4. To what extent does this policy aid in the running of the Nigerian oil and 
gas industry? 
5. Are there any specific initiatives and incentives in this policy that 
supports the use of local resources and local workforce in the activities 
in the oil and gas industry? 
6. How has the implementation of the Nigerian local content policy affected 
the oil and gas industry? 
7. How has the implementation of the Nigerian local content policy affected 
the employability of the local workforce in the oil and gas sector? 
8.  How has the implementation of the Nigerian local content policy affected 
the proportion of the foreign workforce in the industry? 
9. Can you comment on the level of the local workforce currently employed 
in your industry/organisation? 
10.Have you dealt with or came across sub-contracting procurement or 
technical services to other companies, and in what capacity? 
11.How do you approach the selection of sub-contractors among IOC’s and 
local companies? 
12.How has the implementation of the local content policy influenced your 
selection criteria? 
13.What are the infrastructures in place in implementing the local content 
policy in the oil and gas sector? 
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14.What is your view about the resources available for indigenous firms to 
meet up with the local content requirements? 
15.Has the IOC implemented the local content policy in their activities in the 
oil and gas industry? 
16.In terms of training and technological transfer has the IOC implemented 
the local content policy in their oil and gas activities in Nigeria? 
17.What strategies can be most effective in improving the local content 
policy in the Nigerian oil and gas industry? 
 
To critically evaluate the extent of accountability in the implementation 
of local content policy in the Nigerian oil and gas industry- institutional 
approach and strategies within the accountability framework. 
1. What is your view about the level of transparency in the implementation 
of local content policy in the oil and gas industry? 
2. What are the procedures used to ensure transparency in the implement 
of the Nigerian local content policy? 
3. How are these procedures implemented, and enforced? 
4. Which government agencies or regulatory bodies are responsible for the 
implementation of the Nigerian local content policy? 
5. In what way does NCDMB, government and NNPC measure performance 
of the local content implementation in the Nigerian oil and gas industry? 
6. To what extent does the government and NNPC act as a facilitator in the 
implementation of the local content policy? 
7. In monitoring the implementation of the policy in the oil and gas industry, 
how does NCDMB ensure transparency in their operation? 
8. In the implementation of the policy in your organisation, how does you 
organisation ensure transparency in their operation? 
9. Can you comment on the level of transparency in the bidding and 
implementation phase of any project in the Nigerian oil and gas industry?  
10.How does your organisation comply with the implementation of the local 
content policy in your organisation?  
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11.How do you collaborate with the NCDMB in implementing this policy in 
your organisation? 
12.Are you satisfied with the current assessment practice of the NCDMB and 
its operators or are there areas where you feel they can do better? (for 
local companies)  
13.What changes in regulations, economic incentives, and policies are 
needed to improve the implementation of the Nigerian local content 
policy? 
14.Is the law adequate to ensure compliance in the implementation of local 
content policy in the oil and gas industry 
15.Are there mandated reports your company submits to NCDMB? How 
often do you submit this report? 
16.Are there consequences for not submitting these reports? 
 
To draw lessons from international best practices and accountability 
mechanism for implementing local content policy in the oil and gas 
industry  
1. In your view, are there effective local content policies in other oil 
producing countries? 
2.       Looking at other oil producing countries that have effective local 
content policy, what approach can be developed or applied to improve 
the Nigerian local content policy?     
3. In your view, what changes are needed in the regulatory framework for 
improved implementation of the local content policy in the Nigerian oil 
and gas industry?     
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Appendix 4: Supervisor’s consent letter 
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Appendix 5: Node sheet 
Name Memo 
Link 
Sources References Created 
On 
Created 
By 
Modified 
On 
Modified 
By 
 
1.0 Knowledge of the 
Nigerian local content 
policy 
 3 3 04/11/2015 
10:22 
U.O 29/11/2015 
03:46 
U.O  
1.1 Adequate 
participation 
 9 14 04/11/2015 
10:23 
U.O 29/11/2015 
02:12 
U.O  
1.10 Others  1 1 04/11/2015 
10:34 
U.O 19/11/2015 
17:13 
U.O  
1.2 Utilisation of 
local resources and 
personnel 
 7 7 04/11/2015 
10:24 
U.O 29/11/2015 
03:22 
U.O  
1.3 Role of 
company 
 4 5 04/11/2015 
10:24 
U.O 19/11/2015 
14:04 
U.O  
1.5 Deliberate 
policy 
 5 6 04/11/2015 
10:27 
U.O 29/11/2015 
03:22 
U.O  
1.6 Value retention  5 6 04/11/2015 
10:28 
U.O 29/11/2015 
01:34 
U.O  
1.7 Beyond human 
capital 
development 
 1 1 04/11/2015 
10:31 
U.O 19/11/2015 
16:06 
U.O  
1.8 Technological 
transfer 
 8 9 04/11/2015 
10:31 
U.O 29/11/2015 
02:13 
U.O  
1.9 Collaboration  0 0 04/11/2015 
10:33 
U.O 14/11/2015 
14:39 
U.O  
11.0 Incentives  1 2 04/11/2015 
12:48 
U.O 27/11/2015 
16:14 
U.O  
11.1 Local sourcing  5 6 04/11/2015 
12:48 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:12 
U.O  
11.2 government 
support 
 4 4 04/11/2015 
12:49 
U.O 27/11/2015 
16:16 
U.O  
11.3 no benefit  5 7 04/11/2015 
12:49 
U.O 29/11/2015 
03:42 
U.O  
11.4 substandard 
products 
 1 1 04/11/2015 
12:49 
U.O 29/11/2015 
01:41 
U.O  
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Name Memo 
Link 
Sources References Created 
On 
Created 
By 
Modified 
On 
Modified 
By 
 
11.5 Clause 48  2 2 04/11/2015 
12:49 
U.O 27/11/2015 
16:16 
U.O  
11.6 others  2 3 04/11/2015 
12:49 
U.O 27/11/2015 
16:20 
U.O  
12.0 Subcontracting  5 10 04/11/2015 
12:50 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:14 
U.O  
12.1 Joint venture 
and partnership 
 11 18 04/11/2015 
12:50 
U.O 27/11/2015 
23:59 
U.O  
12.1.1 
knowledge 
transfer 
 3 4 04/11/2015 
12:50 
U.O 27/11/2015 
01:05 
U.O  
12.2 Outsourcing  2 3 04/11/2015 
12:50 
U.O 27/11/2015 
20:38 
U.O  
12.3 Standard  2 3 04/11/2015 
12:50 
U.O 26/11/2015 
19:30 
U.O  
13.0 Lessons learnt 
from countries with 
effective policy 
 10 13 04/11/2015 
12:51 
U.O 29/11/2015 
03:46 
U.O  
13.1 Community 
involvement 
 0 0 04/11/2015 
12:54 
U.O 14/11/2015 
14:44 
U.O  
13.1.1 Malaysia  1 1 04/11/2015 
12:55 
U.O 27/11/2015 
17:43 
U.O  
13.1.2 Norway  1 1 04/11/2015 
12:57 
U.O 14/11/2015 
14:45 
U.O  
13.2 Local capacity 
development and 
Logistics 
 3 3 04/11/2015 
12:58 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:40 
U.O  
13.2.1 Brazil  0 0 04/11/2015 
12:59 
U.O 14/11/2015 
14:54 
U.O  
13.2.2 Norway  3 6 04/11/2015 
12:58 
U.O 28/11/2015 
01:21 
U.O  
13.2.3 United 
Kingdom 
 0 0 04/11/2015 
12:59 
U.O 14/11/2015 
14:55 
U.O  
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Name Memo 
Link 
Sources References Created 
On 
Created 
By 
Modified 
On 
Modified 
By 
 
13.2.5 Angola  3 3 04/11/2015 
12:59 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:46 
U.O  
13.3 
Professionalism 
 3 3 04/11/2015 
13:00 
U.O 29/11/2015 
03:18 
U.O  
13.3.1 Malaysia  2 2 04/11/2015 
13:00 
U.O 29/11/2015 
02:54 
U.O  
13.3.2 Trinidad 
and Tobago 
 0 0 04/11/2015 
13:00 
U.O 14/11/2015 
14:59 
U.O  
13.4 Domiciliation  2 2 04/11/2015 
13:01 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:42 
U.O  
13.4.1 Dubai  3 4 04/11/2015 
13:01 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:39 
U.O  
13.4.2 Trinidad 
and Tobago 
 1 1 04/11/2015 
13:01 
U.O 27/11/2015 
17:40 
U.O  
13.4.3 Angola  5 10 04/11/2015 
13:02 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:45 
U.O  
13.4.4 Norway  1 1 04/11/2015 
13:02 
U.O 26/11/2015 
20:27 
U.O  
13.5 Stimulate 
investment 
 0 0 04/11/2015 
13:02 
U.O 14/11/2015 
15:00 
U.O  
13.5.1 Trinidad 
and Tobago 
 1 1 04/11/2015 
13:02 
U.O 27/11/2015 
17:38 
U.O  
13.5.2 Norway  1 1 06/11/2015 
14:50 
U.O 14/11/2015 
15:01 
U.O  
13.5.3 Angola  0 0 04/11/2015 
13:02 
U.O 14/11/2015 
15:00 
U.O  
13.6 Frame 
agreement 
 0 0 04/11/2015 
13:03 
U.O 14/11/2015 
14:50 
U.O  
13.6.1 Trinidad 
and Tobago 
 0 0 04/11/2015 
13:03 
U.O 14/11/2015 
14:51 
U.O  
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Name Memo 
Link 
Sources References Created 
On 
Created 
By 
Modified 
On 
Modified 
By 
 
13.6.2 Angola  0 0 04/11/2015 
13:03 
U.O 14/11/2015 
14:51 
U.O  
13.7 Monitoring  0 0 04/11/2015 
13:03 
U.O 14/11/2015 
14:56 
U.O  
13.7.1 Malaysia  1 1 04/11/2015 
13:03 
U.O 26/11/2015 
16:48 
U.O  
14.0 Barriers to 
successful 
implementation 
 12 24 04/11/2015 
13:04 
U.O 29/11/2015 
03:53 
U.O  
14.1 Lack of 
infrastructure 
 5 6 04/11/2015 
13:05 
U.O 27/11/2015 
21:59 
U.O  
14.2 Lack of power  3 3 04/11/2015 
13:07 
U.O 27/11/2015 
21:59 
U.O  
14.3 Insufficient 
capital 
 7 8 04/11/2015 
13:05 
U.O 27/11/2015 
21:59 
U.O  
14.4 Lack of 
capacity 
 8 12 04/11/2015 
13:06 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:03 
U.O  
14.5 Low oil price  3 4 04/11/2015 
13:05 
U.O 19/11/2015 
14:31 
U.O  
14.6 Ambitious 
policy 
 3 6 04/11/2015 
13:07 
U.O 29/11/2015 
02:34 
U.O  
14.7 Others  5 7 04/11/2015 
13:06 
U.O 27/11/2015 
17:11 
U.O  
2.0 IOC's Role  2 3 04/11/2015 
10:34 
U.O 19/11/2015 
15:56 
U.O  
2.1 Role as middle 
men 
 9 15 04/11/2015 
10:35 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:43 
U.O  
2.2 Partnership and 
collaboration with 
local companies 
 13 27 04/11/2015 
10:35 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:20 
U.O  
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Name Memo 
Link 
Sources References Created 
On 
Created 
By 
Modified 
On 
Modified 
By 
 
2.3 Perception 
about local 
companies 
 4 8 04/11/2015 
10:36 
U.O 26/11/2015 
19:38 
U.O  
2.3.1 locals 
ability to 
withstand 
pressure 
 2 2 04/11/2015 
10:36 
U.O 26/11/2015 
20:19 
U.O  
2.3.2 lack of 
experience 
 5 5 04/11/2015 
10:44 
U.O 27/11/2015 
01:18 
U.O  
2.3.3 opinion on 
local companies' 
performance 
 6 7 04/11/2015 
10:45 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:37 
U.O  
2.3.4 Trust  6 14 04/11/2015 
16:28 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:38 
U.O  
2.4 Training and 
human capital 
development 
 12 20 04/11/2015 
10:46 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:38 
U.O  
2.4.1 Internship  2 2 04/11/2015 
10:46 
U.O 18/11/2015 
14:07 
U.O  
2.4.2 Transfer of 
expertise 
 3 3 04/11/2015 
10:46 
U.O 16/11/2015 
16:21 
U.O  
2.4.3 
Employment and 
training plan 
 1 2 04/11/2015 
10:46 
U.O 26/11/2015 
16:35 
U.O  
3.0 Impact of policy  4 4 04/11/2015 
10:47 
U.O 29/11/2015 
01:36 
U.O  
3.1 Positive impact  1 1 04/11/2015 
10:50 
U.O 27/11/2015 
17:47 
U.O  
3.1.1 Investment  5 5 04/11/2015 
10:50 
U.O 29/11/2015 
02:14 
U.O  
3.1.2 gives local 
companies 
advantage 
 10 18 04/11/2015 
10:50 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:00 
U.O  
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Name Memo 
Link 
Sources References Created 
On 
Created 
By 
Modified 
On 
Modified 
By 
 
3.1.3 
Employment 
 5 5 04/11/2015 
10:50 
U.O 29/11/2015 
01:47 
U.O  
3.1.4 Skills 
acquisition and 
capacity building 
 12 21 04/11/2015 
10:51 
U.O 29/11/2015 
03:59 
U.O  
3.1.5 
Domestication 
 13 16 04/11/2015 
10:51 
U.O 29/11/2015 
03:12 
U.O  
3.1.6 Reduction 
in capital flight 
 5 5 04/11/2015 
10:51 
U.O 29/11/2015 
03:24 
U.O  
3.1.7 
Collaboration 
with other 
sectors 
 0 0 04/11/2015 
10:51 
U.O 10/11/2015 
12:34 
U.O  
3.2 Negative impact  0 0 04/11/2015 
10:52 
U.O 10/11/2015 
12:33 
U.O  
3.2.1 Enforcing 
the law 
irrespective of 
the capacity 
 5 9 04/11/2015 
10:53 
U.O 29/11/2015 
02:34 
U.O  
3.2.2 Increase in 
cost 
 0 0 04/11/2015 
10:53 
U.O 10/11/2015 
12:34 
U.O  
3.2.3 Inefficiency 
in the industry 
 1 1 04/11/2015 
10:53 
U.O 29/11/2015 
01:42 
U.O  
4.0 Strategies to 
improve policy 
 3 3 04/11/2015 
12:22 
U.O 27/11/2015 
17:33 
U.O  
4.1 Enforcement  11 34 04/11/2015 
12:22 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:44 
U.O  
4.1.1 Sanction  1 2 04/11/2015 
12:24 
U.O 14/11/2015 
15:24 
U.O  
4.11 Infrastructural 
improvement 
 3 3 04/11/2015 
12:26 
U.O 28/11/2015 
00:54 
U.O  
4.12 Transparency  6 8 04/11/2015 
12:26 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:41 
U.O  
4.13 Domiciliation  4 10 04/11/2015 
12:26 
U.O 29/11/2015 
03:46 
U.O  
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4.14 Nigerians in 
Diaspora 
 1 2 04/11/2015 
12:26 
U.O 26/11/2015 
16:41 
U.O  
4.15 Petroleum 
Industry Bill 
 6 11 04/11/2015 
12:27 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:47 
U.O  
4.2 Enabling 
environment 
 6 9 04/11/2015 
12:23 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:46 
U.O  
4.2.1 security  0 0 04/11/2015 
12:23 
U.O 14/11/2015 
15:23 
U.O  
4.4 Stakeholders 
involvement 
 7 13 04/11/2015 
12:24 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:40 
U.O  
4.5 Manpower  2 3 04/11/2015 
12:24 
U.O 28/11/2015 
01:20 
U.O  
4.6 Access to funds  2 3 04/11/2015 
12:24 
U.O 16/11/2015 
14:38 
U.O  
4.6.1 
Management of 
funds 
 4 4 04/11/2015 
12:25 
U.O 28/11/2015 
00:27 
U.O  
4.6 Capacity 
building 
 6 8 04/11/2015 
12:25 
U.O 29/11/2015 
03:19 
U.O  
4.8 Incentives  4 4 04/11/2015 
12:25 
U.O 27/11/2015 
17:36 
U.O  
4.9 Empowerment  5 5 04/11/2015 
12:25 
U.O 29/11/2015 
03:40 
U.O  
5.0 Resources 
available for 
implementing the 
policy 
 2 2 04/11/2015 
12:27 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:15 
U.O  
5.1 Training  10 20 04/11/2015 
12:35 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:17 
U.O  
5.2 Access to funds  8 9 04/11/2015 
12:35 
U.O 28/11/2015 
00:26 
U.O  
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5.3 Lack of 
infrastructure 
 5 5 04/11/2015 
12:36 
U.O 29/11/2015 
03:54 
U.O  
5.3.1 insufficient 
power supply 
 0 0 04/11/2015 
12:36 
U.O 14/11/2015 
15:34 
U.O  
5.3.2 
acceptability of 
local products 
 0 0 04/11/2015 
12:37 
U.O 14/11/2015 
15:33 
U.O  
5.4 Government 
support (security) 
 1 1 04/11/2015 
12:37 
U.O 14/11/2015 
15:32 
U.O  
6.0 Employability  6 9 04/11/2015 
12:38 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:11 
U.O  
6.1 Partnership and 
collaboration 
 8 10 04/11/2015 
12:38 
U.O 29/11/2015 
03:22 
U.O  
6.1.1 Succession 
plan 
 5 5 04/11/2015 
12:38 
U.O 29/11/2015 
03:28 
U.O  
6.2 Skill 
development 
 2 2 04/11/2015 
12:38 
U.O 26/11/2015 
17:56 
U.O  
6.3 Reduction in 
foreign workforce 
 16 26 04/11/2015 
12:39 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:10 
U.O  
6.3.1 Reduction 
in expatriates 
doing menial 
jobs 
 3 5 04/11/2015 
12:39 
U.O 27/11/2015 
20:37 
U.O  
6.4 Expatriate 
quota system 
 5 5 04/11/2015 
12:39 
U.O 29/11/2015 
01:52 
U.O  
6.5 Preference to 
Nigerian manpower 
 9 27 04/11/2015 
12:40 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:09 
U.O  
6.6 Trust  1 1 04/11/2015 
12:40 
U.O 10/11/2015 
12:18 
U.O  
6.7 Others  1 1 04/11/2015 
13:46 
U.O 10/11/2015 
12:18 
U.O  
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7.0 Procedures for 
ensuring transparency 
 3 4 04/11/2015 
12:40 
U.O 29/11/2015 
03:37 
U.O  
7.1 Monitoring  15 33 04/11/2015 
12:41 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:27 
U.O  
7.1.1 Monitoring 
and evaluation 
system 
 12 22 04/11/2015 
12:41 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:30 
U.O  
7.1.2 
measurement 
 6 8 04/11/2015 
12:41 
U.O 29/11/2015 
03:14 
U.O  
7.1.3 Shortcut to 
implement policy 
 1 2 04/11/2015 
12:42 
U.O 14/11/2015 
15:15 
U.O  
7.2 Disclosure  5 13 04/11/2015 
12:42 
U.O 28/11/2015 
00:07 
U.O  
7.3 Stakeholders 
involvement 
 1 2 04/11/2015 
12:42 
U.O 27/11/2015 
23:58 
U.O  
7.4 Enforcement  11 21 04/11/2015 
12:43 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:28 
U.O  
7.4.1 submitting 
reports 
 10 16 04/11/2015 
12:43 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:30 
U.O  
7.4.2 reports not 
time bound 
 1 1 04/11/2015 
12:43 
U.O 18/11/2015 
14:12 
U.O  
7.4.3 local 
content plan 
 1 1 04/11/2015 
12:43 
U.O 26/11/2015 
18:47 
U.O  
7.5 Embedded in 
contracts and 
company policy 
 9 18 04/11/2015 
12:44 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:26 
U.O  
7.6 Compliance  8 17 04/11/2015 
12:44 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:31 
U.O  
8.0 Level of 
transparency 
 1 1 04/11/2015 
12:45 
U.O 16/11/2015 
21:58 
U.O  
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8.1 Lots of work to 
be done 
 12 31 04/11/2015 
12:45 
U.O 29/11/2015 
03:43 
U.O  
8.2 MNC do better 
jobs 
 2 2 04/11/2015 
12:45 
U.O 14/11/2015 
15:09 
U.O  
8.3 Relative  7 7 04/11/2015 
12:45 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:25 
U.O  
8.4 Implementation 
phase 
 1 1 04/11/2015 
12:46 
U.O 26/11/2015 
20:08 
U.O  
8.5 100%% 
transparent 
 2 2 04/11/2015 
12:46 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:21 
U.O  
8.6 Sceptical  3 4 04/11/2015 
12:46 
U.O 27/11/2015 
17:20 
U.O  
8.7 Others  3 4 16/11/2015 
20:13 
U.O 29/11/2015 
02:47 
U.O  
9.0 Agencies 
responsible for policy 
 17 36 04/11/2015 
12:46 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:26 
U.O  
9.1 Too many 
regulatory bodies 
 1 1 04/11/2015 
12:48 
U.O 26/11/2015 
18:33 
U.O  
9.2 Lack 
coordination 
 5 13 04/11/2015 
12:47 
U.O 29/11/2015 
02:57 
U.O  
9.3 Manpower  3 5 04/11/2015 
12:47 
U.O 29/11/2015 
03:15 
U.O  
9.4 No qualification  1 1 04/11/2015 
12:47 
U.O 29/11/2015 
04:47 
U.O  
 
 
 
 
 
